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ABSTRACT 
 
This study aims to further a feminist political economy of urban welfare regimes, 
applying a gender lens to processes of urban neoliberalization and an urban lens to 
feminist political economy analyses of welfare state restructuring and resistance. In New 
York City, neoliberal welfare reform dramatically increased need and demand for child 
care, escalating the city’s child care crisis. As thousands of poor single mothers were 
pushed into workfare jobs and the lower reaches of the labour market, the question of 
“Who will care for their children?” was thrust to the forefront of New York politics. In 
response to the crisis, the administration of Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani channelled 
welfare mothers into relying on precarious, home-based child care providers for the care 
of their children, despite federal and state regulations guaranteeing “parent choice” in the 
use of child care subsidies. This strategy can be understood as one of privatization, as the 
city delivered child care services “on the cheap” by downloading costs of and 
responsibilities for caregiving onto low-income families/households and communities, 
and especially the women within them. While occurring against the backdrop of federal 
welfare reform, the city’s response to the crisis is best understood in the context of a 
broader project of urban neoliberalization designed to roll back the institutional legacies 
of New York’s postwar welfare regime, including a public centre-based child care system 
staffed by a unionized workforce. Yet, paradoxically, the city’s strategy to mediate the 
crisis produced openings for progressive civil society actors to contest the grounds of 
mediation and push the state to socialize costs of and responsibilities for child care. The 
most important outcome of this contestation was the unionization of home child care 
workers and their emergence as a powerful political force in the wake of welfare reform. 
Overall, this case study demonstrates that under neoliberalism, urban welfare regimes are 
central sites of contested, state-driven efforts to mediate crisis tendencies in social 
reproduction. Privatized remedies aimed at mediation can unleash contradictions, 
creating openings for resistance and a more progressive reorganization of the work of 
social reproduction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
WELFARE REFORM AND THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CHILD CARE 
WORK IN NEW YORK CITY 
 
 
The new social contract with welfare recipients will require many more mothers to take jobs. But who will 
care for their children while they work? – Editorial, New York Times, October 21st 1996 
 
One of the greatest things I have done in New York City, and one of the things I will be remembered for 
years from now, is workfare—putting people back to work! It is probably one of the best things I have 
done. When students read history books twenty years from now they are going to see that I took a city of 
dependency and made it into a city of workers! – Rudolph Giuliani, Mayor of New York City, 1994-2001  
 
A malignant combination of machine politics, bankrupt welfare statism, and rapacious unionism is 
contributing to the slow-motion suicide of the world’s once greatest city. – Republican politician Newt 
Gingrich commenting on New York City, 1992  
 
 
Tasha was a 25 year-old resident of Brooklyn, New York, and lone-parent of a 15 month-
old baby.1 Since the birth of her child, she had been receiving cash assistance under the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF), better known as “welfare”. 
In November of 1998, Tasha received a letter from New York City’s Human Resources 
Administration (HRA) advising her to report to a designated welfare office for a workfare 
assignment. Like thousands of other welfare recipients in New York, Tasha was to work 
for the city—cleaning parks, filing documents, or sweeping trash in a housing project—in 
return for her welfare cheque.  
 
The letter advised Tasha to make child care arrangements for the day of her appointment, 
and if necessary, for the period of her work activity. While informed that she was to 
receive a government-issued voucher to pay for the services of a child care provider of 
her choice, the letter offered no further child care information or advice.  
 
Tasha spent the weeks leading up to her appointment in a desperate search for child care. 
None of her neighbourhood’s daycare programs had openings; in fact, all had lengthy 
                                                
1 The story of Tasha and Maria is based on field interviews conducted with welfare 
recipients and child care providers in New York City and also informed by the secondary 
welfare reform and child care in New York, namely Chaudry (2004).  
2 Unless otherwise specified, “New York” refers to the City of New York. 
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waiting lists. Tasha called daycare centres located in other parts of the city—some as far 
away as an hour’s bus ride—only to get the same results. Seeing that she was down on 
her luck, Tasha’s neighbour, Maria, offered to watch the baby on the day of her 
appointment.  
 
At the appointment, a welfare caseworker informed Tasha that she had been assigned to 
work twenty hours a week in the city’s Department of Parks and Recreation; she was to 
comply with this assignment in order to continue receiving cash assistance. After filling 
out a stack of forms, the caseworker asked Tasha if she had made child care 
arrangements. Tasha described how difficult it had been to find an opening at a daycare 
centre. Shaking her head, the caseworker told Tasha that she had two weeks to secure 
child care and report to her work assignment or risked having her benefits reduced. She 
urged Tasha to ask a friend, relative, or neighbour to watch the baby, “someone who 
might need the money.” Tasha immediately thought of Maria and hoped that she would 
be willing to provide child care on a more permanent basis.  
 
To Tasha’s relief, Maria agreed. Maria was already looking after two children whose 
mother was on welfare and who, like Tasha, had been called into the city’s workfare 
program. In the recession of the early 1990s, Maria lost her job as a bookkeeper and 
exhausted her unemployment insurance looking for work. When she went to apply for 
welfare, a caseworker helped the forty year-old mother of two teenage boys set up a 
home daycare. Maria had since earned a living caring for the children of low-income 
families in her neighbourhood.  
 
Maria was just one of 28,000 home child care providers contracted with the City of New 
York to care for 85,000 of the city’s poorest children. Paid through subsidies from the 
state, Maria provided the children in her care with meals and snacks, helped them with 
reading and numbers, and directed safe play. Despite the value of her work, Maria did not 
have a pension or health insurance, nor did she have paid vacation or sick leave. And 
unlike the 6,000 child care workers employed in 300 daycare centres funded and 
overseen by the city, Maria was not unionized. As a home-based child care provider, she 
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was classified as an independent contractor under state law and excluded from basic 
labour and employment protections.  
 
While Maria took great pride in her job, she was among the lowest-paid workers in New 
York.2 The previous year, she had grossed $19,000, leaving her family of three just above 
the poverty line.3 Delayed payments from the city’s welfare administration played havoc 
with her ability to pay the rent on time. Sometimes Maria paid for toys, books, and other 
supplies out of her own pocket, knowing the mothers of the children in her care could not 
afford them; but then again, neither could she.  
 
Child Care On the Cheap 
 
This dissertation is about the policies and politics that shape the intertwined fates of 
women like Tasha and Maria. In New York City, welfare reform saw thousands of poor 
single mothers transition from welfare into workfare jobs and the lower reaches of the 
labour market, escalating the city’s already existing child care crisis. As welfare mothers 
entered the largest workfare program in the nation or left public assistance altogether, the 
question of “who will care for their children?” was thrust to the forefront of New York 
City politics (see “Workfare’s Missing Link”, 1996). New York confronted what Peck 
(2001: 251) has called a “classic neoliberal dilemma over welfare-to-work”: its failure to 
adequately fund child care threatened to undermine the very transitions into work it 
sought to encourage. 
 
I employ a feminist political economy (FPE) lens to explore neoliberal restructuring and 
resistance at the intersection of welfare reform and child care. In particular, I examine the 
contested nature of state-driven efforts to mediate escalating crisis tendencies in social 
reproduction, as expressed in New York City’s child care crisis. In response to the crisis, 
the administration of Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani pursued overlapping and mutually 
                                                
2 Unless otherwise specified, “New York” refers to the City of New York. 
3 As of 2005, this was the average annual yearly income of a home child care provider in 
New York City (United Federation of Teachers 2005). 
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reinforcing strategies of privatization aimed at mediating the crisis by downloading costs 
of and responsibilities for caregiving onto low-income families/households and 
communities, and especially the women within them. Yet, paradoxically, these strategies 
opened space for resistance by welfare rights groups, community organizations, child 
care advocates, activist mothers, and labour unions. This study suggests that under 
neoliberalism, urban welfare regimes are central sites of contested, state-driven efforts to 
mediate crisis tendencies in social reproduction. Following Vosko (2006), I argue that 
privatized remedies aimed at mediation can unleash contradictions, creating openings for 
resistance and a more progressive reorganization of the work of social reproduction. 
 
Upon election to the mayor’s office in 1994, Rudy Giuliani pursued an aggressive agenda 
of privatization, deregulation, and retrenchment, designed to reduce the size and scope of 
local government, restructure public services along neoliberal lines, and curtail the power 
of municipal unions (see Weikart 2001; Moody 2007; O’Connor 2008;). At the 
intersection of welfare reform and child care, this agenda played out in multiple ways. In 
the name of expanding “parent choice”, the Giuliani administration marketized public 
child care services through the enlargement of what was previously a small voucher 
scheme. The expansion of this scheme allowed an increasing number of low-income 
parents to use child care subsidies to purchase care in the private child care market, 
including from informal, i.e. unregulated, home-based child care providers.   
 
At the same time, the administration shuttered a number of unionized city-run daycare 
centres, reducing the supply of affordable, quality child care in some of New York’s 
highest needs neighbourhoods and laying off municipal daycare workers. When the 
federal welfare reform act of 1996 heightened the city’s child care crisis, New York’s 
welfare bureaucracy pressured poor mothers into relying on an expanding pool of 
precarious home child care providers for the care for their children. In the process, the 
city systematically violated welfare recipients’ legislated child care rights, including their 
right to choose regulated child care arrangements and their right to be excused from 
workfare without penalty if they failed to find adequate care.    
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For the Giuliani administration, home child care was the fastest and most cost effective 
route to moving poor mothers off the welfare rolls. Home child care was non-union, cost 
substantially less than regulated care, and was subject to minimal government oversight. 
Prior to welfare reform, only a small number of home child care providers had been paid 
through state subsidies to care for the children of families on public assistance. In the 
wake of welfare reform, the ranks of these providers expanded dramatically as they 
emerged as a vital workforce in the city’s neoliberalizing welfare state. Performing public 
care work in private homes, excluded from key employment protections and labour 
rights, and without a union to advance their collective interests, women like Maria 
delivered a much-needed service “on the cheap”. It was on the backs of home child care 
workers’ labour that the City of New York could call welfare reform a “success”.  
 
Despite increases in federal child care funding, in the decade following welfare reform 
there was little to no growth in the unionized, public centre-based child care system that 
had made New York an outlier amongst municipal child care regimes in the United 
States. The Giuliani administration failed to finance the expansion of this system leaving 
social reproduction to individual (subsidized) “choice” in a mostly private child care 
market of home child care providers who more often than not shared the same social and 
geographic location—i.e. poor women of colour in the city’s low-income 
neighbourhoods—as the mothers they served.  
 
Although in the wake of welfare reform the growth of state-subsidized home child care 
was not peculiar to New York, I situate these developments within the context of the 
city’s historical and contemporary political economy.4 While occurring against the 
backdrop of federal welfare reform, the Giuliani administration’s response to the child 
care crisis is best understood as part of a broader project of urban neoliberalization, 
which targeted the institutional legacies of New York’s postwar welfare regime—what 
                                                
4 In the years following welfare reform, publicly subsidized home child care expanded 
across the US (see Whitebook 2001). Home-based family child care became the fastest-
growing segment of the child care industry and represents the most frequently used ‘out 
of home’ care. Smith (2007: 326) cites welfare reform as “the most critical force fuelling 
family child care’s growth.” See also Reese (2010, 2011). 
 
 
6 
Freeman (2000) has called its “urban social democracy”—including the city’s public 
centre-based child care system and its unionized workforce. Neoliberal policymakers, 
think tanks, and economic elites had long argued that the size and scope of local 
government in New York—especially the degree to which the city underwrote social 
reproduction through an extensive municipal welfare state—fostered “dependency” 
amongst the poor, was a drag on economic competitiveness, and was detrimental to the 
city’s long-term fiscal health (see Brash 2011; Tabb 1982).  
 
Furthermore, as an influential actor in municipal politics—with a vested interest in strong 
public services—the city’s public sector unions were viewed as an obstacle to the 
restructuring of local government. Since the late 1980s, New York City had pioneered 
new ways to get public service work done cheaply, such as widespread contracting, 
workfare, and volunteering, as well as by shifting services to unpaid work in families and 
communities (see Krinsky 2011: 383). For proponents of neoliberalism, these 
privatization efforts had not gone far enough. As the Republican politician, Newt 
Gingrich said of New York in 1992, “bankrupt welfare statism and rapacious unionism 
has caused a systemic crisis that requires radical, even revolutionary, change” (Gingrich 
1992). Rudy Giuliani promised to bring about such change. His administration’s policies 
at the intersection of welfare reform and child care were part of a broader neoliberal 
project, which reflected the longstanding desires of neoliberal ideologues, conservative 
politicians, and New York’s corporate elite.  
 
In foregrounding the historical and place-specific context of neoliberal restructuring in 
New York, I take seriously Brenner and Theodore’s (2002, 2003) call for a context-
sensitive understanding of neoliberalization. Brenner and Theodore argue that neoliberal 
projects are “contextually embedded” insofar as they are produced within contextually 
specific political-economic landscapes defined by legacies of inherited institutional 
frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political and social struggles. As 
neoliberalism develops in constant tension with inherited institutional legacies and 
existing social-political constellations of power in particular locales, “actually existing 
neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore 2002) is necessarily path-dependent, uneven and 
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variegated across different locales (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010). Likewise, the 
resistance neoliberalism engender is also shaped by context. As Krinsky (2006: 159) 
observes, wherever neoliberal restructuring is tried, it generates “specific sorts of 
opposition depending upon the existing configuration of, and division of labour in, the 
state and civil society groups in political-economic space.” In other words, resistance to 
neoliberalism is contingent on place and pre-existing and locally variable capacities for 
resistance (Peck 2001). 
 
While the Giuliani administration attempted to mediate the child care crisis through 
strategies of privatization, it faced very “specific sorts of opposition”. Resistance to the 
administration’s policies drew on a rich history of popular struggles over social 
reproduction and more specifically, the social organization of care work in New York; 
struggles that shaped the city’s postwar welfare regime and in which poor and working 
class women’s activism was central. As the city attempted to deliver child care services 
“on the cheap”, welfare rights organizations, legal aid lawyers, child care advocates, low-
income community groups, activist mothers, and labour unions, mobilized to demand the 
state socialize costs of and responsibilities for child care.  
 
These efforts culminated in community- and union-led campaigns to organize the home 
child care workforce. By channelling state subsidies to the least regulated, least-trained, 
and worst paid sectors of the child care industry—i.e. home child care—the Giuliani 
administration expanded the ranks of a precarious, but publicly funded workforce. Many 
previously “private-pay” home child care providers now received state subsidies for the 
care of children of low-income families. This quasi-public status opened the legal and 
discursive space to organize a union and make claims on the state as public employees 
providing an essential social service. In the decade following welfare reform, home child 
care workers emerged as a powerful political force in New York, contesting the city’s 
child care policies, winning improvements in wages and working conditions, and 
successfully demanding increased funding for child care overall.  
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In short, progressive civil society actors sought to mediate the child care crisis on terms 
more favourable to welfare mothers and the women who cared for their children, directly 
challenging the neoliberal logic of “child care on the cheap”. Their success suggests that 
privatized remedies aimed at mediating crisis tendencies in social reproduction can be 
paradoxical, unleashing contradictions and opening space for resistance and a more 
equitable distribution of the costs of and responsibilities for social reproduction. Even in 
the age of the “neoliberal city”—in which privatization, deregulation, and welfare state 
retrenchment appear hegemonic processes—marginalized communities, precarious 
workers, and their allies, maintain the capacity to shape welfare regimes from below.    
 
The Urban Welfare Regime: Towards a Feminist Political Economy  
 
This study takes the “urban” as its scale of analysis. Since the neoliberal turn of the 1970s 
“cities have become strategically crucial geographical arenas … in which a variety of 
neoliberal initiatives have been articulated” (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 349). Despite a 
growing literature on the importance of cities as sites of neoliberal policy 
experimentation, state reorganization, and contestation (see Brenner and Theodore 2002, 
2003; Leitner, Peck, and Sheppard 2007; Peck and Tickell 2002), FPE and feminist 
welfare state scholarship have tended to neglect the “urban” as a scale of analysis.5 On 
the other hand, critical approaches to urban neoliberalism often fail to address questions 
of social reproduction and the shifting relationship between states, markets, and 
families/households (see Mahon 2005).  
 
As a corrective, I situate my contributions within the feminist political economy (FPE) 
tradition—with its concern for the interrelationships among gender, race, and class as 
                                                
5 For example, research employing an urban lens does not feature in three of the most 
recent collections of feminist political economy scholarship, Bezanson and Luxton 
(2006), Braedley and Luxton (2010), and Rai and Waylen (2014). And while there is 
renewed feminist engagement with the city (see Peake and Rieker 2013), little of this 
work employs a materialist/political economy perspective. And feminist scholarship on 
the welfare state—of the historical-institutionalist variety—has overwhelmingly reflected 
the “methodological nationalism” of the mainstream scholarship with which it is in 
dialogue (Mahon 2010). 
 
 
9 
they are shaped by households, communities, markets, and states, and women’s activism 
(Luxton 2006)—to advance a feminist political economy of urban welfare regimes, 
applying a social reproduction lens to processes of urban neoliberalization and an urban 
lens to FPE analyses of welfare state restructuring and resistance.  
 
Feminist political economists understand welfare regimes as complex webs of forces “in 
which the relationship between numerous variables—labour markets, unpaid work in the 
home, family structures, race and ethnicity, political struggles, state policies—can be 
considered as part of a dynamic whole in which the process of interaction and change is 
critical” (Porter 2003: 29). Of central importance within this ensemble is the relationship 
between production and social reproduction, particularly as it is manifested through the 
nexus between the family/household, the market, the state, and the third (not-for-profit) 
sector.  
 
“Social reproduction” refers to the social processes and labour that goes into the daily and 
generational maintenance of the working population, and is intimately tied to gender 
relations  (Fudge and Vosko 2003: 185). It encompasses the work involved in biological 
reproduction, the reproduction of human labour, including education and training, and the 
reproduction of provisioning and care needs (Luxton 2014). Social reproduction occurs at 
the level of the household through unpaid care work, performed primarily by women, and 
at the level of the state through social transfers such as education and health care (Vosko 
2006). When organized in the market, the work of social reproduction typically entails 
low-wage service-sector jobs disproportionately occupied by immigrant women and 
women of colour (Luxton 2014: 155).  
 
The concept of social reproduction provides a basis for understanding how the state, the 
market, and the family/household, “interact and balance power so that the work involved 
in the daily and generational production and maintenance of people is completed” 
(Bezanson and Luxton 2006: 3). As feminist political economists have argued, social 
reproduction and capital accumulation are fundamentally in tension and often in 
contradiction with one another, expressed in the conflict between the standard of living of 
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workers and the profit imperative (see Picchio 1992; Cameron 2006). The relationship 
between social reproduction and capital accumulation must therefore be mediated and 
stabilized by the social institutions of the state, the market, families/households, and 
potentially, the third sector (Picchio 1992; Bezanson 2006)  
 
As Vosko (2006: 147-148) has argued, “The state’s role is particularly crucial in 
mediating this contradiction or, put differently, limiting persistent crisis tendencies in 
social reproduction.” Yet state-driven efforts at mediating crisis tendencies are inherently 
neither regressive nor progressive, but shaped by politics, ideology, and the orientation of 
particular governments. As fundamentally political in nature, these interventions can be 
partial, inadequate, and even paradoxical, giving rise to contradictions and opening space 
for social movements to contest the terms of mediation (see Vosko 2006; Martin 2010). 
Depending on the balance of social forces in a given social formation, and the political 
opportunity structures they face, social movements may mobilize around alternative 
political projects designed to mediate crisis tendencies and secure a viable process of 
social reproduction on very different grounds than the state.  
 
In this study, I demonstrate that cities are key sites of struggles over social reproduction 
and contested state-driven efforts at mediating its crisis tendencies. Urban struggles over 
social reproduction were central in the development of postwar welfare regimes as 
national governments intervened in social reproduction—in various degrees—through the 
creation and expansion of national welfare states. In this way, the national state took on 
some of the costs of and responsibilities for social reproduction previously borne by 
subnational governments and private institutions (namely the family, churches, and 
charities). Yet since the late 1970s, postwar welfare regimes have been restructured and 
rescaled (see Mahon 2005, 2010). Responsibilities for key aspects of social reproduction 
have been downloaded to subnational governments—including to cities—and offloaded 
via processes of privatization to families/households, to markets, and to the third sector. 
 
The relationship between state rescaling and greater privatization of social reproduction 
is perhaps most evident in liberal welfare regimes. As social policy shifts from an 
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emphasis on needs-based entitlements to labour market “activation”, and as 
responsibilities for program standards and social welfare provision are devolved to 
subnational governments, cities have become important sites of neoliberal interventions 
in the “social” (see Peck 2001). As the national state retreats from its role in key areas of 
social provisioning, the salience of the urban welfare regime as a site of struggle over 
social reproduction and contested state efforts at mediating crisis tendencies must be 
accounted for.  
 
Rescaling, restructuring, and the urban welfare regime 
The urban welfare regime was an important component in the scalar architecture of 
national welfare states under Fordist-Keynesianism, acting as a local relay for national 
Keynesian welfare policies and provider of services, benefits, and facilities to urban 
populations (Harvey 1989). National governments allocated resources to local 
governments on the basis of need, social entitlements, and automatic stabilizers, ensuring 
that localities had sufficient revenue to cover the costs that local need generated (Peck 
and Tickell 2002: 395). Under neoliberalism, earlier systems of national state support for 
municipalities have been retrenched and policy responsibilities devolved. Lacking the 
resources to meet new demands, cities are forced to decide whether to finance social 
infrastructure through the local tax base, redeploy programs and services in more “cost-
efficient” ways, or effectively abandon the urban role in “the social” altogether 
(Hackworth 2007: 12).  
 
In liberal welfare regimes, urban governments have generally responded to downloading 
by offloading costs of and responsibilities for social reproduction onto 
families/households, the market, and/or the third sector (Mahon 2005). Thus, the 
reconfiguration of responsibility for individual welfare from a matter of social or public 
obligation, to one increasingly regarded as a private individual or, at most, a family or 
charitable matter, has partly been achieved through processes of state rescaling (Fudge 
and Cossman 2002; Mahon 2005). At the urban scale, this reconfiguration has figured in 
the broader restructuring of local government and municipal services since the 1970s as 
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privatization, deregulation, and market-based solutions to problems of urban governance 
gain ascendancy under neoliberalism (see Katz 2013). 
 
While the state has rolled back supports for social reproduction, the “urban” has been an 
important site for the rollout of neoliberal interventions in the “social” (see Wacquant 
2009a). In the North American context, cities are key sites of workfare initiatives aimed 
at disciplining welfare recipients—including lone mothers—into the lower reaches of the 
labour market, individualizing responsibility for social reproduction, diverting poor 
women’s labour from family care, and increasing their reliance on the low-wage, 
precarious jobs abundant in urban labour markets (see Ehrenreich and Piven 2006). 
While poor and working class families struggle to make ends meet in the absence of 
decent work and in the context of limited state supports for social reproduction, crisis 
tendencies in social reproduction have escalated. And while crisis tendencies can be seen 
in a host of social processes (Bezanson 2006: 34), they take one expression in a crisis 
around care (see Vosko 2006).  
 
The care crisis has been particularly acute in urban regions; for as Mahon (2009: 210) 
observes, “the impact of post industrialism on labour markets, and, thus, the intensity and 
extent to which the need for non-parental child care is experienced, are likely to be 
greatest in major urban areas.” The increase in full-time employment for women, and 
social changes such as smaller family sizes and geographic mobility, are reducing the 
number and availability of family members who can provide unpaid care work in urban 
regions (Glenn 2010: 152). Furthermore, in the US context, low-income households have 
been disproportionately concentrated in cities since the 1960s (see Wilson 1997). As this 
study illustrates, aggressive welfare-to-work initiatives that push poor single mothers into 
the lower reaches of urban labour markets have escalated the care crisis in big cities 
especially (see also Peck 2001; Reese 2011).  
How states respond to the care crisis fundamentally shapes the social organization of care 
work i.e. the location of care work, the conditions of those who provide it, and the value 
accorded this work (Glenn 2010: 5-6). In liberal welfare regimes, in which social 
supports are limited and means-tested and care is largely seen as the private responsibility 
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of families, policy responses have been partial and inadequate. Whereas women in 
middle class households can offload their own care work onto low-waged, precarious 
workers (typically racialized and/or immigrant women), women in poor and working-
class urban households cope by intensifying their unpaid care work in the home and/or 
through increased reliance on extended kinship networks and community to take up the 
social reproductive slack (see Glenn 2010).  
Contextual embeddedness   
While my focus above is on liberal welfare regimes generally, these processes have also 
been geographically variable within particular welfare states. In the US context, variation 
at the subnational scale was a feature of the postwar welfare state, although national 
funding and rule regimes provided a degree of uniformity in the organization and quality 
of social entitlements (see Katz 1986). Yet in an era of welfare state rescaling and 
restructuring, variation at subnational scales has intensified  (see Soss et al. 2011). 
Neoliberal welfare reform has involved the devolution of policymaking and 
administrative oversight from the federal government to state and local governments and 
to some extent, to the private and third sectors. For this reason, work requirements and 
the provision of employment supports such as child care display variation from state to 
state, and in some cases locality to locality (see Glenn 2010: 161).  
 
While not losing sight of the “national”—as what happens in cities is governed by 
processes that combine dynamics at different scales of socio-spatial activity (Boudreau, 
Young, and Keil 2009: 20)—given this broader context, the urban scale warrants 
increased scholarly attention in the study of welfare state restructuring and resistance (see 
Mahon and Macdonald 2010). As Mahon (2001: 30) argues, to neglect the local/urban 
dimensions of welfare regimes in the contemporary period is to miss crucial aspects of 
the neoliberal restructuring process and its contestation by social movements. With these 
arguments in mind, the theoretical framework employed in this study takes into 
consideration the contextual embeddedness—or place-specific context—of neoliberal 
projects and the resistance they engender. I now turn to illuminate the national and local 
contexts for this study.  
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Context and Settings  
 
The National Context: Welfare Reform and Child Care 
 
In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), replacing the sixty-year old Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children program (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF). PRWORA marked the end of welfare as a federal entitlement, limited welfare 
benefits to two years consecutively or five years over a recipient’s lifetime, and made 
benefits contingent on efforts to get paid work (Mink 1998). Furthermore, welfare reform 
shifted provision away from cash assistance and toward a litany of work-support services, 
central among which are child care subsidies (Houser et al. 2014). 
The stated goals of PRWORA were: to reduce the dependence of low-income families on 
government aid; to promote employment, self-sufficiency, and marriage; and reduce out-
of-wedlock births among low-income single mothers—who make up approximately 90 
percent of adult TANF recipients (Mink 1998).6 Under TANF, most states have adopted 
welfare-to-work programs, or “workfare”, based on a ‘work first’ philosophy designed to 
push welfare recipients to take the first job offered and which limit access to training and 
educational opportunities. This approach is designed to enforce work while residualizing 
welfare (Peck 2001: 10).  
While welfare reform abrogated the right of poor mothers to care for their own children, 
PRWORA did give some recognition to the work of child care. Under TANF, providing 
child care to enable another welfare recipient to participate in a community services 
program counts as a “work activity”. And there is evidence to suggest that local welfare 
bureaucracies have encouraged welfare mothers to pursue child care as a career (see 
                                                
6 The legislation set work participation rates (WPR) for states, starting at 25 percent in 
1998 and rising to 50 percent by 2002. The WPR is defined as the degree to which TANF 
families are engaged in work activities that lead to self-sufficiency (Soss et al. 2011). A 
family “counts” toward the WPR if an adult or minor head of household engaged in a 
qualified work activity for a minimum of 30 hours a week, or 20 hours a week if the 
family includes a child under age 6.  
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Smith 2007). In addition, policymakers recognized that legislation which firmly recasts 
poor mothers as employable would dramatically escalate the need and demand for non-
parental child care (Michel 1999). To this end, under its accompanying child care bill, the 
Child Care Development Block Grant (CCDBG), the federal government tripled 
expenditures on child care and permitted states to allocate a portion of their TANF funds 
towards child care assistance programs.7  
Yet despite the increase in federal child care spending, funding levels have never been 
adequate to cover all subsidy eligible families (Adams and Rohacek 2002). In order to 
meet federally mandated work participation rates, states have targeted child care 
assistance to families currently in receipt of welfare in order to facilitate their transition 
into welfare-to-work programs and the labour market. Furthermore, reflecting the 
devolved nature of poverty governance under TANF, access to and eligibility for 
subsidized child care varies by state, and within states, by city/county (Levy and Michel 
2002).  
For families that do gain access to subsidies, under federal regulations state-level social 
service agencies must allow parents to choose any legal child care provider that accepts 
state-issued subsidies or vouchers.8 In most states, acceptable providers include licensed, 
i.e. regulated, child care centres and home-based family daycares, but also license-
exempt informal care, often provided by kith and kin and colloquially known as “family, 
friend, or neighbour care”. However, welfare recipients’ child care choices are severely 
constrained by the availability, accessibility, and affordability of various child care 
arrangements, the existence of numerous bureaucratic impediments, and a lack of access 
to information regarding their legislated child care rights, options, and the quality of care 
                                                
7 While TANF recipients are eligible for child care assistance under federal law, they are 
not entitled under state regulations (Levy and Michel 2002: 246). However, 35 states 
currently provide a child care guarantee for TANF families, while 27 states continue to 
guarantee child care for families leaving TANF for up to one year (Adams and Rohacek 
2002). 
8 The concept of  “parent choice” has been a feature of the federal and state child care 
subsidy system since 1988 (Adams and Rohacek 2002: 4) 
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offered by various providers—all of which are shaped by state and local policies (Houser 
et al. 2014).9  
 
Despite impediments to access and low subsidy take-up rates, welfare reform has driven 
massive growth in publicly subsidized home child care (see Adams, Volker, and Reese 
2006). In the wake of welfare reform, policymakers promoted home-based child care as a 
cost-effective way to rapidly expand the supply of child care services in low-income 
communities, meeting rising demand while having the spin-off effect of creating 
employment opportunities for poor women (Reese 2011). As Whitebook (2001: 45) has 
found, as voucher payments have increased as a proportion of public child care funding 
under TANF, “the lion’s share of public resources have flowed increasingly to the least-
trained and worst-paid sectors of the industry” i.e. informal home child care providers 
and family daycare providers.  
 
Home child care providers—overwhelmingly women and disproportionately women of 
colour—face low-incomes, no benefits, and often delays in reimbursement payments 
from local welfare bureaucracies (Tuominen 2003). State reimbursement levels are set at 
rates so low that many home child care providers do not earn enough income to lift their 
families above the poverty line (Blank, Campbell, and Entmacher 2010). Furthermore, as 
independent contractors or small businesses, home-based child care providers are largely 
excluded from coverage under labour law and employment protections, including the 
right to organize and collectively bargain (Boris and Klein 2008). Thus, the work of 
home child care is characterized by a gendered precariousness actively constructed and 
maintained by state policies. 
 
While TANF undermined poor mothers’ rights to care for their own children, some 
observers have argued that it has opened political space to expand and improve 
subsidized child care (see Reese 2011). Over the past decade there have been a series of 
union drives targeting home child care providers, which along with campaigns to 
unionize home health care aides, constitute a new wave of care worker organizing in the 
                                                
9 See Appendix 2.  
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US (Brooks 2005; Boris and Klein 2008). As low-income women of colour, many of the 
women engaged in these campaigns share the social location of the families they serve, 
and often live in the same urban neighbourhoods (see Tuominen 2003, 2008). Home 
child care providers may have spent time on welfare or earn incomes so low that they 
qualify for government assistance (see Smith 2007).  
 
Thus, while in the wake of welfare reform, campaigns to defend poor mothers’ rights to 
stay at home to care for their children have had limited success, campaigns to improve 
child care providers’ rights as workers—including higher wages, better working 
conditions, and the right to influence the development of child care programs through 
collective bargaining—have had better outcomes (Reese 2011: Chapter 6).  
 
The Local Context: New York City and Urban Neoliberalism 
 
Under the Giuliani administration, New York City became a key site of neoliberal 
welfare reform, rolling out one of the most punitive workfare programs in the nation (see 
Krinsky 2007a). For a number of reasons, the city was symbolic for both welfare’s 
defenders and its critics. First, the welfare rights movement of the 1960s and early 1970s 
had been at its strongest and most effective in New York (see Kornbluh 2007). During 
this period, thousands of poor mothers previously denied state support for the work of 
raising and caring for their children, gained access to the city’s welfare rolls (Piven and 
Cloward 1993). While the strength of the welfare rights movement ebbed by the mid-
1970s, New York remained a hub of anti-poverty activism and home to a network of 
social service agencies, community organizations, and welfare rights lawyers dedicated to 
advancing poor peoples’ rights. For welfare’s most ardent critics, this “welfare industrial 
complex” made the city an “ATM machine to non-working unwed mothers, dispensing 
taxpayer dollars with little asked in return” (MacDonald 2014).  
 
Second, at its postwar peak in 1995, New York City’s welfare caseload was larger than 
that of every state but California (DeParle 1998). The city accounted for around 70 
percent of New York State’s welfare recipients, while paying 70 percent of welfare’s 
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total local cost (CSWL 2001).10 These factors contributed to making the city’s welfare 
system a focus in the national and state politics of welfare reform. Additionally, while the 
majority of AFDC recipients nationwide were white, in the racial composition of the 
city’s welfare rolls, New York amplified the racist anxieties that shaped public discourse 
around women, welfare, and the family.11 The Giuliani administration employed racially 
coded language—invoking terms like “dependency”, the “work ethic”, and the 
“underclass”—to mobilize a policy agenda that targeted not only welfare recipients, but 
the urban poor in general (see Wacquant 2009a). 
 
The politics of welfare reform also reflected a broader ideological war on postwar urban 
liberalism, of which New York City was “the symbolic capital” (Brash 2011: 28). 
Between 1945 and 1975, New York came to embody “a particular style of social 
democratic politics: one that embraced a strong welfare state, a culture of labour power 
and solidarity, and a belief in the necessity of using government (even city government) 
to help the disadvantaged” (Philips-Fein 2013: 25). What Freeman (2000, 2014) has 
called an “urban social democracy” was embodied in: an extensive system of public 
housing and rent control; a network of twenty-two public hospitals; a tuition-free 
municipal university system; cheap and easy-to-use mass transit; and compared to much 
of the country, generous welfare benefits for the poor (see Freeman 2000, 2014). New 
York’s fiscal crisis of 1975 was seized upon by political and economic elites as an 
opportunity to restructure local government along neoliberal lines by cutting welfare 
benefits, privatizing municipal services, eliminating public sector jobs, and curbing the 
power of municipal unions.  
 
Yet despite successive rounds of austerity and restructuring, by the early 1990s many of 
the institutional legacies of social democratic New York remained—although in a more 
                                                
10 New York is one of a minority of states in which welfare is still administered by 
agencies of local government, rather than by agencies of state government. The city is 
responsible for administering welfare and for paying for about half of welfare’s local cost 
net of the federal contribution (CSWL 2001). 
11 In 1998, the racial composition of the city’s TANF caseload was 5 percent white, 33 
percent Black, and 59 percent Hispanic (DeParle 1998). 
 
 
19 
diminished form. This was largely due to the resistance and resilience of the city’s unions 
and social movements and a lingering left-wing political culture that emphasized 
collective responsibility for social reproduction (see Freeman 2014). One such legacy 
was the nation’s most comprehensive public centre-based daycare system. Across the US, 
the direct delivery of child care services by local government had all but ended in the 
1980s, when many social services were marketized through voucher schemes. In contrast, 
New York City had preserved its public daycare centres, the product of post-war 
struggles to save government run day nurseries established in the New Deal and 
expanded during the Second World War. The city’s child care system was notable not 
only for the number of children it served, but also for its commitment to high quality care 
that set national benchmarks (see ACS 2005). Furthermore, in the 1960s, the women on 
whose labour this system rests became the first daycare workforce in the nation to 
unionize and set the bar for wages and working conditions in the child care sector. In the 
1970s, the daycare workers’ union had defended child care services against austerity and 
along with the city’s child care movement, had unsuccessfully campaigned for a 
universal child care program to be funded and operated by the municipal government.   
 
In sum, in New York’s urban welfare regime, proponents of neoliberalism—the city’s 
corporate elite, real estate interests, neoliberal think-tanks, and right-wing politicians—
saw the institutional legacies of the city’s social democracy and the residual power of 
municipal unions and progressive social movements. Just as New York had once been a 
laboratory for social democracy, under the Giuliani administration it became a laboratory 
for an aggressive project of urban neoliberalization. The mayor sought to build on the 
incremental neoliberal reforms of the past with a sweeping project of deregulation and 
privatization, rolling back the urban welfare state and the municipal component of the 
social wage. As this dissertation asserts, while occurring against the backdrop of federal 
welfare reform, the administration’s response to the child care crisis is best understood as 
part of this broader project of urban neoliberalization.   
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Methodology  
 
As described in the opening section of this chapter, this project is concerned with 
exploring the urban welfare regime as a site of contested, state-driven efforts to mediate 
crisis tendencies in social reproduction, as expressed in New York City’s child care 
crisis. While the Giuliani administration pursued privatized remedies aimed at mediating 
this crisis, progressive civil society actors rejected the city’s neoliberal agenda and 
developed resistance strategies that pushed the local state to socialize costs of and 
responsibilities for care. In order to elevate the contextual embeddedness of these 
processes, I situate contemporary welfare state restructuring and resistance within the 
historical context of the city’s unique postwar welfare regime and the popular struggles 
over social reproduction and the social organization of care work that gave it shape.   
 
At a macro-level, this study advances a feminist political economy of urban welfare 
regimes, bringing together the insights of the FPE tradition with critical geographical 
approaches to urban neoliberalization. This approach is detailed in Chapter One, but 
serves as a lens for the study as a whole. FPE is dialectical, concerned with conflict and 
change, and seeks to understand society from “a materialist perspective that puts women, 
gender, race and class at the heart of its analysis” (Luxton 2006: 40). It is therefore 
process-orientated and preoccupied with social relations, attentive to historical context, 
and to social context and to social location (Vosko 2006: 12). A FPE analysis of welfare 
state restructuring and resistance at the intersection of welfare reform and child care thus 
demands a multi-method approach.  
 
Situating contemporary restructuring and resistance in historical context necessitated 
historical research, including use of the newspaper archives of The New York Times and 
The Village Voice. This research provided insights into the city’s child care movement 
and day care workers’ union and their role in the emergence of New York’s child care 
“exceptionalism” in the postwar period. I supplemented the data gained from this 
research with secondary literature on the history of social policy in New York and on the 
welfare rights and child care movements. This research was integral to mapping working 
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class women’s struggles over the social organization of care work and how these 
struggles shaped the city’s welfare regime. I rounded out my historical research with a 
number of interviews with child care advocates and welfare rights organizers active in the 
1970s and 1980s. This historical research allows me to make the case that the city’s 
unique public child care system and its unionized workforce was an essential element of 
New York’s urban social democracy and thus a target for neoliberal restructuring under 
the Giuliani administration.  
  
The data employed in the analysis of the Giuliani administration’s welfare and child care 
policies, and the resistance it engendered, was gained through a number of research 
methods. In order to document the escalation of the city’s child care crisis in the wake of 
welfare reform, I relied on statistical analysis. Through this analysis, I was able to trace 
the decline in the welfare caseload in New York City, from 1993 to 2010, and subsequent 
rise in the need and demand for non-parental child care. I also used statistical analysis to 
chart the child care usage patterns of welfare mothers by child care type, documenting 
their overreliance on home-based child care. Data on child care usage was also assembled 
from research reports by the non-profit child care resource and referral agency, Child 
Care Inc. 
 
To determine that welfare mothers overreliance on home child care was the product of 
Giuliani administration polices, and not reflective of the preferences of welfare mothers, I 
engaged in policy analysis, reviewing municipal government documents and reports on 
welfare reform and child care produced by non-profit groups and social service agencies. 
I supplemented this research with interviews with eight city bureaucrats who had 
oversight of welfare and child care, and were forthcoming about the difference between 
the city’s rhetoric around respecting welfare mothers’ legislated child care rights—
including their right to choose centre-based regulated child care—and the city’s 
preference for expanding the home child care market to meet rising demand. Some of 
these informants are named while others chose to remain anonymous.  
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Mapping the administration’s policies, and the resistance it engendered, was also done 
through documentary analysis of media coverage of welfare reform, child care, and social 
movement organizing. To this end, I conducted a key word search of The New York 
Times archives using the terms “day care”, “child care”, and “welfare”, covering the 
period from 1993 to 2010. The search produced just over one hundred articles, which 
were reviewed and coded. In order to understand how progressive civil society actors 
identified and mobilized around the contradictions produced by the administration’s child 
care policies, I interviewed twenty-one activists and advocates in welfare rights 
organizations, the day care workers’ union, community organizations, and in the city’s 
child care movement. These informants also provided me with access to social movement 
materials which assisted in charting the multiple resistance strategies developed by civil 
society groups, culminating in the campaign to unionize home child care providers. 
Interviews with staff from the home child care workers’ union were particularly useful in 
highlighting the union’s strategy to organize home-based providers based on their quasi-
public status. As with the civil servants interviewed, some of these informants choose to 
remain anonymous.  
 
Chapter Outline 
 
In New York, an aggressive welfare-to-work agenda escalated the city’s already existing 
child care crisis. Rather than responding to the child care crisis by investing in the city’s 
high quality, centre-based, unionized daycare system—the product of popular struggles 
and a key institution in New York’s urban welfare state—the Giuliani administration 
sought to mediate the crisis through overlapping and mutually reinforcing strategies of 
privatization, closing public daycare centres, marketizing child care services through the 
expansion of vouchers, and channelling welfare mothers into relying on an expanding 
pool of precarious, home child care providers for the care of their children—
systematically violating welfare mothers’ legislated child care rights in the process. By 
downloading costs of and responsibilities for caregiving onto low-income families and 
communities, and especially the women within them, New York City delivered child care 
services “on the cheap”. However, these privatized remedies aimed at mediation created 
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openings for resistance and ultimately led to the unionization of the home child care 
workforce. This study suggests that under neoliberalism, urban welfare regimes are 
central sites of contested state-driven efforts at mediating crisis tendencies in social 
reproduction. While neoliberal restructuring creates crisis tendencies for poor and 
working class families, privatized remedies aimed at mediation can be contradictory, 
opening space for alternative political projects that seek a more equitable distribution of 
the work of social reproduction across the state-market-family/household nexus.   
 
I make my case in five chapters. Chapter One establishes the theoretical framework for 
this project, which aims to further a feminist political economy of the urban welfare 
regime by applying a gender lens to processes of urban neoliberalization and an urban 
lens to feminist political economy analyses of welfare state restructuring and resistance. 
The chapter is organized into three sections. First, I tease out the relationship between the 
study’s primary concepts—namely social reproduction, crisis tendencies, and the social 
organization of care work—and situate them within a broader FPE understanding of 
welfare regimes. Second, I argue that FPE and feminist welfare state scholarship miss 
crucial aspects of welfare restructuring and resistance by neglecting the urban as a scale 
of analysis. I draw on feminist insights into the political economy of scale and feminist 
scholarship on women’s urban activism to decentre the “national” as a scale of analysis. I 
assert the urban as an important site of state intervention in social reproduction under 
Fordist-Keynesianism and a site of women’s activism around social reproduction and the 
social organization of care work. The third section of the chapter highlights how the 
restructuring and rescaling of welfare states under neoliberalism has produced crisis 
tendencies in social reproduction for poor and working-class urban families/households, 
which take sharp expression in a crisis of care. The concluding section discusses the 
concept of “actually existing neoliberalism” to drawn attention to how restructuring, and 
the resistance it engenders, are “contextually embedded” and require an analysis that 
accounts for its place-specific characteristics. This theoretical framework will allow me 
to analyze contested state-driven efforts to mediate crisis tendencies in a specific urban 
welfare regime, i.e. New York City.  
 
 
 
24 
By exploring its historical context, Chapter Two elevates the contextual embeddedness of 
contemporary welfare state restructuring and resistance in New York. In the first half of 
the chapter, I highlight how working class women’s struggles over the social organization 
of care work, as part of broader struggles over social reproduction, were central to the 
development and character of the city’s unique urban welfare regime, i.e. its urban social 
democracy. Through the child care movement, the welfare rights movement, and the day 
care workers’ union, working class women contributed to shaping an urban welfare 
regime that socialized more of the costs of and responsibilities for social reproduction 
than any other city in the United States. The city’s unionized, public centre-based daycare 
system was a product of these struggles as were the relatively generous levels of welfare 
benefits available to poor New Yorkers. The neoliberalization of New York, which began 
in response to the 1975 fiscal crisis, restructured the institutions of the city’s social 
democracy through processes of privatization, deregulation, and retrenchment. In the 
1980s, the neoliberal practices pioneered in New York were implemented at the federal 
level by the Reagan administration. The second half of the chapter explores the impact of 
this restructuring, which produced crisis tendencies in social reproduction for poor and 
working class households. Although fiercely contested by social movements, successive 
city administrations emphasized privatized remedies aimed at mediation, shifting costs of 
and responsibilities for social reproduction onto families/households, the third sector, and 
the market. However, by the early 1990s, many of the institutional legacies of New 
York’s urban social democracy remained, including its public centre-based daycare 
system. The Giuliani administration’s policies at the intersection of welfare reform and 
child care were a continuation—and in many ways an intensification—of the 
neoliberalization of New York’s welfare regime since the mid-1970s. 
 
With the historical context for contemporary restructuring and resistance in place, 
Chapter Three explores the Giuliani administration’s policies at the intersection of 
welfare reform and child care. In the first section of the chapter, I sketch the contours of 
neoliberal governance in Giuliani’s New York, focusing on the transformation of the 
urban welfare regime. The sections that follow detail the overlapping and mutually 
reinforcing strategies of privatization employed by the Giuliani administration to mediate 
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the city’s child care crisis, including the expansion of child care vouchers and closure of a 
number of the city’s unionized daycares. With these foundations in place, the third 
section of the chapter examines how, despite its rhetoric of “parent choice”, the city’s 
welfare bureaucracy channelled poor mothers into relying on an expanding pool of 
precarious, home-based providers for the care of their children. While welfare recipients 
did not overwhelmingly prefer this type of child care, and furthermore, their right to 
choose among a variety of child care settings was protected in state and federal 
regulations, the welfare bureaucracy overcame these barriers by systematically violating 
welfare recipients’ legislated child care rights. By channelling public resources to the 
least regulated, least-trained, and worst-paid sectors of the child care industry—i.e. home 
child care—the Giuliani administration provided child care “on the cheap”. In the final 
section of the chapter, I detail how the administration cut municipal investment in child 
care at a time of peak demand, as federal funds increasingly supplanted municipal child 
care dollars, further demonstrating the city’s lack of commitment to quality, affordable, 
regulated child care.  
 
Paradoxically, the Giuliani administration’s privatized remedies aimed at mediating the 
child care crisis unleashed a set of contradictions, creating openings for resistance. 
Chapter Four details the various ways child care advocates, welfare rights organizations, 
legal aid lawyers, activist mothers, and labour unions challenged the neoliberal logic of 
“child care on the cheap”. The first section of the chapter explores the child care activism 
of New York City’s largest anti-workfare coalition. While this coalition did not give high 
priority to child care in their organizing, it pushed the issue of child care to the forefront 
of welfare rights struggles in the city. The second section explores the extensive public 
outreach efforts of child care advocates, welfare rights groups, and legal-aid lawyers, as 
they attempted to make welfare mothers aware of their legislated child care rights. 
Exposing the coercive practices of the city’s welfare bureaucracy, which pressured poor 
women into relying on home child care providers, activists employed the Giuliani 
administration’s “choice” discourse to demand welfare mothers be given real choice in 
child care. In the third section of the chapter, I discuss the joint efforts of child care 
advocates and labour movement activists to leverage welfare-to-work grants to establish 
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an innovative child care program. Rather than resist the expansion of home child care, 
this program, Satellite Child Care, used welfare-to-work grants to raise the wages and 
improve the working conditions of home child care providers. While Satellite was 
defunded by the city, it laid the groundwork for community- and union-led campaigns to 
organize the home child care workforce. In the fourth and fifth sections of the chapter, I 
examine two such campaigns. By channelling public funds to the home child care 
workforce, the Giuliani administration opened up the legal and discursive space for 
unions to organize home child care workers as public employees providing an essential 
social service. From an invisible, isolated, and unorganized workforce, home child care 
providers emerged as a political force in the wake of welfare reform, demanding greater 
socialization of the costs of and responsibilities for social reproduction, and ultimately 
more socially just solutions to New York City’s child care crisis.   
 
I conclude this dissertation with a discussion of the urban welfare regime as a central site 
of contested, state-driven efforts to mediate crisis tendencies in social reproduction under 
neoliberalism. As I argue, resistance to the Giuliani administration’s logic of “child care 
on the cheap” and the success of the home child care workers’ union demonstrates that 
even in the age of the “neoliberal city”—in which privatization, deregulation, and welfare 
state retrenchment are near hegemonic processes—marginalized communities, precarious 
workers, and their allies, have the capacity to shape urban welfare regimes from below. 
Given the transformation of urban labour markets and the growth of low-wage service 
sector work, including care services, struggles to revalue social reproductive labour must 
be at the heart of any effort to build a more socially just city.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE URBAN WELFARE REGIME: TOWARDS A FEMINIST POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
 
 
Feminist political economy has relatively neglected cities and the urban as a scale of 
analysis while critical approaches to urban neoliberalization often fail to address 
questions of social reproduction. Situating my contributions within the feminist political 
economy (FPE) tradition—with its concern for the interrelationships among gender, race, 
and class as they are shaped by households, communities, markets, and states, and 
women’s activism (Bezanson and Luxton 2006)—the theoretical framework presented in 
this chapter aims to further a feminist political economy of the urban welfare regime by 
applying a social reproduction lens to processes of urban neoliberalization and an urban 
lens to feminist political economy analyses of welfare state restructuring and resistance.  
 
I start by defining a number of key concepts in a FPE approach to welfare regimes, 
namely social reproduction, crisis tendencies, and the social organization of care work. I 
tease out the relationship between these concepts and situate them within a broader FPE 
understanding of welfare state restructuring and resistance. Next, with an eye to the US 
context and the intersection of welfare reform and child care, I explore three ways in 
which the state shapes the social organization of care work: through a reliance on 
primarily means-tested social programs, making only a small part of socially necessary 
care work a public responsibility; through the explicit exclusion of home-based care 
workers from labour protections; and via diverse forms of state coercion—including 
welfare-to-work programs—which track poor, racialized, and immigrant women into care 
work.  
 
Welfare state scholarship tends to assume that the national scale is the privileged level of 
social policy action, contestation, and analysis (see Mahon 2005, 2010). In the second 
section of the chapter, I highlight the importance of the city and the urban scale as a site 
of both social welfare provision and contestation. First, drawing on feminist scholarship 
on cities and social movements, I emphasize the ways in which women’s urban activism 
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around social reproduction—particularly, working class women’s activism—has shaped 
urban welfare regimes and the social organization of care work in urban space. I then 
employ a FPE lens to situate cities and the urban scale in the development and interscalar 
arrangements of the national Fordist-Keynesian welfare regime and the gendered—and in 
the United States, racialized—social settlement around which it was built. 
 
The US constitution assigns responsibility for public welfare to state and local 
governments. However, in two periods of economic and social crisis—the 1930s and 
1960s—in which social struggles were especially acute in big cities, the federal state 
intervened to mediate tensions in social reproduction through the creation and subsequent 
expansion of a national welfare state. It is in this context that the urban state’s role in 
social reproduction evolved from a limited one in the pre-New Deal era to greater 
involvement under Fordist-Keynesianism. During this period, urban social problems 
came to be understood primarily as structural in nature and city governments bore some 
responsibility for maintaining a minimum level of social reproduction for all (Vitale 
2008). These developments were mirrored across the advanced political economies, as 
the local state came to play a “managerial-welfarist” function, serving as a relay point for 
national Keynesian welfare policies and providing benefits, services, and facilities to 
urban populations (Harvey 1989).  
 
As a political economic project, neoliberalism emerged as a ruling class response to the 
crisis of Fordist-Keynesianism and represents “a direct challenge to feminist, labour, and 
left-wing demands for greater social responsibility for care” (Luxton 2010: 163). Under 
neoliberalism, welfare states have been restructured and rescaled as responsibilities for 
key aspects of social reproduction have been downloaded to subnational governments—
including to cities—and offloaded via privatization to families/households, to the third 
sector, and to markets (Mahon 2005, 2010). Local relays of national welfare service-
provision have been retrenched and urban welfare state apparatuses restructured along 
neoliberal lines (Brenner and Theodore 2003). From their managerial-welfarist function 
under Fordist-Keynesianism, under neoliberalism urban governments are increasingly 
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preoccupied with mobilizing city space as an arena for market-orientated growth and elite 
consumption practices (Brenner and Theodore 2002, 2003).   
 
The third section of the chapter explores how these processes—along with broader shifts 
in gender relations—have created crisis tendencies in social reproduction for poor and 
working-class urban families/households, which find one expression in a crisis of care. 
From underwriting some of the work of social reproduction under Fordist-Keynesianism, 
urban governments have increasingly shifted services to unpaid work in 
families/households, to the third sector, and to the market to provide for a price, often in 
the name of expanding “choice” (see Lipman 2011). In addition, cities are key sites of 
workfare initiatives aimed at disciplining urban welfare recipients—including lone 
mothers—into the lower reaches of the labour market, individualizing responsibility for 
social reproduction (see Peck 2001). As I note, these processes of privatization are not 
only profoundly gendered, but in the US also racialized as women of colour are 
disproportionately represented among beneficiaries of the urban welfare state and as 
workers employed in the delivery of social services.12  
 
This is the context for contemporary urban struggles over social reproduction and 
contested state-driven efforts at mediating its crisis tendencies under neoliberalism. Yet 
neoliberal projects—and the resistance they engender—are not even across space and 
                                                
12 By the 1960s, urban poverty in the US was increasingly racialized (and to some extent, 
feminized), owing to a confluence of factors, including: African-American migration 
from the South to northern cities; white middle and working class flight to the suburbs; 
deindustrialization and persistent racial discrimination in urban labour markets; and the 
growth of female-headed households in urban black communities (see Wilson 1997).  
Since the late 1960s, African Americans of both sexes have been overrepresented in 
government work and public administration (see Katz 2012; Wilson 1997). By the early 
1990s, one in five African-Americans worked in the public sector (Wilson 1997). 
Overall, the public sector remains the most important source of good jobs for African 
Americans: the median income of black men in the public sector is 50 percent higher than 
among those who work in the private sector. Among black women, that difference is 78 
percent (Katz 2012:61-63). This also accounts for the overrepresentation of African 
Americans in public sector unions, especially in big cities. As Katz (2012) notes, 
dependence on the public sector for occupational mobility and secure employment leaves 
African Americans particularly vulnerable in times of austerity and public sector 
retrenchment.  
 
 
30 
place. In recognition of the geographic variability of restructuring and resistance, I turn to 
Brenner and Theodore’s (2002) concept of “actually existing neoliberalism,” which 
draws attention to the “contextually embedded” character of neoliberal projects in that 
they evolve and are deployed within contextually specific political-economic landscapes 
defined by legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory 
practices, and political struggles. Likewise, contestation is also contingent on place-
specific dynamics, including pre-existing and locally variable capacities for resistance 
(Peck 2001). Hence, we need a FPE analysis of urban welfare regimes that accounts for 
the contextually embedded, or place-specific, character of restructuring and resistance.  
 
1. Welfare State Restructuring and Resistance: A Feminist Political Economy 
Approach 
 
Feminist political economists have developed an approach to welfare state analysis that 
understands welfare regimes as: “complex webs of forces in which the relationship 
between numerous variables—labour markets, unpaid work in the home, family 
structures, race and ethnicity, political struggles, state policies—can be considered as part 
of a dynamic whole in which the process of interaction and change is critical” (Porter 
2003: 29). As Porter notes, while these variables interact to shape the character and 
development of a regime, of central importance within this ensemble is the relationship 
between production and social reproduction, particularly as it is manifested through the 
nexus between the family/household, the market, the state, and the third (not-for-profit) 
sector (Porter 2003: 29).  
 
Social reproduction refers to the social processes and labours involved in maintaining and 
reproducing people, specifically the labouring population and their labour power on a 
daily and generational basis (Laslett and Brenner 1989). Social reproduction involves: 
conception and birth; the work of caring for and maintaining people at the immediate 
daily level (including childrearing and the provision of clothing, shelter, food, health care 
and basic safety); the development and transmission of knowledge, social values, and 
cultural practices; and the construction of individual and collective identities (Picchio 
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1992; Luxton 2014). When employed in a feminist political economy sense, social 
reproduction provides a basis for understanding how the state, the market, the 
family/household, and the third sector, “interact and balance power so that the work 
involved in the daily and generational production and maintenance of people is 
completed” (Bezanson and Luxton 2006: 3).  
 
Social reproduction occurs at the level of the household through unpaid work, done 
primarily by women, and at the level of the state through social transfers such as 
education and health care (Vosko 2006: 456). The market, where services are available 
for a price, can also provide social reproduction. In the North American context, when 
organized in the market, social reproduction typically entails low-wage service-sector 
jobs disproportionately occupied by immigrant women and women of colour (Luxton 
2014: 155; see also Glenn 2010).  
 
The organization of social reproduction is a question of politics and power. As Luxton 
(2014: 154) remarks, “struggles over who bears the costs of social reproduction, as well 
as over standards and quality of life, are at the heart of class struggle and are central to 
the oppression of women, and racialized and poor peoples.” The degree to which social 
reproduction is privatized or socialized in a given historical period—i.e. who bears its 
costs and responsibilities—is reflective of social, political, and economic struggles, and 
the balance of social forces (most vitally those of class, gender, and race) in a given 
social formation (see Cameron 2006).  
 
Crisis Tendencies in Social Reproduction 
 
Feminist political economists maintain that under capitalism, there is a central friction, 
tension, or contradiction between social reproduction and capital accumulation (see 
Picchio 1992; Vosko 2006; Cameron 2006). This dynamic results from the separation of 
production from social reproduction, generating a conflict between the standard of living 
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of workers and the profit imperative.13 As Bezanson (2006: 28) notes, “profit-
maximization and standard-of-living maximization are rarely compatible.” The 
relationship between social reproduction and capital accumulation must be therefore be 
mediated and stabilized by the social institutions of the state, the market, 
families/households, and potentially, the third sector.  
 
The state plays a crucial role in mediating this contradiction, “or, put differently, limiting 
persistent crisis tendencies in social reproduction” (Vosko 2006: 147).14 According to 
Vosko (2006: 148), “States respond to tensions in social reproduction in various ways. 
Like crisis tendencies themselves, efforts at mediation are inherently neither regressive 
nor progressive”, but shaped by politics, ideology, and the orientation of particular 
governments. As such, the institutional interventions employed by the state to mediate 
crisis tendencies can and do vary.15 As Bezanson (2006: 175) has emphasized, “while 
existing forms of stratification and inequalities of power are ready conduits for the 
direction that mediation takes in a given period,” political mobilization can reroute the 
state-household-market-third-sector circuits of mediation.  
 
                                                
13 There are nuanced differences in how feminist political economists conceptualize this 
contradiction. For instance, Vosko (2006: 147), following Picchio (1992), remarks that 
under capitalism there is a tendency toward the separation of the site of procreation and 
daily and generational maintenance (the household) from the productive sphere of waged 
work. As such social reproduction is not directly structured by employers but is typically 
organized and performed in households by primarily women. The separation of 
production from social reproduction thus gives rise to this “essential contradiction”. 
Cameron (2006: 46), on the other hand, argues that production and social reproduction 
should not be understood as two distinct, separate spheres, but as two aspects of one 
processes of capital accumulation “and the relationship between them is contradictory in 
a dialectical sense of a unity of opposites.” 
14 See also Picchio (1992) and Ursel (1992). 
15 In mediating this relationship, “the state intervenes to shape and stabilize a particular 
system of class relationships and, within it, a gender order” (Cameron 2006: 46). The 
gender order can be defined as a set of social relations characterized by a sexual division 
of labour and a gender discourse that supports that division. It reflects a historically 
specific configuration of state-market-household relations so that the work of maintaining 
and reproducing people on a daily and generational basis is accomplished. However 
gender orders are not static; they are reflective of social relations, which are constantly in 
flux, dynamic and shaped by social struggles (see Cameron 2006). 
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Given their inherently political nature, state interventions can be paradoxical, giving rise 
to contradictions and creating opportunities for social movement actors, including the 
women’s movement and organized labour, to contest the terms of mediation (see Martin 
2010; Vosko 2006).16 Thus, depending on the balance of social forces within a given 
social formation, and the political opportunity structures they face, social movements 
may mobilize around alternative political projects designed to mediate crisis tendencies 
and secure a viable process of social reproduction on very different grounds than the 
state. Typically, such projects involve demands for the state to socialize more of the costs 
of and responsibilities for social reproduction, easing the burden on families/households, 
and particularly the women within them. Under neoliberalism, one site at which crisis 
tendencies in social reproduction are evidenced, and where contested efforts at their 
mediation play out, is the social organization of care work. 
 
The Social Organization of Care Work 
 
In FPE scholarship, the relationship between care work and social reproduction has been 
conceptualized in various ways.17 For the purposes of this study, we can understand care 
work as a particular set of labours that entails providing for the needs and well being of 
persons and thus facilitates and is central to the daily and generational reproduction of 
people i.e. social reproduction (see Glenn 2010). This approach differentiates care from 
other processes and labours integral to social reproduction. For instance, state transfers 
that support caregiving, while essential to social reproduction, are not in and of 
themselves care work. And the education system, a key institution in social reproduction, 
may involve care work—especially in the education of young children—but also 
encompasses a range of activities beyond care.  
                                                
16 As a result, as Vosko (2006: 167) argues, “the state’s power to mediate crisis 
tendencies holds both opportunities and dangers.” 
17 As Luxton (2006: 36) notes, early FPE scholarship tended to equate social reproduction 
with women’s unpaid work in the household, particularly care work. The more expansive 
understanding of social reproduction employed in this chapter moves beyond the central 
focus on women’s work in the home that left vague this work’s relationship to the 
complementary work (also often done by women for pay) provided by state services such 
as education and health care or in the market. 
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Care work generally involves three interrelated activities: first there is the direct caring 
for a person, which includes physical care (e.g. feeding, bathing), emotional care (e.g. 
listening, offering reassurance), and the direct services that assist people in meeting their 
physical and emotional needs (e.g. shopping for food); second, care work involves the 
maintenance of the immediate physical surroundings in which people live—for example, 
a home, daycare, or long-term care facility; and lastly, care work involves the fostering of 
people’s relationships and social networks, including the “weaving and reweaving of the 
social fabric,” or mending and maintaining personal relationships (Glenn 2010: 5-6). 
When done for pay in occupations such as home health aide, housekeeper, nurses’ aide, 
or childcare provider, care work typically involves some mixture of these activities. 
 
Beyond the particulars of the labour, the “social organization of care” refers to the 
location of care work, the conditions of those who provide it, and the value accorded this 
work (Glenn 2010). It is defined by the systematic ways in which care for those who need 
it is allocated and how the responsibility for caring labour is assigned (Glenn 2010: 5-6; 
Meyer, Harrington, and Michel 2000). Like the broader process of social reproduction in 
which it is embedded, the social organization of care is dynamic and shaped by a range of 
factors, including gender relations, labour markets, and social struggles. The state, 
however, plays a crucial role in shaping the organization of care, especially in the degree 
to which it supports care work in the household, socializes care through the direct 
delivery or subsidization of care services, or leaves care to be purchased on the market.  
 
In the US context, there are three ways in which the state shapes the social organization 
of care work that are of particular importance to this study. First, the reliance of liberal 
welfare regimes on primarily means-tested social programs fundamentally shapes the 
entire labour market for care (Boris and Klein 2012). Making only a small part of socially 
necessary care work a public responsibility perpetuates care as women’s work, rendering 
much of the skill and labour invisible and making it undervalued (Armstrong and 
Armstrong 2004: 26). And while socializing this work and rendering it visible does not 
necessarily lead to its valuation, the state has been an important site of women’s struggles 
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for the valuation of care and its recognition as skilled labour (Armstrong and Laxer 
2006).18 
 
Second, employment and labour law shapes the social organization of care, especially in 
the degree to which it provides protections to care workers. For example, in the United 
States, home-based care workers—home health care aides, homemakers, domestic 
workers, and home childcare providers—have historically been excluded from definitions 
of “employee” and from coverage under labour rights and employment standards. The 
state has actively denied their status as workers and the home as a site of wage labour. By 
further devaluing home-based care work, these exclusions have interacted with social 
policy to allow the state to deliver care services—such as home health care or home child 
care—“on the cheap” (see Boris and Klein 2008, 2012).  
And finally, as Glenn (2010: 5-6) has argued, the social organization of care has been 
“rooted in diverse forms of coercion upheld by the state”—including slavery, indentured 
servitude, welfare-to-work/workfare policies, and guest worker programs. These forms of 
coercion have tracked poor, racialized, and immigrant women into work caring for others 
beyond their immediate kith and kin. Echoing Boris and Klein (2012), as Glenn observes 
(2010: 5), “forms of coercion have varied in degree, directness, and explicitness but 
nonetheless have served to constrain and direct women’s choices; the net consequence of 
restricted choice has been to keep caring labour ‘cheap’.”  
 
As a FPE approach to welfare state analysis makes clear, the state plays a vital role in 
shaping the social organization of care work, and social reproduction more broadly. The 
state can intervene “to offset or offload the high costs of social reproduction onto or away 
from” families/households (Bezanson 2006: 42). Just how the state intervenes to mediate 
persistent crisis tendencies in social reproduction shapes social relations of race, class, 
and gender, exacerbating or alleviating existing inequalities in the labour market, 
family/household, and society more broadly. However, feminist political economists and 
feminist welfare state scholars have tended to treat the welfare state as a singular entity as 
                                                
18 These struggles have taken numerous forms, including public sector unionism in the 
caring professions (see Armstrong and Laxer 2006; Boris and Klein 2012).   
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opposed to a scalar configuration of welfare provision, social policy action, and 
contestation (Mahon 2005, 2010).  
 
As Mahon (2006: 458) has argued, feminist analyses of the welfare state have privileged 
the national scale as a level of analysis, “not the least because post-war welfare regimes, 
and more broadly gender regimes, came to be consolidated at the national scale.” In this, 
feminist welfare state scholarship has reflected the methodological nationalism of 
mainstream scholarship with which it is in dialogue. Mainstream scholars, such as 
Esping-Andersen (1990), constructed a theoretical framework to understand the causes 
and consequences of national welfare state development and variation, focusing on social 
classes and interest groups engaged in political struggle, including trade unions and left-
wing political parties. Scholars working in this tradition—i.e. the power resources 
school—built a comparative framework based on the construction of Weberian ideal-
types that differentiated national welfare state regimes on the axis of decommodification 
(see Esping-Andersen 1990).19 
 
Feminist welfare state scholars have critiqued this approach for its blindness to the 
gendered character of welfare regimes and social citizenship, and for failing to consider 
the relationship between unpaid work and welfare, the role of the family and domestic 
sphere, the consequences for gender equality of various welfare regimes, and the role of 
women in the origins and development of the welfare state (see Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 
1996; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999).20 However, as Mahon (2006: 457) remarks, 
                                                
19 For Esping-Andersen (1990: 21-2) decommodification “occurs when a service is 
rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without 
reliance on the market.” Advanced welfare states thus fit into one of three ideal-types 
(liberal, corporatist, or social democratic) depending on the configuration of services and 
benefits and to what degree this allows their citizens to exist outside of the market and the 
wage relation. Decommodification empowers workers against markets and thus it is no 
surprise that welfare states shaped by the influence and strength of social democratic 
parties and trade unions have provided the greatest degree of freedom from reliance on 
the market (see Esping-Andersen 1990).  
20 I opted not to do this extensive literature review of feminist welfare state scholarship. 
My main concern here is to show how much feminist welfare state scholarship has been 
methodically national.  
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while “feminist politics had long transcended national boundaries, and an important 
strand of feminist research questioned the focus on (national) states … feminist welfare 
state scholarship frequently conformed to the methodological nationalism that 
characterized mainstream research.” This has blinded feminist welfare state scholars to 
important processes and variations at subnational scales (see Mahon 2010). 
 
While feminist political economists and feminist welfare state scholars has been 
concerned with understanding the role of the state and social struggles in configuring and 
reconfiguring the distribution of the work of social reproduction across the state-market-
family/household nexus, feminist geographers have asked in what ways these processes 
are also matters of space, place, and scale (see Marston 2000). By decentring the national 
scale in welfare state analysis, their work can help forward a FPE of the urban welfare 
regime. With an eye to the urban scale in particular, it is to questions of social 
reproduction, scale, and welfare state regimes that the chapter now turns.  
 
2. Social Reproduction, Scale, and the Urban Welfare Regime 
 
Political-economic geography has employed the concept of scale to emphasize the ways 
social, economic, and political practices are produced and reproduced through spatial 
practices and discourses (England 2010).21 Theorizing the relationship between the 
production of scale and social reproduction, feminist geographers have made important 
contributions that advance a FPE analysis of welfare regimes. Given the focus of this 
                                                
21 In welfare state analysis, scales reflect “a particular, though neither static nor 
uncontested, hierarchical relational ordering of spatially bounded political locales” 
(Paterson 2014: 182). As Paterson makes clear, this approach “serves to distinguish scalar 
theory from approaches such as institutionalism and multi-level governance. Similar to 
scalar theory, these approaches emphasize sites of contest and political action; however, 
unlike scalar theory, they do not question the ways in which those sites are discursively 
constituted and constructed with references to other arenas of political action. In contrast, 
from the perspective of scalar theory, these temporally and spatially contingent orderings 
are referred to as ‘scalar fixes,’ which are constituted by scalar discourses in which 
specific scales—national, sub-national, local, institutional and so on—and the actors 
associated with them are assigned various roles within interscalar rule regimes” (2014: 
182). 
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study, I argue that these interventions are useful to understanding how welfare state 
restructuring and resistance at the urban scale are implicated in social reproduction, care 
work, and the social relations of class, gender and race through which they are organized.  
 
Decentring the National Scale 
 
Mainstream critical geography aims to understand how political-economic processes—
namely production, state regulation, and class conflict—are organized across space and 
place (Marston 2000). As a corrective to this gender-blind approach, feminist 
geographers have argued for the integration of gender relations and the scales of the 
household and the community/neighbourhood in debates on scalar politics and political 
economy (see Marston 2000; McDowell 2001). Yet far from being relegated to the 
household or community/neighbourhood, social reproduction can involve processes at 
multiple scales.22 For instance, welfare state transfers that support care work in the home 
or provide care services in the community may involve national, regional, and/or local 
governments in funding and regulatory regimes (Mahon 2005). And depending on the 
political opportunity structures they face, social movements demanding greater collective 
responsibility for social reproduction may make claims on the state at multiple scales (see 
Mahon and MacDonald 2010).   
 
In this vein, the concept of scale is particularly useful to analyses of welfare regimes, 
especially in the context of the restructuring and rescaling of welfare states under 
neoliberalism. As Paterson (2014: 182) observes, “Rather than viewing the state as an 
ontological given, scalar theory enables researchers to explore the state as a series of 
socially constructed arenas and associated processes.” Such an approach allows us to 
decentre the methodological nationalism typical of welfare state scholarship, opening up 
the space for research on how systems of social provision, social infrastructure, and 
social policy are necessarily embedded in a complex political economy of scale and to 
                                                
22 As in early feminist political economy scholarship, feminist geographers such as 
Marston (2000) and McDowell (2001) have equated social reproduction with women’s 
care and domestic labour in the household.   
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explore the degree to which national welfare state regimes exhibit variation at subnational 
scales—with implications for women’s social citizenship and gender equality within 
particular welfare regimes.23  
 
Given the centrality of cities in processes of welfare state development, restructuring, and 
resistance, a feminist political economy of the urban welfare regime is long overdue. I 
want to make two points in support of this claim. The first, brief point is that cities and 
urban welfare regimes are vital sites of working class women’s activism and struggles 
over the social organization of care work and social reproduction more broadly. These 
struggles have, and continue to, shape the development and character of welfare 
regimes—a point that I take up in detail in the historical case study presented in Chapter 
Two (see also Prentice 1989; Mahon 2005).  
 
The second point relates to the importance of the urban scale in the development of the 
national Keynesian welfare state and evolving role of local government in social welfare 
provision. As I illustrate, as both a site of social policy action and contestation, the urban 
scale was central in state efforts to mediate tensions between capital accumulation and 
social reproduction in the Fordist-Keynesian era. By outlining the role of urban welfare 
regimes in this period, and their relationship to national welfare states, we are better able 
to understand their restructuring under neoliberalism and the implications for the social 
organization of care work and social reproduction more broadly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
23 Most comparative feminist welfare state research does not account for subnational 
variation, for instance O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver (1999) classic study of gender 
relations and social policy across advanced national welfare regimes. 
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Women’s Activism and the Urban Welfare Regime  
 
Reflecting the methodological privileging of the national scale in feminist welfare state 
research, Cohen and Brodie have argued: “women’s movements throughout the world 
have tended to target the national state as the scale at which social reforms could be 
delivered, supporting the construction of a strong welfare state” (as qtd. in Mahon and 
Macdonald 2010: 209). While feminists have mobilized to demand national policies that 
advance women’s social citizenship, from maternity leave to universal child care, such a 
claim can be read as minimizing a history of women’s activism at the urban scale and the 
degree to which campaigns targeting the national state have been grounded in local, and 
specifically urban politics.24 This is especially true of working-class women’s activism 
and the anti-capitalist current of the women’s movement for as Brenner (2014: 144) 
observes, “Partly because of where they live and work, but also because of the many 
working-class women’s movements that have flourished in cities, socialist feminists have 
been particularly interested in transforming the urban environment.”  
 
As Brenner (2014) has argued, in the absence of adequate social supports, women in 
working-class neighbourhoods have often created cross-household networks through 
which they share the work of social reproduction (see also Haydan 1982; Naples 1998). 
These caregiving networks have traditionally formed the social base for women’s 
organizing around the politics of everyday life—the raising of children and the sustaining 
of households—including around issues such as tenants’ rights, welfare policy, 
environmental justice, daycare services, and community-based healthcare. This activism 
has also taken the form of “the defense of and the demand for the expansion of public 
space” (Brenner 2014: 146): for example, working class women’s campaigns for safe 
streets, the revitalization of parks and playgrounds, and the preservation of after-school 
programs, all centre around what Katz (2001) has called “the urban spaces of social 
reproduction.”  
                                                
24 See for instance Prentice (1989) and Michel’s (1999) studies of women and child care 
politics in Canada and the US respectively. In both cases, the women’s movement push 
for universal child care had its genesis in struggles to save publicly funded municipal day 
care centres in the immediate post-war period.  
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Furthermore, unlike social transfers that national states can distribute directly to 
individuals, many services provided by the state are produced and consumed at the local 
scale—including public housing, education, and child care (Mahon 2005). Women’s 
struggles have targeted municipal governments and social planning practices, demanding 
such services be made more responsive to their needs (see Wekerle 1984). For instance, 
in the United States, working class women have waged campaigns for the inclusion of 
daycare centres in public housing projects or for twenty-four hour child care centres that 
accommodate the needs of women working non-standard hours (see Naples 1998). 
African American women have a long history of struggle for the desegregation of 
municipal services and an end to institutionalized racism in urban transportation, housing, 
education, recreation, and welfare (see Hill Collins 2000). Finally, through public sector 
unions, working class women have been on the frontlines of struggles to protect and 
expand municipal services, particularly social welfare services (see Boris and Klein 
2008).  
 
In sum, these urban struggles have mobilized around working class women’s identities as 
workers employed by the state, as unpaid community caregivers who link other 
community residents to the state, and as beneficiaries of state welfare programs (Naples 
1998). Even national movements in which working class women’s activism has been 
central—for example, in the US, the welfare rights movement or the movement for a 
national child care program—have their roots in urban struggles with the immediate face 
of the state in local government and social service bureaucracies (see Kornbluh 2007; 
Michel 1999). 
 
As feminist scholarship on urban social movements makes clear, these struggles have 
contributed to shaping the built form of cities, their physical and social infrastructure, and 
the degree to which urban space is configured in such a way that takes into consideration 
women’s needs as both wage earners and as unpaid caregivers (see Wekerle 1984; 
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McDowell 1999; Brenner 2014).25 Thus, working class women’s activism has continually 
challenged urban policies that assume male breadwinners and privatized care work, 
demanding the state not only socialize costs of care but take into consideration questions 
of geographic equity, women’s urban mobility, and access to services and other social 
supports. In these struggles, women have shaped systems of social welfare provision at 
the urban scale, sometimes in ways that necessitate the intervention of higher orders of 
government to underwrite social reproduction.26 I take up the intersection of cities, the 
urban welfare regime, and working class women’s struggles over the social organization 
of care work in greater detail in Chapter Two.  
 
Fordist-Keynesianism, Social Reproduction, and the Urban Welfare Regime  
 
As described in the previous section, the urban scale has been an important site of 
working class women’s activism around social reproduction. As will be explored in 
Chapter Two, in New York City such struggles contributed to shaping the historical 
development and unique character of the city’s post-war urban welfare regime. In this 
section however, I employ a feminist political economy lens to give a brief and more 
general account of cities and urban welfare regimes in the development, and interscalar 
arrangements, of the Fordist-Keynesian welfare state, highlighting the US context and its 
liberal welfare regime.27  
 
Across the advanced political economies, the national scale was the preeminent locus of 
capital accumulation and regulation of political and economic life during the Fordist-
Keynesian era (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 1989). As Brenner and Theodore 
(2002, 2003) observe, in the post-war period cities and local government came to play a 
                                                
25 As McDowell has argued: “the layout of cities, urban transport networks and 
timetables, as well as the internal layout of individual homes, are based on an assumption 
of permanent nine-to-five employment by a male breadwinner, with a wife who combines 
housework and childcare in the local neighbourhood” (1999: 118). 
26 For example, the welfare rights movement in the United States. See Kornbluh (2007), 
Nadasen (2005), Piven and Cloward (1977).  
27 My reading of these developments has been influenced by Cameron’s (2006) study of 
social reproduction and Canadian federalism.  
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largely redistributive role in national welfare regimes, acting as local relays for national 
Keynesian welfare policies. Urban governments maintained a “managerial-welfarist” 
function, concentrating on the local provision of services, facilities, and benefits to urban 
populations (Harvey 1989). In terms of services and benefits delivered, with few 
exceptions, urban welfare regimes tended to reflect the national social policy regimes in 
which they were embedded and the gender settlements around which they were built (see 
Mahon 2005).  
 
In the US, municipal governments were generally guided by the principles of urban 
liberalism which posited that the local state bears some responsibility for the maintenance 
of a minimum level of social reproduction for all (Vitale 2008). Under this paradigm, 
urban social problems were largely understood as structural and material in nature and 
could be solved through government intervention. To this end, local governments 
actively engaged in the provision of social services while overseeing the administration, 
and in some cases, contributing to the financing of, social welfare programs established 
by upper levels of government. This reflected the evolution of the urban state’s role in 
social reproduction from a limited one in the pre-New Deal era to greater involvement 
under the intergovernmental arrangements of Fordist-Keynesianism.28 Through a feminist 
political economy lens we can understand this evolution as the result of state responses to 
major economic and social crises, and intense social struggles, in which government 
intervened to mediate tensions between social reproduction and capital accumulation in 
the interests of economic, political, and social stability (see Abramovtiz 2010).  
 
With the emergence of industrial capitalism in the late 1800s, urban politicians used 
public welfare (typically in the form of outdoor relief, including cash and groceries) to 
command the loyalty of the poor and working class (Katz 1986). Families/households, 
and women’s labour within them, remained the main sources of welfare for most working 
class households (Gordon 1994). However, at the turn of the century urban social 
                                                
28 However, even at the height of the post-war period, subnational variation was a feature 
of the US welfare state (Katz 1986). See Chapter Two for the case of New York City. 
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reformers—including women in the settlement house movement—concerned with acute 
problems in social reproduction, and urban elites concerned with growing social 
instability, pushed city governments to commit to playing a more active role in social 
welfare provision, creating departments of public welfare and public works projects to 
augment the efforts of local relief agencies, charities, and churches (see Katz 1986: 151-
157). 
 
The Great Depression demonstrated the inability of private institutions and subnational 
governments to effectively mediate tensions between social reproduction and capital 
accumulation. With cities and states overwhelmed by rising social needs and civil unrest, 
the federal government intervened to directly underwrite social reproduction through the 
creation of a national welfare state (see Piven and Cloward 1977). However, while the 
national state promoted full employment and provided a safety net for the (white) 
working class, social programs were constructed around a male-breadwinner, female-
caregiver family form, which assumed women’s unpaid care work in the home and 
upheld patriarchal authority (Abramovitz 1996). As such, services supporting women’s 
paid employment were limited; for example, what child care services were available were 
offered mainly through private charities and churches, not state programs (see Michel 
1999). The gender settlement of Fordist-Keynesianism was further reflected in labour 
laws that excluded female-dominated occupations from coverage under employment 
standards and labour law, privileging occupations dominated by (white) men (see Boris 
and Klein 2012).  
 
Furthermore, the US version of the Fordist-Keynesian welfare state was built around a 
racialized social settlement (see Abramovitz 2010). People of colour did not benefit from 
social policies and employment/labour protections to the same degree as whites. For 
example, as I discuss further in Chapter Two, many social programs: excluded African 
American and Latino families and provided them with lower benefits; reinforced racist 
labour market policies; and disadvantaged single mothers in particular, who were 
frequently denied access to welfare. In other words, welfare state racism “deprived 
families of colour of the resources needed to adequately care for their families” 
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(Abramovitz 2010: 19). However, while the welfare state treated both women and people 
of colour as secondary citizens, the rights discourse that framed social citizenship did 
provide the grounds on which these groups could make future claims on the state in the 
name of civil, social, and economic rights (Lipman 2011: 11). 
 
In the 1960s, social movements—including the Black freedom movement and the 
women’s movement—mobilized to demand the expansion of civil rights and social 
citizenship. As discussed in Chapter Two, rebellions of urban blacks in particular sparked 
further state investment in social reproduction as the federal government sought to restore 
civil order and retain the political support of African Americans (see Piven and Cloward 
1977). This period marked the greatest increase in federal government spending on social 
welfare since the 1930s, contributing to the growth of urban welfare regimes, cementing 
their importance within the interscalar architecture of the Keynesian welfare state (see 
Katz 1986, 2012).  
 
The federal and state governments increased grants-in-aid to municipalities and state and 
municipal budgets grew as public sector spending rose dramatically (Piven and Cloward 
1977). As discussed in Chapter Two, in major cities social welfare expenditures included 
increased state support for poor women of colour’s care work in the household, as 
welfare policy was liberalized in response to urban unrest and the challenges of the 
welfare rights movement.29 Public funding for child care services also increased during 
this period although services remained limited and means-tested, reflecting continued 
ambivalence about women’s participation in the labour market despite rising rates of 
female labour force participation in the 1960s (Michel 1999).  
 
As the national state attempted to mediate tensions in social reproduction, urban welfare 
regimes came to deliver not only a range of federally funded social welfare benefits and 
services to the poor, but also provided employment opportunities for people of colour in 
                                                
29 This account is not meant to present the urban welfare regime of the period as 
unproblematic. As Lipman (2011: 11) argues, “Although the welfare state settlement 
provided social benefits it was also bureaucratic and often unresponsive, especially to 
poor people, people of colour, and women.” 
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an expanding public sector workforce (Katz 2012). With the expansion of the welfare 
state, the public sector became a key site of employment for African-Americans in 
particular, with black women taking up positions in social services, including in health 
care, childcare, and welfare administration.30 In many cities, this period was also marked 
by the growth of public sector unionism as municipal workers demanded collective 
bargaining rights, improved wages and working conditions and, along with the broader 
working class, the expansion of municipal services (see Freeman 2015). Overall, the 
urban welfare regime emerged as a key site of labour and social movement demands for 
greater collective responsibility for social reproduction (see O’Connor 1973; Piven and 
Cloward 1977; Castells 1979).  
 
By the early 1970s, cities across the advanced political economies illustrated the broader 
contradictions of Fordist-Keynesian capitalism, expressed in escalating tensions between 
the needs of capital and the rising expectations, bargaining power, and standards of living 
of the working class. Perhaps to a greater degree than any other advanced political 
economy, in the United States the crisis of Fordist-Keynesianism was expressed as a 
urban (fiscal) crisis, owing to a combination of economic restructuring (the shift to a 
post-Fordist economy), falling tax revenues (due to deindustrialization, suburbanization, 
and white flight), rising social welfare costs and public sector wage bills (reflecting the 
gains of the poor and municipal unions in the 1960s), and declining transfers from the 
federal and state governments (reflecting the turn to the right in national politics) (see 
Harvey 2007; O’Connor 1973).  
 
However, the US was not an exceptional case. As neoliberal ideas and modes of 
governance gain ascendency, urban welfare regimes across the advanced political 
economies faced increasing pressures to restructure with national governments 
retrenching social welfare spending and downloading key responsibilities for physical 
and social infrastructure to subnational governments. Central state supports for municipal 
                                                
30 As Katz (2012: 60) observes, “Public and publicly funded employment has been the 
most powerful vehicle of economic mobility for African Americans and the most 
effective antipoverty legacy of the War on Poverty and Great Society.” 
 
 
47 
activities began to dwindle and fiscal austerity measures were increasingly imposed on 
urban governments (Brenner and Theodore 2003). 
 
The advanced political economies also faced challenges stemming from changes in social 
reproduction, particularly the erosion of the male breadwinner/female caregiver family 
form. With shifts in gender norms, a decline in the family wage, growth of dual earner 
households, and social policies encouraging women’s labour market “activation”, rising 
numbers of women entered paid employment (Mahon 2005). As will be described in the 
next section, these transformations have had a distinctly urban dimension. Liberal welfare 
regimes, such as the US, have generally responded to these pressures by privatizing more 
of the costs of and responsibilities for social reproduction, shifting them to unpaid work 
in families/households, to the third sector, and to the market to provide for a price. It is in 
this broader context that the urban scale has become a central site of contested state-
driven efforts at addressing escalating crisis tendencies in social reproduction under 
neoliberalism.   
 
3. Social Reproduction, Privatization, and the Neoliberalization of the Urban 
Welfare Regime 
 
Across the advanced capitalist world, neoliberalism emerged as a ruling class response to 
the crisis of Fordist-Keynesian capitalism in the late 1970s.31 As a class project, 
neoliberalism seeks to restore the former dominance of capital in the economy as well as 
in the broader society and entails the increased penetration and domination of the state by 
capitalist class interests (Larner 2000: 5). Neoliberal states advance policies and forms of 
governance that eliminate barriers to capital accumulation and effectively shift power and 
wealth from labour to capital, including but not limited to: the privatization of public 
assets; the liberalization of world trade and removal of restrictions on corporate 
investment; the lowering of corporate tax rates; industrial and environmental 
                                                
31 The crisis was manifest in a sustained global recession, declining rates of profit across 
the advanced capitalist countries, and high unemployment combined with high inflation, 
or “stagflation”. See Harvey (2005), Dumenil and Levy (2004), and Larner (2000). 
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deregulation; and rolling back costs of social reproduction through welfare state 
retrenchment and the containment of working class wage demands through anti-union 
legislation and labour market deregulation (see Cameron 2006; Dumenil and Levy 2004).  
 
At the urban scale, neoliberal projects seek to dismantle the urban institutions of Fordist-
Keynesianism, including: public housing and rent control; public monopolies in the 
provision of standardized municipal services; municipal unions and local collective 
bargaining regimes; and the redistributive functions of local welfare state apparatuses 
(Brenner and Theodore 2002, 2003). Neoliberal urbanism emphasizes the mobilization of 
city space for capital accumulation and elite consumption practices, and market-based 
solutions to problems of urban governance, including social problems such as poverty 
and homelessness (see Vitale 2008).  
 
Central to neoliberal restructuring projects at all scales is the ideology and practice of 
privatization. This section outlines a feminist political economy approach to privatization 
before exploring how processes of privatization have been fundamental to the neoliberal 
restructuring of urban welfare regimes with gendered, and in the US, racialized effects.  
 
Privatization 
 
In neoliberal ideology, collective responsibility for social welfare is replaced by the belief 
that “societies function best when individuals are free to pursue their interests in the 
market without government intervention … ‘Freedom,’ ‘choice,’ and ‘individual rights’ 
are best guaranteed by the market” (Lipman 2011: 8). Privatization is thus central to 
neoliberal ideology and practice and is intimately linked to the belief that the market is 
both a guarantor of freedom and superior to the state as a mechanism to allocate goods 
and services in the economy (Harvey 2005). Privatization can take many forms, 
including: the sale of public assets to the private sector; the introduction of market 
mechanisms into existing state institutions; the implementation of user fees for public 
services; public/private partnerships in infrastructure development; and the contracting 
out of public services to for-profit companies and/or the third sector (Cooke 2008). 
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Privatization is often couched in the ideological guise of expanding consumer choice and 
individual rights to the exclusion of collective rights and public goods (Lipman 2011). 
Across a range of public services, proponents of neoliberalism cast the state as inflexible 
and limiting of choice. However, while “choice” suggests the opportunity or privilege of 
choosing freely, neoliberalism works to constrain real choice by undermining the public 
sector and directing citizens toward market-based solutions to social problems (see 
Lipman 2011; Teghtsoonian 1996). Furthermore, as Kershaw (2004: 928) has argued, 
“The language of choice facilitates the articulation of neoliberal principles with a 
rhetorical framework that conveys a sense of political neutrality and individualizes 
responsibility for social inequalities.” In doing so, neoliberal projects relegate the goal of 
equality—class, gender, racial equality—to a lesser status compared to the goal of 
individual liberty of choice (Kershaw 2004). 
 
In this vein, feminist political economists have developed a broader understanding of 
privatization that illuminates how neoliberal restructuring fundamentally reconfigures the 
distribution work of social reproduction across the state-market-family/household nexus, 
with gendered effects. For example, Fudge and Cossman (2002: 4) argue that 
neoliberalism reconfigures the responsibility for individual welfare from a matter of 
collective, social, or public obligation, to one “increasingly regarded as a private 
individual or, at most, a family or charitable matter.” Privatization is thus better 
understood as a “broad policy impulse to change the balance between public and private 
responsibility in public policy” and as such, involves the “fundamental renegotiation in 
the relationship between the public and private spheres that characterized the Keynesian 
welfare state” (Fudge and Cossman 2002: 18).  
 
In a FPE framework, privatization involves the retrenchment of the state in social 
reproduction, as goods owned or delivered publicly are shifted to the private market, the 
third sector, or the family/household, manufacturing a new division of responsibility for 
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individual and social welfare (Fudge and Cossman 2002).32 This process is profoundly 
gendered, classed, and often racialized, as privatization builds on existing unequal 
divisions of care work among men and women, racialized groups, and social classes. As 
neoliberal states privatize social reproduction, the responsibility for this work 
disproportionately falls to women, whether as unpaid work in households—heightening 
tensions between paid employment and unpaid care work—or as low-wage work in the 
labour market.  
 
Women in middle and upper class households can typically purchase services associated 
with social reproduction on the market, offloading their care work onto low-waged, 
precarious workers (typically racialized and/or immigrant women) through the exercise 
of market-based “choices”. However, in poor and working class households, women may 
respond to privatization through the intensification of their unpaid labour or through 
increased reliance on extended kinship networks and community to “take up the slack” 
for shortfalls in subsistence provision, income, or for an absence of welfare state services 
(Bezanson 2006: 12).33 Thus, as Kershaw (2004) notes, while offering the illusion of 
choice, privatization restricts most women’s choices in terms of the amount of paid or 
unpaid work, and leisure activities they wish to participate in. 
 
                                                
32 However, privatization should not be equated with simply the withdrawal of the state 
from social provisioning. It can involve a reconfiguration of the form of state regulation 
rather than simply deregulation (Fudge and Cossman 2002: 19). The concept of “re-
regulation” helps us understand how state form and the deployment of state power under 
neoliberalism have enforced new divisions of power and responsibility in social 
reproduction. For instance, the transition from welfare to workfare can entails an 
intensification of state involvement in the lives of poor women and an active state role in 
reconfiguring the care arrangements on which they depend in order to engage in workfare 
and paid work. Re-regulation thus highlights “the ways in which privatization is a highly 
selective process of shifting some public responsibilities to the private sphere while 
diligently protecting and intensifying the role of the state to regulate other areas” (Fudge 
and Cossman: 2002: 20).  
33 While espousing free markets and less government, the reconfiguration of the work of 
social reproduction requires an active state. While the neoliberal state seeks to guarantee 
the necessary political-economic conditions for capital accumulation it also plays a vital 
role in limiting “the power of those social groups whose interests are most closely linked 
to social reproduction, particularly labour and women” (Cameron 2006: 66).  
 
 
51 
In child care, neoliberal states may invoke “choice” to promote tax deductions or care 
allowances for mothers who reduce their paid workload rather than expanding publicly 
delivered child care services that would allow women to remain in the workforce 
(Kershaw 2004: 930). Alternatively, demand-side child care subsidies in the form of 
vouchers or tax credits may be promoted to purchase care in the market. Yet the value of 
vouchers or tax credits often preclude the “choice” of high quality, regulated child care 
options, pushing families to rely on unregulated providers or on family, friends, and 
neighbours. Furthermore, for poor women such schemes are often rolled out under the 
auspices of welfare to work programs that preclude the choice of full-time motherhood. 
As Teghtsoonian (1996: 119) points out, neoliberal policies premised on “choice” thus 
fail to “acknowledge the persistence of material and ideological constraints on women’s 
‘opportunity or privilege of choosing freely’ with respect to the care of their children.”  
 
Neoliberalization of the Urban Welfare Regime 
 
The urban welfare regime is one site at which processes of privatization play out as part 
of broader projects of neoliberal welfare state restructuring. As Mahon (2005: 341) points 
out, welfare state restructuring has “often gone hand in hand with rescaling, i.e. the 
production, reconfiguration or contestation of … hierarchies among geographical scales.” 
Across the advanced political economies, neoliberalism sees national states devolve 
tasks, burdens, and responsibilities to subnational governments, including responsibilities 
for key aspects of social reproduction (Mahon 2005). Lacking the fiscal capacities to fund 
these responsibilities, with earlier systems of central government support for municipal 
activities retrenched, cities are forced to decide whether to finance social infrastructure 
through the local tax base, redeploy programs and services in more “cost-efficient” ways, 
or effectively abandon the urban role in “the social” altogether (Hackworth 2007: 12). In 
liberal welfare regimes, city governments have generally opted to offload costs of and 
responsibilities for social reproduction onto families/households, the market, and the third 
sector. In this way, welfare state retrenchment has been in part been engineered via 
downloading to subnational scales (Mahon 2005).  
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However, while experiencing pressures to restructure from above, urban governments 
have also reoriented policy and practices in response to local pressures (see Hackworth 
2007). Capitalist class demands for deregulation, privatization, and welfare state 
retrenchment made at national and regional scales find their urban equivalent in 
coalitions of chambers of commerce, business improvement associations, urban elites, 
and neoliberal think tanks and policymakers, that seek to roll back the urban institutions 
of Fordist-Keynesianism, including the redistributive functions of the local state, as well 
as contain the power of those social groups most closely connected to social 
reproduction, including municipal unions and the urban poor. As Brenner and Theodore 
(2002: 372) put it, in the name of creating a “good business climate” these coalitions seek 
“the destruction of the ‘liberal city’ in which all inhabitants are entitled to basic civil 
liberties, social services, and political rights.”  
 
The primary impetus behind these efforts is the desire to mobilize urban space “as an 
arena both for market-orientated economic growth and for elite consumption practices,” 
dismantling any barriers to investment and capital accumulation (Brenner and Theodore 
2002: 372). Yet regardless of the political stripe of those in municipal office, with 
national economies opened up to global markets, cities have had to engage in inter-urban 
competition for highly mobile flows of capital, skilled labour, and culture (Allawhala et 
al. 2011: 210). Urban governments increasingly rely on policies designed to capture these 
flows, including tax abatements and other measures aimed at subsidizing capital to 
relocate and invest in the city. This shift from a “managerial-welfarist” function to “urban 
entrepreneurialism” has deleterious impacts on the urban welfare regime; as cities 
attempt to attract investment, “reducing government subsidies for social welfare and 
privatizing public health, education, transportation, and public housing are axiomatic” 
(Lipman 2011: 26).34  
                                                
34 As Lipman (2011: 24) observes, in the United States, “neoliberal theories of ‘lean 
government’ and devolution of powers to local governments, justified cuts in federal 
funding to cities.” These cuts imposed fiscal constraints on local governments and 
delinked them from national government. With the imposition of fiscal austerity 
measures upon cities, city governments increasingly turned to debt financing to fund 
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Thus, under neoliberalism, there is a general tendency for urban governments to shift 
from underwriting some of the work of social reproduction to downloading services to 
unpaid work in families/households, to the third sector, and to the market to provide for a 
price. In the US, privatization of costs of and responsibilities for social reproduction can 
be witnessed in a range of policy measures and practices, including but not limited to: the 
expansion of third sector and private sector delivery of urban social services; the 
abolition of rent control and the privatization of public housing; the privatization of 
public education and introduction of charter schools; the scaling back of community 
development agencies; and the introduction of user fees for previously free municipal 
services, such as public recreation facilities (Lipman 2011; Brenner and Theodore 2003).  
 
Perhaps one of the most widespread forms of privatization employed in neoliberal urban 
governance is the marketization of urban services through voucher programs in housing, 
employment services, education, and child care (see Lipman 2012; Hackworth 2007). As 
mentioned in the previous section, these programs are rolled out in the name of 
expanding “consumer choice” yet the overall aim is to reduce the size and scope of local 
government, shifting costs of and responsibilities for social reproduction to 
households/families. Furthermore, in areas such as education, voucher schemes typically 
work to weaken the power of municipal unions and lower municipal labour costs as the 
direct delivery of services by unionized public employees is replaced by non-union third 
sector and private sector entities.  
 
Processes of privatization at the urban scale are also witnessed in the restructuring of 
social assistance programs and the shift from welfare to workfare. Welfare-to-work 
initiatives discipline the poor into the lower reaches of the urban labour market, while 
individualizing responsibility for social reproduction (see Soss et al. 2012).35 As Peck 
                                                                                                                                            
municipal services and obligations, therefore subjecting them to regulation by powerful 
financial interests, and especially bond rating agencies (Hackworth 2007). 
35 The roll out of punitive workfare strategies have been paired with aggressive urban 
policing tactics designed to manage the social fallout from a retreating welfare state, 
increasingly precarious work, and the gentrification of poor and working class 
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(2001) observes, while often undertaken at the national scale, neoliberal welfare reforms 
typically entail some form of decentralization or devolution in policy development and 
delivery systems. For example, in the US, national welfare reform ended the federal 
entitlement status of welfare for poor women and children, introduced time-limited 
benefits, capped welfare spending, and mandated work participation, but also devolved 
residual provisions to the states (Soss et al. 2012). Welfare reform has thus been 
implemented in such a way as to encourage new forms of local experimentation (within 
parameters set by state and federal rule regimes) as policymakers seek “best practices” 
and tailor programs to the needs of local labour markets (Peck 2001). 
 
In the US, race has played a central role in the neoliberal restructuring of the urban 
welfare state (see Lipman 2011; Soss et al. 2012). Since the height of Fordist-
Keynesianism in the late 1960s, the urban poor have been racially coded as black and 
Hispanic and “the ‘inner-city’ and the public institutions with which it is identified are 
pathologized in a racially coded morality discourse that legitimates their dismantling” 
(Lipman 2011: 12). The mobilization of this racialized logic justifies the privatization of 
urban services such as public housing, schools, and health clinics. And while national 
welfare programs serving the “deserving poor” are less politically vulnerable, services 
and benefits associated with racially marked urban populations are targeted by 
policymakers for derision and dismantling (see Soss et al. 2012). Finally, this process of 
racialization is tied up in the reframing of urban social problems, namely poverty. In the 
1960s and 1970s, poverty generally understood as structural and material in nature; under 
neoliberalism, poverty is reframed in cultural terms. Calls for “individual responsibility” 
and ending “dependency” construct people of colour as an undeserving “urban 
underclass” mired in a “culture of poverty”, providing policymakers with another 
rationale to dismantle social programs and privatize social reproduction (see Soss et al. 
2012).   
                                                                                                                                            
neighbourhoods (see Wacquant 2009a, 2009b). In this context, surveillance, zero-
tolerance policing, and the containment of immigrants, the homeless, low-income 
communities of colour, and the poorest residents of the city, becomes a primary function 
of the urban state through its police force and criminal justice system (Smith 1996).  
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The Urban Care Crisis 
 
It is in this broader context that the urban welfare regime has become a central site of 
escalating crisis tendencies in social reproduction for poor and working class urban 
families/households and contested efforts aimed at their mediation. These households, 
and especially the women within them, typically struggle to balance the demands of paid 
work and social reproduction in the context dwindling social supports and polarized 
urban labour markets characterized by the prevalence of precarious, service sector 
employment at the low-end.  
 
While crisis tendencies can be seen across a range of social processes, they take one 
expression in a growing crisis of care (Bezanson 2006; Vosko 2006). In liberal welfare 
regimes, two factors make this crisis especially acute in urban regions. First, shifting 
gender relations began to disrupt post-war patterns of social reproduction earlier in big 
cities than in rural areas (Mahon 2005: 342). As growing numbers of women have 
entered urban labour markets, less are available to provide care at home and in their 
communities, reshaping the social organization of care work. Second, the concentration 
of the poor in urban regions—especially in the US context—means that social policies 
designed to push single mothers into the lower reaches of the labour market have resulted 
in a growing need and demand for care in big cities (see Reese 2011).   
 
State-driven efforts at addressing the care crisis tend to reflect the characteristics of the 
broader welfare regimes in which they are embedded (see Mahon 2005).  In terms of 
child care, liberal welfare regimes typically favour demand-side supports, such as 
vouchers or subsidies targeted at low-income families and child care tax credits targeted 
to middle-class households. Thus, in the absence of universal, publicly funded child care 
services and paid family leave, how families/households manage the care crisis is 
dependent on the resources available to them. In the US, more economically privileged 
families/households have relied upon a steady stream of low-wage immigrant care 
workers as well as proliferating high-end preschool and au-pair services in major urban 
centres. In contrast, poor households must rely on limited, means-tested and often 
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inadequate publicly funded care services or use state subsidies in the form of vouchers to 
purchase care from informal providers, including kith and kin (see Polakow 2007).  
 
As Glenn (2000: 84) points out, this response reflects “a privatized and gendered caring 
regime in which families, rather than larger society, are responsible for caring and in 
which women (and other subordinate groups) are assigned primary responsibility for care 
giving.” As will be discussed in Chapter Three, in the wake of welfare reform in New 
York, privatized solutions to the escalating child care crisis relied upon an expanding 
pool of precarious, home-based child care providers. New York’s response to the crisis 
had the effect of shifting costs of care onto low-income families/households and 
communities, and especially the women within them, as the city attempted to provide 
much-needed child care services “on the cheap”.  
 
Actually Existing Urban Neoliberalism  
  
While I have noted some general tendencies in welfare state restructuring at the urban 
scale (highlighting the US context and liberal welfare regimes in particular) neoliberal 
restructuring projects are geographically variable not only across, but within national 
states. Brenner and Theodore’s (2002, 2003) concept of  “actually existing neoliberalism” 
reminds us that these projects evolve within contextually specific political-economic 
circumstances defined by legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, 
regulatory practices, and political struggles, i.e. they are “contextually embedded”. An 
adequate understanding of neoliberal restructuring must therefore explore the 
“contextually specific interactions between inherited regulatory landscapes and emergent 
neoliberal, market–oriented restructuring projects at a broad range of geographical 
scales” (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 349).  
 
In keeping with this approach, analyses of “actually existing” urban neoliberalism must 
also account for the contextually embedded character of resistance and contestation. As 
Krinksy (2006: 159) has argued, wherever neoliberal governance is tried, “its ‘roll-back’ 
moment—i.e. the point at which it uproots the existing social policy infrastructure—
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generates specific sorts of opposition depending upon the existing configuration of, and 
division of labour in, the state and civil society groups.” Peck (2001) makes a similar 
observation in his study of anti-workfare politics, arguing that resistance to workfare is 
particularized and localized and appears just as variegated as workfare strategies 
themselves. Anti-workfare politics, he observes, is “contingent on pre-existing and 
locally-variable capacities for resistance, primarily at the urban scale” (Peck 2001: 496).  
 
In the United States, labour unions, community organizations, anti-poverty groups, social 
service advocates, welfare rights organizations, public space activists, and child care 
advocates have combined in different coalitions, in different cities, and with differing 
degrees of success to contest the neoliberal restructuring of urban welfare regimes (see 
Reese 2011; Krinsky and Reese 2006). Like the restructuring it confronts, resistance to 
urban neoliberalization must therefore be understood as contextually embedded in 
political-economic space. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Feminist scholarship on welfare regimes has tended to treat the state as a singular entity, 
with little attention given to the scalar nature of welfare provision, social policy action, 
and contestation. The urban in particular has been overlooked as a scale through which to 
explore questions of social reproduction, welfare state restructuring/resistance, and the 
reorganization of the state-market-family/household nexus under neoliberalism. Given 
the importance of cities, as sites of state intervention in social reproduction and of 
women’s activism around social policy and social infrastructure, addressing this lacuna is 
one of the primary theoretical objectives of this study. To this end, with an eye to the US 
context, the theoretical framework presented in this chapter has attempted to outline a 
feminist political economy approach to urban welfare regimes, mapping their 
transformation under neoliberalism and the implications for social relations of class, race, 
and gender.  
Under Fordist-Keynesianism, national states came to underwrite some of the costs of and 
responsibilities for key aspects of social reproduction. Responding to economic and 
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social crises, and to social struggles from below, the national state intervened to mediate 
tensions between social reproduction and capital accumulation, constructing a national 
welfare state—albeit one ordered on a male-breadwinner/female-caregiver gender 
settlement which assumed women’s unpaid care work in the home. Across advanced 
political economies, cities played a crucial role in this mediation with local government 
acting as a relay point for national Keynesian welfare policies and a provider of social 
services and benefits to urban populations.   
 
The breakdown of Fordist-Keynesianism and rise of neoliberal globalization has been 
marked by the restructuring and rescaling of economic production and state regulatory 
activity. Under neoliberalism, responsibilities for key aspects of social reproduction have 
been downloaded from the national to subnational scales and offloaded via privatization 
to families/households, to the third sector, and to the market to provide for a price. In 
response to both fiscal pressures imposed from above and to the mobilization of urban 
elites around a neoliberal agenda, cities have increasingly adopted entrepreneurial 
approaches to municipal governance. While cities attempt to attract highly mobile flows 
of capital with business tax cuts, tax abatements, and deregulation measures, they have 
rolled back the urban institutions of Fordist-Keynesianism, including the redistributive 
aspects of the local welfare state, and have sought to contain those social groups—
including public sector unions and the urban poor—most closely linked to social 
reproduction.  
 
Given this overall context, to remain blind to the urban dimensions of welfare regimes 
under neoliberalism is to miss crucial aspects of welfare state restructuring and resistance 
(see Mahon and Macdonald 2010). In neoliberalizing cities, urban social services once 
delivered directly by the local state are increasingly privatized via market mechanisms, 
contracting out to the third sector, and/or shifted to families/households. Furthermore, 
mandatory work requirements are imposed on urban welfare recipients, disciplining the 
poor into the lower reaches of the labour market and individualizing responsibility for 
social reproduction. As I have pointed out, these processes of privatization are 
gendered—and in the United States, racialized—with women of colour 
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disproportionately represented among the frontline providers of urban social services and 
as beneficiaries of welfare state programs.  
 
As neoliberal states regulate labour markets in favour of capital, implement social 
policies that elevate private responsibility for social reproduction, and dismantle social 
and labour market supports, they create crisis tendencies in social reproduction for poor 
and working class households in particular, which find one expression in crisis of care. 
As in other periods of escalating tensions in social reproduction, the urban scale remains 
an important site at which contested state efforts at mediation play out. The directions 
these efforts take are not only dependent on the orientation of particular governments but 
shaped by social struggle and the balance of social forces in a given urban welfare 
regime.  
 
As we see in liberal welfare state responses to the care crisis, state efforts to mediate 
escalating crisis tendencies in social reproduction have centred on strategies of 
privatization, eroding the already limited public care infrastructures established under 
Fordist-Keynesianism, while tracking poor, immigrant, and racialized women into care 
work. Whether through unpaid care in the household or through precarious, low-waged 
work in the market, third sector, or a neoliberalizing public sector, liberal welfare states 
presume these women will pick up the social reproductive slack left in the wake of 
dwindling social supports and growing labour market insecurity. However, across and 
even within particular welfare states, these processes have been geographically variable. 
A focus on “actually existing” urban neoliberalism allows us to better identify, analyze, 
and understand the contextually embedded character of these processes as exhibited by 
welfare reform in New York City, the reorganization of care work it entailed, and the 
politics of resistance it engendered.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CARE WORK AND THE URBAN WELFARE 
REGIME: WELFARE AND CHILD CARE IN NEW YORK CITY, 1935-1993 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the historical context of neoliberal restructuring and resistance at 
the intersection of welfare reform and child care in New York City. As discussed in 
Chapter One, Brenner and Theodore’s (2002, 2003) approach to “actually existing” urban 
neoliberalism emphasizes the “contextual embeddedness” of neoliberal restructuring 
projects insofar as they are produced within contextually specific political-economic 
circumstances defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy 
regimes, regulatory practices, and social and political struggles. It is only by examining 
these legacies in some depth that we can fully appreciate the contextually embedded—or 
place-specific—character of welfare reform in New York, the reorganization of child care 
work it entailed, and the politics of resistance it engendered.     
 
With these theoretical concerns in mind, the aim of this chapter is threefold. The chapter 
highlights how popular struggles over the social organization of care work—as part of 
broader struggles over social reproduction—shaped the historical development and 
unique character of New York City’s urban welfare regime. For as I argue in Chapter 
Three, it was the product of these struggles, in the institutional legacies of the city’s 
social democracy, which the Giuliani administration sought to restructure along 
neoliberal lines.  
 
I also seeks to illustrate the ways in which contemporary struggles over the social 
organization of care work—the focus of Chapter Four—are situated within a long history 
of contestation over child care, welfare, and the value of women’s care work in the city; 
struggles in which working class women and women of colour’s activism have been 
central. As this chapter suggests, opposition to the Giuliani administration’s neoliberal 
project was very much rooted in place-specific legacies of resistance.  
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Finally, through New York City the chapter tracks escalating crisis tendencies in social 
reproduction for poor and working class families/households under neoliberalism. 
Although fiercely contested by social movements, successive city administrations 
emphasized privatized remedies aimed at mediation. The Giuliani administration’s 
response to the child care crisis was a continuation—and in many ways an 
intensification—of the neoliberalization of New York’s welfare regime and ongoing 
privatization of social reproduction since the mid-1970s. 
 
However, before providing a detailed outline of the chapter, it is necessary to briefly 
introduce New York’s post-war welfare regime. While urban welfare states of the 
Fordist-Keynesian era generally acted as a relay point for national Keynesian welfare 
policies, New York was exceptional in the degree to which local government underwrote 
social reproduction, providing a wider range of benefits, services, and protections to poor 
and working class families/households than any other city in the US.      
 
New York’s Urban Social Democracy  
 
Under Fordist-Keynesianism, New York City built what Freeman (2000, 2014) has 
alternatively called an “urban social democracy”, “social democratic polity” or “welfare 
state in one city.”36 Between 1945 and 1975, New York came to embody “a particular 
style of social democratic politics: one that embraced a strong welfare state, a culture of 
labour power and solidarity, and a belief in the necessity of using government (even city 
government) to help the disadvantaged” (Philips-Fein 2013: 25). In response to the 
demands of the city’s working class and progressive social movements—as expressed 
through electoral politics, a robust labour movement, and participation in tenants groups, 
                                                
36 New York’s urban welfare state could arguably be described as “social liberal”, 
denoting a social policy/welfare regime that has both the characteristics of a means-
tested, liberal welfare state and some of the universalistic programs typical of a social 
democratic welfare regime. However, I choose to follow Freeman (2000, 2014) and 
others in characterizing the constellation of social programs, a strong labour movement, 
and a left-wing political culture as an urban social democracy. 
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block associations, welfare rights, civil rights, and women’s organizations—the city came 
to “underwrite a vision of urban social citizenship, unique to New York” (Phillips-Fein 
2013: 25; see also Freeman 2000, 2014). 
 
By the height of the Keynesian welfare state in the early 1970s, New York City was 
home to: an extensive system of public housing; a network of twenty-two public 
hospitals; a tuition-free municipal university system; cheap and easy-to-use mass transit; 
a wide range of social services and community agencies serving poor and working class 
neighbourhoods; and compared to much of the country, generous welfare benefits for the 
poor (see Freeman 2000, 2014). The city also boasted the largest publicly funded child 
care system in the nation, staffed by a unionized workforce and notable not only for the 
number of children it served, but for its commitment to quality child care that set national 
standards (see ACS 2005).  
 
The neoliberal restructuring of New York—initiated as a response to the fiscal crisis of 
1975—can be understood as an effort by political and economic elites to rollback the 
gains of popular struggle, diminish the power of progressive social movements and 
public sector unions, and shift costs of social reproduction away from the state and onto 
families/households.37 From 1975 onwards, drastic cuts to social services and income 
supports—including to welfare and child care—and general disinvestment from the city’s 
social infrastructure has shifted more of the burden of social reproduction onto 
families/household. This restructuring has had markedly gendered and racialized impacts, 
as working class women, and especially women of colour in the city’s low-income 
neighbourhoods, struggle to balance the demands of paid employment and social 
reproduction. 
 
This chapter highlights five key moments—divided into five corresponding sections—
that have shaped the social organization of care work in New York and the historical 
development and character of the city’s welfare regime, providing the historical context 
                                                
37 On the crisis as opportunity to roll back working class gains, see Tabb (1982), Freeman 
(2000), Sites (2003), Moody (2007), Philips-Fein (2013). 
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for contemporary restructuring and resistance.38 The first section traces the roots of the 
city’s child care exceptionalism in the New Deal welfare state and immediate post-war 
period. Public child care in New York was established during the Great Depression as 
part of the federal government’s New Deal efforts to create jobs for unemployed school 
teachers. At the start of the war, this nascent public child care system was bolstered by 
the establishment of wartime day nurseries and preserved by social movement struggles 
to save municipal child care services in peacetime (see Michel 1999).  
 
In the 1960s, New York was the epicentre of a national movement for welfare rights 
(Kornbluh 2007).39 Amidst Civil Rights demonstrations, urban riots, and the federal 
government’s Great Society initiatives, poor women of colour demanded state support for 
the work of raising and caring for their children. In the second section, I explore how the 
militant activism of welfare mothers, combined with rising levels of civil disorder, led to 
the liberalization of social assistance in New York City and the reorganization of poor 
women of colour’s care work.   
 
The demands of the urban poor triggered demands by other groups, such as municipal 
workers and daycare activists (Piven and Cloward 1977). In the third section of the 
chapter, I examine how New York’s daycare movement, driven by a vision of universal 
child care, mobilized to demand the expansion of the city’s public daycare system. The 
movement’s voice was amplified by the city’s daycare workers who became the first 
child care workforce in the country to unionize, setting national standards for wages and 
working conditions in the sector. Their success was part of a broader wave of municipal 
unionism in New York City, as public sector workers improved wages and working 
conditions in a range of municipal and social services (see Freeman 2015).  
                                                
38 As Kornbluh (2007: 197) has argued, local case studies are essential to the study of 
twentieth-century American politics because “much political power was exercised, and 
fought, at the local level.” While the development of New York’s welfare state is 
intimately tied to politics at the national scale, the aim here is to elucidate the unique 
history of the city’s welfare regime and especially popular struggles over the social 
organization of care work at the local scale. As such, I highlight federal policies and 
politics only when particularly relevant to the New York context.  
39 See also Piven and Cloward (1977) and Nadasen (2012). 
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The fiscal crisis of 1975 marked a turning point in New York politics and led to 
numerous battles over daycare services, public assistance, and the future of the city’s 
welfare state. Political and economic elites blamed the crisis on “overly generous” social 
programs and the city’s municipal unions. As New York became a test case for neoliberal 
policies and practices (see Harvey 2005: 44-48), welfare rights groups, the daycare 
movement, and the daycare workers’ union fought to defend past gains and protect the 
legacies of the city’s social democracy. I explore these struggles in the fourth section of 
the chapter.   
 
The fifth and final section looks at the impact of the neoliberal turn at the national scale 
on welfare and child care in New York. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the federal 
government drastically cut aid to cities and rolled back many aspects of the New Deal 
and Great Society welfare state.40 During this period, the real value of welfare benefits 
fell precipitously. As New York adopted welfare to work policies designed to push poor 
mothers into the labour market, social spending cuts led to the contraction of the city’s 
public child care system, escalating the child care crisis for poor families/households. At 
the same time, federal funding for child care became closely tied to the notion of “parent 
choice” and increasingly delivered through vouchers as municipal services were 
restructured along neoliberal lines.  
 
In the chapter’s conclusion, I detail what remained of New York’s social democratic 
welfare state come the election of Rudolph Giuliani in 1993. Whereas previous mayoral 
administrations chipped away at the institutional legacies of popular struggle in New 
York, Giuliani sought to radically restructure the role and scope of local government 
through strategies of privatization. As social supports were cut and growing numbers of 
poor mothers entered paid work, New York became the site of escalating crisis 
tendencies in social reproduction, which took one expression in a growing child care 
crisis.  
                                                
40 Together, the reforms and social welfare programs of the 1930s New Deal and the 
1960s Great Society constituted the American version of the Keynesian welfare state.  
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1. The Roots of New York City’s Child Care Exceptionalism 
 
Child care in the United States has largely been considered a private responsibility (see 
Levy and Michel 2002). Historically, public funding for child care services is limited, 
means-tested and tied to efforts to move poor mothers from welfare into paid work. 
Furthermore, the lack of public investment in child care has had deleterious consequences 
for both program quality and the quality of working conditions of child care providers: 
most child care programs have been considered to be of low to mediocre quality, while 
child care providers are among the most poorly paid workers in the country (Whitebook 
2001; Polakow 2007).  
 
New York City has stood as somewhat of an exception to these national trends, an outlier 
amongst municipal child care regimes. At various points in the city’s history, social 
movement struggles—in which working class women’s activism has been central—have 
pushed the local state to socialize more of the costs of and responsibilities for child care. 
Partly as a result of these struggles, the city has come to boast the largest municipal child 
care system in the nation and has traditionally been committed to strong regulations and 
the delivery of high quality services that set national standards (see ACS 2005). This 
section examines the historical roots of New York’s child care exceptionalism.  
 
From the New Deal to the Post-War Era 
 
Public child care in New York City has its origins in the New Deal welfare state, a suite 
of social welfare programs introduced by the federal government as a response to social 
and economic disruption of the Great Depression (see Piven and Cloward 1977; Katz 
1986).41 During the 1930s, rent strikes, mob looting, bread riots, and demonstrations—
often led by Communist Party organizers and other left-wing activists—spread across the 
US. This unrest was at its most acute in major urban centres. Confronted with mass 
unemployment, rising levels of unrest, and declining tax revenues, local governments and 
                                                
41 For an account of the role of popular struggles in the rise of the New Deal welfare 
state, see Piven and Cloward, (1977), Chapter Two.  
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municipal relief agencies were overwhelmed by demands for assistance. Many cities, 
including New York, were pushed to the brink of bankruptcy, unable to cope with 
growing social need. Big city mayors and other urban elites demanded aid from the 
federal government to quell social disorder and save local government from fiscal ruin 
(Piven and Cloward 1977). This social and political instability led to the election of 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the launch of the New Deal, and the introduction of social 
programs such as emergency relief, Social Security, and unemployment insurance (Piven 
and Cloward 1977; see also Katz 1986).  
 
A key agency created by the New Deal was the Works Projects Administration (WPA). 
The WPA hired millions of unemployed workers to carry out public works projects 
across the country. As part of its mandate, the WPA also established a program of 
Emergency Nursery Schools (ENS) under which New York established fourteen school-
based nurseries; the city’s first publicly funded child care infrastructure (see Michel 
1999). Prior to the New Deal, child care services in the city had taken the form of day 
nurseries—many of questionable quality—run almost exclusively by private 
philanthropy, non-profit, and religious organizations (ACS 2005).  
 
New York’s ENS nurseries met the needs of only a small number of the city’s poor 
families; their primary purpose was to create jobs for unemployed teachers, nurses, and 
nutritionists, in addition to caring for children while unemployed parents looked for work 
(Michel 1999). As the nation recovered from the Great Depression, federal funding for 
the ENS program was ended and the survival of New York’s nascent public child care 
system was put into question (Michel 1999: 194).  
With the onset of the Second World War, rising numbers of women entered New York’s 
war industries and the lack of adequate child care services prompted Mayor Fiorella 
LaGuardia to establish a Committee on the Wartime Care of Children. Through this 
committee, New York committed to saving the ENS nurseries and became the only city 
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in the nation with publicly subsidized daycare services (ACS 2005).42 New York 
provided an example to the nation and between 1943 and 1945 wartime daycares were 
established in hundreds of cities under the federal government’s 1941 Lanham Act 
(Michel 1999). At the height of the war, approximately 130,000 children in 47 states 
were being served in 3,000 publicly-funded daycare centres. As Fousekis (2011) has 
argued, it was the closest the country has come to establishing a universal child care 
system. 
However, an anomaly in wartime planning had initially threatened New York’s daycares: 
the city escaped designation as a “war-impact area” and as a result, its daycare services—
some public, others voluntary—were not eligible for federal funds under the Lanham Act 
(Michel 1999: 193-194). As growing numbers of women found work in the city’s 
factories, the LaGuardia administration struggled to provide child care services. In the 
midst of an escalating child care crisis, and as result of intense lobbying from the city, 
New York State agreed to jointly fund child care, appropriating $2.5 million for daycare 
for mothers engaged in defense-related industries (Michel 1999: 194).  
During this period, the city government’s role in the administration of child care became 
firmly established as New York was home to just over eighty daycares serving the 
children of working parents (DCCNY 2012). Pushed by women in the social reform 
movement and child studies experts, City Hall committed to establishing and maintaining 
high standards in the system through the creation of the Day Care Unit in the municipal 
Department of Health. The unit was a pioneering institution in the field, overseeing the 
introduction of educational programs, improving hygiene, and developing physical 
infrastructure (Michel 1999: 194; see also ACS 2005: 38). According to Michel (1999: 
194), upon the conclusion of the war, New York City officials, civic leaders, and parents, 
were all “eager to see that their model system lasted into the postwar period.” 
 
                                                
42 The Committee also laid the groundwork for a partnership between City, State, and 
non-profit child care sponsoring boards that continues to this day (ACS 2005). 
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The Post-War Fight to Save Child Care 
At war’s end, women were expected to return to the home as demobilized soldiers 
returned to the nation’s factories (see Michel 1999). Bureaucrats within New York 
State’s youth authority argued that the city’s daycare services were too costly and that 
access should be restricted to needy families, effectively reducing child care to a welfare 
service. They recommended the withdrawal of State aid and the relegation of daycare to 
an issue of local welfare (Michel 1999: 195). Many of the city’s working class women 
strongly opposed these recommendations and a citywide grassroots mobilization of 
parents and children—driven by several left-leaning Popular Front groups under the 
banner of the United Parents Association (UPA)—demanded the continuation of State 
funding and the preservation of public daycare services (Michel 1999: 193).  
 
The United Parents Association consisted of liberals, socialists, and communists, and 
called for child care as a universal right, seeing it as an essential component of women’s 
social citizenship (Michel 1999: 194). The organization was born in the milieu of what 
Freeman (2000) has called “Red New York” as communists and other leftists exerted 
influence in the social, cultural and political life of the post-war city.  
 
In its fight to preserve public daycare, the UPA was joined by the Day Care Council of 
New York (DCC). In contrast to the former’s working class base, the DCC found support 
in the city’s upper-class philanthropic organizations and civic circles and “emphasized 
the financial need of specific families as rationale for the public funding of child care” 
(Michel 1999: 194-195). Despite their ideological differences, as Michel (1999: 195) 
writes, the joint campaign of the UPA and DCC was “part of a wave of postwar activism 
in which, for the first time, American parents directly expressed their need for child care 
in a visible and organized fashion.”  
 
While the State ignored the bourgeoning daycare movement’s demands, under intense 
pressure from the UPA and DCC, the city government agreed to make up the State’s 
portion of the funds and keep New York’s wartime daycares operating (Michel 1999: 
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195). This was a massive victory for New York’s daycare movement as it marked the 
first peacetime allocation of municipal tax dollars for child care programs (DCCNY 
2012). The city’s New Deal nurseries—expanded into wartime daycares—were now an 
established feature of post-war New York’s welfare state, funded exclusively through the 
municipal tax base.   
 
In the aftermath of the victory, New York’s daycare movement continued to be an 
influential actor in city and State child care politics. Activists continued to press City Hall 
to expand its commitment to public child care and by 1950 New York was serving over 
4,600 children in close to 100 daycare centres, a quarter of which were located in the 
city’s newly constructed public housing projects (Michel 1999: 195). Eighty-four percent 
of child care funding came from the municipal government, with parent’s fees and 
participating agencies making up the remainder (Michel 1999: 195). As evidence of New 
York City’s child care exceptionalism, the State of California was the only other 
jurisdiction in the nation to establish a post-war, publicly-funded child care system (see 
Fousekis 2011).  
 
Child Care Politics Enters the Cold War 
 
Yet as the country descended into the anti-communist hysteria of the Cold War, the 
tenuous coalition at the heart of the day care movement began to unravel (Michel 1999: 
196). While the movement’s left-wing continued to argue for child care as a universal 
entitlement for working mothers, middle-class women in the DCC found political 
expediency in emphasizing child care as a welfare service. Subject to redbaiting, the 
city’s radical daycare activists were marginalized while municipal officials welcomed 
more “respectable” advocates into the policymaking fold (Michel 1999: 197). At the 
national level, the child care coalition established during the war, which mirrored that of 
New York, broke apart as moderate groups feared they would be labeled “communists” 
and distanced themselves from the demand for universal child care (Fousekis 2011). 
 
 
 
70 
The marginalization of the radical left, and the likes of the UPA, had important 
implications for local and federal child care policy going forward. The DCC was to 
become the dominant force in New York City, and national, child care politics (Michel 
1999). The organization emerged as the core of a new national daycare movement that 
framed child care primarily as a welfare service for the poor, not a social right (Fousekis 
2011). As Michel (1999: 210) remarks, by the beginning of the 1960s, national child care 
organizations were fighting a losing battle to “reverse the dangerous trend toward linking 
child care with efforts to reduce the welfare rolls.” 
 
In places like New York and California, where the daycare movement’s ambitions had 
been high and the goal of universal child care within reach, means-testing came to 
determine eligibility for subsidized daycare (Fousekis 2011). Despite these shifts, 
publicly-funded child care services emerged as a fixture of New York’s post-war welfare 
state—setting national standards for early childhood education, and unique in the support 
it received from city government. While the system fell far short of the vision of New 
York’s radical daycare activists, the demand for universal child care would be revived in 
the 1960s and early 1970s by organizations such as the Day Care Forum and the 
Committee for Community Controlled Day Care. 
 
2. The Welfare Rights Movement in New York City 
 
From the early 1960s to the mid 1970s, New York was the epicentre of a national 
movement of poor women demanding reform to welfare policy, greater respect and 
dignity, and state support for their care work in the home (see Piven and Cloward 1977; 
Kornbluh 2007; Nadasen 2005, 2012).43 Though an interracial movement, African-
American women took the lead in the struggle for what became known as “welfare 
rights” (Nadasen 2005, 2012). Black women had long been excluded from poor relief 
programs by racist local authorities that deemed them “employable”. However, amidst 
                                                
43 As Kornbluh (2007: 17) writes: “The forces that spawned welfare rights organizing 
were national in scope. They inspired poor women and men to mobilize all over the 
country. But New York City led the way.” 
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insurgencies of the urban poor, and the political response they provoked, millions of poor 
women and children gained access to welfare (Piven and Cloward 1977). Together, these 
women demanded, “a decent standard of living based on the work they performed as 
mothers, regardless of behaviour or personal morality” (Nadasen 2012: 13). But as New 
York emerged as a symbol of the movement’s success it quickly became a target for 
those who sought to roll back the gains made by poor women of colour and their allies.  
 
Welfare and Women of Colour’s Care Work 
 
To understand why welfare rights mounted a challenge to the prevailing social 
organization of care work, we need to briefly explore the history of poor relief. In 1935 
the Social Security Act (SSA), a key part of the New Deal, established Aid to Dependent 
Children (ADC). ADC was modeled on state laws and locally administered programs, 
known as “mothers’ pensions”, that from 1908 to 1935 provided cash grants to poor 
single mothers and their children (Gordon 1994). Mothers’ pensions were based on the 
principle that the state should underwrite the social reproduction of families lacking a 
male breadwinner, allowing mothers to remain home to care for their children 
(Abramovitz 1996). In response to the social and political turmoil of the Great 
Depression, the SSA established in ADC a federal entitlement to relief for poor women 
and their children. However, while the federal government jointly funded the program 
with states and local governments, the latter retained administrative authority (Piven and 
Cloward 1971).44 
 
States and localities used this authority to exclude the vast majority of black, Hispanic 
and other women of colour, and sometimes poor whites, from eligibility for ADC, often 
under the guise of ‘suitable home’ provisions which allowed welfare case workers to 
                                                
44 This was the product of a compromise by the FDR administration with Southern 
Democrats who feared welfare would jeopardize the supply of cheap black labour relied 
upon by white farmers and wealthy white households. As a result, in order to 
accommodate local labour requirements and the demands of powerful Southern 
politicians, the new legislation gave a great deal of discretion to state legislatures and 
local officials in program design and administration (Piven and Cloward 1971). 
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deny aid based on moral evaluations of a home’s fitness for raising children (Piven and 
Cloward 1971).45 On these grounds, welfare authorities frequently denied aid to unwed 
mothers, who were disproportionately black women (Soss et. al 2012: 87). Yet 
moralizing concerns about black mothers’ ‘worthiness’ overlapped with the priorities of 
states and local authorities for the regulation of the labour supply (Piven and Cloward 
1971). Since the time of slavery, black women’s work outside of their own home had 
defined their social role: “they reproduced for slave masters, nannied white children, 
worked as wet nurses, yet had little opportunity to nurture and care for their own children 
on a full time basis” (Nadasen 2010: 116). Their exclusion from poor relief programs 
reflected socially defined gender roles as workers, not homemakers or mothers.  
 
The result of these exclusions was a highly racialized social welfare system, which 
favoured social reproduction by white households, while channelling poor women of 
colour and immigrant women into low-wage employment in the agricultural sector or in 
the homes of wealthy white families (Abramovitz 2010: 19). Until the 1960s, few women 
were actually admitted to the welfare rolls: poor black mothers in the South, Mexican-
American mothers in the Southwest, and many immigrant women were all routinely 
denied access to welfare on the grounds that they were “employable” (Piven and Cloward 
1971). By 1939, four years after the introduction of ADC, 89 percent of welfare 
recipients were white and racialized exclusions and lagging state implementation meant 
that by 1940 two-thirds of all eligible children were not covered by the federal program 
(Abramovitz 2000: 65). For those mothers who did gain access to ADC, rates were set at 
levels that compelled many to engage in wage work to supplement their benefits (see 
Piven and Cloward 1971).  
 
Denied financial support to raise and care for their own children, the work of domestic 
service, including child care, served as one of the primary sources of employment 
available to women of colour and to black women in particular (Glenn 2010). However, 
                                                
45 Local authorities could adjust ADC regulations in order to keep these women in the 
labour pool when there was an insufficient supply of low-wage men to meet the needs of 
local labour markets (Piven and Cloward 1971). 
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New Deal labour legislation denied home-based workers’ basic labour rights, including 
old age insurance, unemployment benefits, the right to collective bargaining, and 
minimum wage and maximum hours protections (see Boris and Klein 2012). The 
exclusion of domestic service from employment protections and labour laws reflected the 
historical privileging of white male industrial workers by policymakers and the 
unwillingness to recognize women’s paid domestic and care work as legitimate labour 
(see Tuominen 2007). In sum, welfare policy and New Deal labour legislation conspired 
to systematically devalue the care work of poor women of colour, whether unpaid work 
in their own homes or paid work in the homes of wealthy white families.  
 
The Welfare Explosion 
 
In the 1960 and early 1970s, the prevailing social organization of care work was 
challenged as the traditional restrictions on access to welfare collapsed (see Piven and 
Cloward 1971, 1977). The welfare rolls tripled and millions of previously excluded 
women gained access to public assistance: from 1960 to 1972, the number of families on 
welfare rose from 745,000 to 3 million (Piven and Cloward 1993: 273-275). However, as 
welfare costs rose, policymakers looked for ways to impose restrictions on access. The 
welfare explosion would spark debates about the employability of poor mothers and the 
need for public child care to support their return to the labour market (Quadagno 1994). 
These debates were indelibly shaped by the politics of race: as ADC recipients became 
increasingly black and never-married, politicians declared a “welfare crisis” and called 
for increased work expectations (see Reese 2005).  
 
According to Piven and Cloward (1977), the relief explosion of the 1960s, particularly 
post-1964, was primarily a response to the civil disorder of the urban black poor, which 
had emerged as a political force—electorally and in their exercise of disruptive power—
in northern cities. Beginning with Rochester, New York, in 1964, Watts in 1965, Harlem 
and Bedford-Stuyvesant in 1966, poor African Americans rose up in urban rebellions 
against police brutality, institutionalized racism, mass unemployment, and the squalid 
living conditions of the black ghetto (see Katz 2012). While the rise in welfare caseloads 
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occurred across the country, it was far greater in older industrial cities, such as New 
York, where black rebellion was met with a combination of state violence and federal 
efforts to restore social order by expanding access to public assistance (see Piven and 
Cloward 1977).  
 
Under the guise of the Great Society, the federal government intervened in local relief 
arrangements in primarily three ways: by establishing new services that provided the poor 
with information about welfare entitlements and gave them assistance in accessing 
welfare; with federal litigation which challenged local laws and policies that restricted 
access to welfare; and by supporting new poor peoples’ organizations which informed the 
poor of their entitlements and put pressure on local officials to approve applications for 
assistance (Piven and Cloward 1993: 250). The latter development fostered the growth of 
nascent organizations of poor black women who asserted their right to welfare as a 
citizenship right, part of a groundswell of civil rights activism around economic issues 
such as jobs and housing (Nadasen 2005).46  
 
In 1966 these organizations came together to form the National Welfare Rights 
Organization (NWRO), which at its peak had 30,000 members and 540 chapters 
nationwide (see Kornbluh 2007). Demanding higher benefits and a right to a guaranteed 
annual income, women in the welfare rights movement made claims on the state based on 
the work of social reproduction done in their homes and communities.47 They argued that 
access to subsistence outside of the labour market was emancipatory for women who had 
otherwise been condemned to low-wage, menial, and sometimes dangerous employment 
                                                
46 As early as the late 1950s, poor women on welfare had started coming together in 
local, community-based groups around the country, attempting to address violations of 
their civil rights, low benefit levels, and negative portrayals of welfare recipients in the 
media (Nadasen 2010: 103). Federal funding through the War on Poverty provided these 
organizations with the resources needed to expand their organizing and develop political 
influence (see Piven and Cloward 1977; Nadasen 2005, 2010; Kornbluh 2007). 
47 Access to decent welfare benefits not only permitted a degree of decommodifcation, 
but also expanded poor women’s power vis-à-vis men. The ability to maintain 
autonomous households, and exit unloving and/or abusive relationship, was thus central 
to the struggle for welfare rights (see Federici 2006; Abramovitz 2000; Mink 1998). 
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outside of their own homes, while being denied the right to raise and care for their own 
children on a full-time basis.48 
 
Welfare Rights in New York City 
 
While the NWRO was national in scope, the epicentre of welfare rights was New York 
City. As Kornbluh (2007: 4) writes, New York City’s welfare rights groups were “by far 
the largest, had the greatest network of support from middle-class professionals such as 
social workers, lawyers, and priests; and they were the most important sources of strategy 
and personnel for the national welfare rights movement.” By the early 1960s, activist 
groups of welfare recipients—predominantly African-American and Puerto Rican 
mothers—had begun to sprout up across New York, many of them under the auspices of 
local anti-poverty programs funded by the federal government. These groups worked 
with middle-class allies to form welfare rights chapters, coming together under the 
umbrella of the City-Wide Coordinating Committee of Welfare Groups (Kornbluh; 
2007).  
 
Several thousand public assistance recipients, the majority of them poor women of 
colour, strategized and mobilized to change welfare in New York. The City-Wide 
Coordinating Committee led protests, marches, and mass demonstrations on the streets 
                                                
48 As both Nadasen (2005, 2012) and Federici (2006) have argued, in their demands, 
welfare rights activists articulated a working class black feminism distinct from the 
politics of the mainstream, and predominantly white, middle-class, women’s movement 
which rejected domesticity as oppressive and emphasized equality of opportunity in the 
labour market and equal rights at work. As Federici (2006: 76) notes, the movement 
“gave voice to the dissatisfaction of that many American women felt with a social policy 
that ignored their work in the home, stigmatizes them as parasites when they demand 
public assistance,” while benefiting from their work in the social reproduction of the 
American workforce. The valorization of motherwork led movement organizers and 
participants to rethink the welfare system and reframe the politics of “welfare crisis”. 
Prefiguring the demands of some currents of the women’s movement in the 1970s, the 
movement campaigned for state-funded “wages for housework” and asserted the value of 
the work of social reproduction by declaring welfare a woman’s right.  
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and in welfare offices, which led the city to further liberalize welfare. As Kornbluh 
(2007: 3) writes: 
 
Activists used tactics that ranged from demonstrations, sit-ins and other forms of civil 
disobedience, to legislative lobbying, registering voters to participate in elections, and suing 
welfare department officials in court. By 1970, the City-Wide Coordinating Committee of Welfare 
Groups had helped welfare families gain cash grants worth hundreds of thousands of dollars.  
 
Lawyers and grassroots organizers worked with welfare mothers to challenge the 
arbitrary decisions of their caseworkers. Legal processes such as ‘fair hearings’ were 
used extensively: for example, in the fall of 1967 alone, welfare rights groups sponsored 
3,000 fair hearings cases in New York City—a massive increase from the annual average 
of fifty (Nadasen 2005: 111).  
 
Along with the threat of further civil disorder, the impacts of these and other movement 
tactics was significant: fewer welfare recipients were subject to sanctions or eliminated 
from the public assistance rolls; more applicants were able to get assistance as traditional 
procedures for investigating welfare eligibility broke down; caseworkers began ignoring 
regulations as they attempted to process a mounting number of applications; and more 
poor families got access to the full range of benefits—including clothing assistance and 
furniture allowances—to which they were entitled (Piven and Cloward 1977). These 
factors contributed to the significant growth of the city’s welfare rolls: By 1973, one out 
of ten of the nation’s welfare recipients were New Yorkers (Jackson and Johnson 1973; 
emphasis added).  
 
For those seeking to roll back the gains of the welfare rights struggle, New York became 
a symbol of everything that was wrong with the welfare state and the Great Society 
programs introduced by the Johnson administration. Conservatives, and some Democrats, 
proclaimed a “welfare crisis”, and the heart of the crisis, New York City (Kornbluh 
2007). Writing in 1973, presidential advisor Daniel Patrick Moynihan argued that this 
crisis was tearing apart “the social fabric” of the city:  
 
The social fabric of New York City is coming to pieces. It isn’t just ‘strained’ and it isn’t just 
‘frayed’; but like a sheet of rotten canvas, it is beginning to rip, and it won’t be too long until even 
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a moderate force will be capable of leaving it in shreds and tatters… (Moynihan as qtd. in Piven 
and Cloward 1977: 338) 
 
When New York’s reformist mayor, John Lindsay, ran for re-election in 1969, his 
opponents made welfare spending a central issue of the campaign, claiming his 
administration had allowed poor people to “defraud the city” (Kornbluh 2007: 4). As 
white working and middle class voters became increasingly conservative on issues of 
racial equality, Lindsay abandoned his commitments to the city’s poor and pledged to cut 
the welfare budget and tighten eligibility requirements (Kornbluh 2007: 10).  
 
By the mid-1970s, the national welfare rights movement had fragmented and lost 
momentum (Nadasen 2005; Piven and Cloward 1977). As the urban disorder and protest 
movements of the previous decade ebbed, national politics took a turn to the right. With 
the election of Richard Nixon in 1968 and legislation that tied welfare receipt to 
participation in paid work, New York’s welfare recipients faced severe cuts in benefits 
and restrictions on their eligibility (Kornbluh 2007). According to Kornbluh (2007: 4), 
the city’s welfare rights activists confronted “a new set of strategies by the city and state 
that undercut their organizing efforts and ultimately decimated their membership ranks.” 
The epicentre of the movement was to become a focus of national backlash against 
welfare mothers and the urban poor in general, as racially-coded narratives about the 
“culture of poverty”, “welfare dependency”, and the breakdown of the black family 
animated neoliberal efforts to dismantle the social movement gains of the 1960s and roll 
back the welfare state (see Reese 2005). 
 
The Legacy of Welfare Rights in New York 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, the legacy of welfare rights in New York is threefold: 
First, as Piven writes (2012: 111), “for a brief time during the more liberal period of 
welfare in the 1960s and 1970s, a good many single mothers had been permitted to live 
on the dole while their children were young, and even to live at levels not worse than low 
wage workers.” Nowhere was this more apparent than in New York: over a period of 
twelve or so years, thousands of the city’s poorest mothers—predominantly women of 
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colour previously denied access to welfare—won financial support for the work of raising 
and caring for their children. Due to the militancy of the movement, the welfare system 
came to provide some of the most generous benefits in the country, easing the poverty 
experienced by poor women and their children (see Piven and Cloward 1977; Kornbluh 
2007).  
 
Second, women in the welfare rights movement reframed their unpaid care work as 
legitimate work worthy of a wage; in this they were the forerunners of future struggles by 
women of colour—and some white women, in movements such as Wages for 
Housework—to have their care work socially recognized and economically valued (see 
Federici 2012). Finally, in their militancy and success—given the sheer number of 
families who gained access to assistance and to the full range of benefits to which they 
were entitled—welfare rights expanded social citizenship and the reach of the city’s post-
war welfare state (see Freeman 2000).  
 
The welfare rights movement was part of a moment in which popular struggles demanded 
economic, social and racial justice. In response to the urban unrest and the social 
movements of the 1960s, the Johnson administration not only liberalized welfare but also 
established a series of social programs under the Great Society (see Katz 2013). In New 
York, these programs buttressed the city’s social democratic orientation and by the early 
1970s, the local welfare state included free tuition in the municipal university system and 
a vast network of community agencies and economic development projects in low-
income neighbourhoods (see Phillips-Fein 2013). With its comparatively generous social 
programs and large welfare caseload, the city became “the scourge of conservatives 
everywhere” (Freeman 2000); some critics took to referring to New York as “Moscow-
on-the-Hudson” (Magnet 2004). New York City would become a symbolic target of the 
neoliberal counterrevolution to come, and within a few years, many of the historical 
achievements of working class and social movements in the city were at risk of being 
undone. 
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3. Care Workers Organize and the Fight for Universal Child Care in New York 
 
Daycare Workers Unionize 
 
While welfare rights activists asserted the value of their care work by declaring welfare a 
woman’s right, the welfare rights movement also sought the creation of daycare centres 
to support poor mother’s employment.49 However, activists criticized the dynamic 
created when poor women were hired to care for other women’s children and the way 
institutionalized child care could oppress underpaid women care workers (Nadasen 
2010). According to Nadasen (2010: 115-116), movement leaders warned that the fight 
for “child care should ensure that it did not create ‘a reservoir of cheap female labour’ 
that ‘institutionalized, partially self-employed Mammies,’” for while daycare centres 
“could potentially free some women from the constraints of child care, they could just as 
likely increase exploitation of other women.” In this, the movement levelled a critique of 
the race and class blindness of a mainstream women’s movement’s that demanded 
daycare but paid little attention to the working conditions of those employed as child care 
providers.  
 
Perhaps owing to the strong left-wing presence in New York City’s women’s movement, 
the child care demands of welfare rights activists complemented the political thrust of the 
city’s daycare movement. Daycare activists made important gains in the mid- to late-
1960s and saw levels of mobilization reminiscent of the fight to preserve funding for 
wartime daycare (Interview 21). An important element in this wave of organizing and 
advocacy was the struggles of the city’s daycare workers, which included child care 
providers and support staff such as assistants, maintenance workers, and cleaners. This 
workforce cared for the children of low-income families in New York’s publicly-funded 
daycares. Given their poverty-level wages, they were the “reservoir of cheap female 
labour” welfare rights activists sought to bring attention to. However, like the welfare 
                                                
49 The national NWRO office produced a guide for local welfare rights chapters on how 
to organize a comprehensive community-controlled child care program and demanded 
universal child care (Nadasen 2010) 
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mothers they served, daycare workers collectively organized to assert the value of their 
care work, and to demand better wages and working conditions.  
 
Although postwar New York had emerged as a centre of labour movement power, 
according to Freeman (2015), by the early 1960s “only a handful of city workers were 
covered by collective bargaining, and most did not belong to a union. Pay and working 
conditions in many agencies were miserable, and there was little workers could do about 
it.” However, in January 1965, eight thousand social workers went on strike, demanding 
improvements in their pay and benefits and in the treatment of their welfare clients. 
According to Freeman, the social workers’ strike “sparked organizing by other workers 
and led the city to set up a new system of labour relations that formalized collective 
bargaining.” Unions such as the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME) District Council 37 and 1707, won important organizing drives in 
city-owned hospitals, and with school lunch workers, school aides, building cleaners, 
chemists, librarians, actuaries, lifeguards, and court reporters. Many of these newly 
organized city employees were African-American and Puerto Rican; collective 
bargaining lifted many of these workers above the poverty line for the first time (Freeman 
2015).   
 
As part of the wave of public sector unionism sweeping New York, the city’s daycare 
workers set about organizing. By 1967, they had become the first child care workforce in 
the nation to unionize, forming what would become Local 205 Day Care Employees, 
AFSCME (Whitebook 2002). After a bitter three week strike, in which 1100 daycare 
workers shut down 113 of the city’s child care centres, members of the daycare local 
voted 643 to 65 in favour of their first contract (“Day-Care Workers”, 1969). The 
contract included recognition of a union shop, the introduction of a welfare fund, and a 
series of pay increases paralleling recent settlements won by other municipal employees 
(Clines 1969). Perhaps most importantly, the wage scale for child care providers was 
made comparable to that offered to elementary teachers in the public school system 
(Clines 1969). Daycare workers were incorporated into one of the city’s growing 
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municipal workers’ unions, Local 1707 of the Community and Social Agency 
Employees.  
 
It did not take long for the newly unionized workers to exercise their political power. In 
1969, after intense lobbying, New York City introduced the first for-credit training 
program to upgrade the skills of daycare workers (DCCNY 2012), making the link 
between child care quality and the quality of working conditions and wages of child care 
providers. And as was the case in the 1940s and 1950s, what happened in New York 
child care politics had ripple effects beyond the city. The success of Local 205 sparked a 
wave of child care worker organizing across the nation: daycare workers joined social 
service employees’, auto workers’, and even painters’ unions in Massachusetts, 
Michigan, and Wisconsin (see Blank et al. 2010).  
 
However, while in the proceeding decades unions such as the American Federation of 
Teachers (AFT) and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) would go on to 
organize daycare centres in scattered cities across the US, by 2004 only three percent of 
the child care workforce was in a union or covered by a union contract (Blank et al. 
2010). In this regard, Local 205 were trailblazers in the fight for dignity, respect, and 
better wages and working conditions in the sector, and today remain the largest daycare 
local in the country (see DC 1707 2012).   
 
In addition to the struggles of daycare workers, growing child care activism led by 
feminists in the New Left, civil rights activists, and early childhood advocates, pushed the 
administration of Mayor Lindsay to initiate a Task Force on Early Childhood 
Development. The Taskforce would put early childhood education and care squarely onto 
the city’s policy agenda (DC1707 2012). Many of these activists would coalesce into the 
Day Care Forum, a coalition of child care interests, which emerged as the city’s most 
prominent and progressive child care advocacy group—a 1960s version of the UPA 
(Interview 21). While the Day Care Forum mobilized for the expansion of public 
investment in child care throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, it would emerge as 
central player in the struggle to resist daycare cuts in the wake of the fiscal crisis of 1975.  
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Home Care Workers Organize 
 
Like the city’s daycare workers, New York City’s home health aides were part of a 
growing public sector workforce as the welfare state expanded during the Great Society 
years. Home health aides cared for infirm and elderly individuals supported through 
Medicare and Medicaid programs, funded by all three levels of government but 
administered by the city’s public health department. Municipal employment and training 
programs channelled increasing numbers of poor women of colour into these jobs, often 
directly recruiting women from New York’s welfare rolls. As increasing numbers of poor 
people accessed Medicare and Medicaid in the mid- and late 1960s, the ranks of the city’s 
home health care workforce swelled (Boris and Klein 2012).  
 
As Boris and Klein (2012: 69) remark, during these years “the remaking of poor women 
into caregivers became a nationally articulated goal of the federal government.” Thus the 
increased health care funding that marked the Great Society saw care work become more 
intimately tied to an emerging federal welfare to work agenda that sought to move single 
mothers on welfare into paid employment. Local government, community service 
agencies, and welfare groups could apply to the federal government for grants to place 
welfare recipients and the unemployed in home health care jobs. In this way, poor women 
of colour were tracked into low-wage, precarious care work that allowed government to 
expand social services “on the cheap”, in many ways providing a template for the 
expansion of publicly subsidized home child care in the wake of welfare reform (see 
Boris and Klein 2012: Chapter 3). 
 
However, like the city’s daycare workers, by the late 1960s New York’s home health care 
aides had formed a union, AFSCME Local 371, and struggled to have their care work 
recognized and valued. With a growing membership, the union engaged in political 
action, public appeals, and legislative lobbying to address wages, working conditions, 
and client well-being, asserting itself as a force in New York City politics. Citing 
budgetary concerns, the city and state government countered this growing militancy by 
downsizing the home health care workforce and reclassifying workers as independent 
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contractors. The restructuring effectively busted the union, excluding the city’s home 
health workers from the right to organize and collectively bargain. After 1970, the work 
was outsourced from the city altogether through vendor contracts (Boris and Klein 2012).  
 
The Fight for Universal Child Care 
 
While New York’s daycare workers organized in the late 1960s, their ranks expanded in 
the early 1970s when the city’s publicly funded daycare centres proliferated at an 
extraordinary rate (see Brozan 1979). The cause of this expansion was fourfold: First, 
under the Great Society, federal aid to big cities had provided local government with the 
means to expand social services, including daycare.50 Second, in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, black and Latino struggles for “community control” of social services led to 
growing enrolment in daycare programs in previously underserved communities.51 Third, 
the push for community control overlapped with a resurgent daycare movement, which 
found its voice in the Day Care Forum and the Committee for Community Controlled 
Day Care. Daycare activists, including progressive child care advocates and feminists, 
worked alongside the daycare workers union to pressure the city to expand quality child 
care. And finally, the daycare movement found a sympathetic ear in the city government 
as feminists and child care advocates entered a newly created municipal agency expressly 
devoted to children’s services (Interview 21). The confluence of these factors led not only 
to the expansion of daycare services in New York but a push for universal child care.   
 
Much of the child care activism and advocacy of this period centred on the Agency for 
Child Development. In 1969, the Lindsay administration appointed the noted African-
                                                
50 Some of this money was intended to provide women on welfare with the supports 
needed to transition into the labour market (Quadagno 1994). 
51 The community control movement had its origins in struggles for racial justice and the 
Johnson administration’s War on Poverty. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, a 
central piece of the Great Society, stated that federally funded programs would be 
“developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation of the 
residents of the areas and members of the groups served.” It called for community action 
programs to mobilize resources that could be used in a direct attack on the roots of 
poverty and racial injustice (Katz 2008).  
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American social worker, Georgia L. McMurray, to head an Early Childhood Taskforce 
(Carney Smith 1996). Along with child development experts, the Taskforce included a 
number of feminists from the civil rights movement and the New Left, including the co-
founder of Ms. Magazine and daycare activist, Dorothy Pitman Hughes (Love 2006). The 
Taskforce recommended the creation of an agency to deal exclusively with children’s 
services, focusing particularly on the needs of pre-school children and their families. In 
1971, ACD was founded and McMurray appointed its first commissioner.  Under 
McMurray’s leadership, New York City went from serving 15,000 children in 260 
daycare centres in 1969 to well over 300 centres, serving a total of 45,000 children five 
years later (Carney Smith 1996: 461).  
 
With input from the city’s daycare movement, ACD introduced a number of pioneering 
reforms, such as ten hour a day child care services to meet the needs of parents working 
non-standard hours—although the more radical demand of “around-the-clock” day-and-
night care, while supported by McMurray, was deemed too costly by the city (Carney 
Smith 1996: 461). ACD also established public outreach programs to encourage 
immigrant and non-English speaking communities to place their children in city daycares, 
contributing to expanding enrolment in the public system (Interview 21). In addition, the 
agency introduced citywide counselling resource centres for parents and expanded the 
number of home-based daycare programs to service the needs of families in underserved 
neighbourhoods. Finally, McMurray established a number of state subsidized child care 
programs for working and middle-class families who could afford to pay a portion of 
program operating costs (Carney Smith 1996: 461).  
 
While the daycare movement welcomed these reforms, activists pushed McMurray and 
her agency to fulfill their vision of universal child care (Interview 21). At the national 
level, from 1969 to 1971, a coalition of feminists, early childhood advocates, labour and 
civil rights leaders had worked with Congress to legislate universal child care policy. 
Their efforts came to a halt when President Nixon vetoed the Comprehensive Child 
Development Act of 1971 (Michel 1999). The makeup of the national child care coalition 
was mirrored in New York City, as organizations such as the Day Care Forum and the 
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Committee for Community Controlled Day Care—harkening back to the days of the 
UPA—demanded a universal, publicly-funded, high quality child care system; even if the 
federal government refused to fund one (Interview 21).52 New York’s daycare movement 
sought to build on the city’s tradition of child care exceptionalism, but in the absence of a 
significant increase in State and federal child care funding, the city claimed the vision of 
universal child care was too costly to realize (Interview 21). New York was already on 
the hook for a substantial portion of the welfare and Medicaid costs that rose rapidly in 
the 1960s and early 1970s (Kornbluh 2007).  
 
The tensions between the city and the daycare movement came to a head when ACD 
sought to impose new child care eligibility requirements handed down from the State. 
Against the backdrop of President Nixon’s veto and federal efforts to more closely tie 
child care funding to welfare to work initiatives, these new regulations were designed to 
restrict access to the city’s publicly-funded daycares to the poorest of the poor. 
Furthermore, they required program directors to behave like welfare caseworkers, 
recording the details of their clients’ lives, including marital status, income, health, and 
their “addictive habits” (see Feigelson 1973). Both parents and daycare directors found 
the new procedures “outrageous and demeaning” (Feigelson 1973: 41). Sixty daycare 
centres, all members of a coalition called the Committee for Community Controlled Day 
Care (CCCDC), refused to comply with the new regulations. In response, ACD 
threatened to withhold funding from the centres. The CCCDC replied by taking the city 
to court, claiming ACD was violating the terms of its contract (see Feigelson 1973).   
 
At stake in this fight were competing visions of New York City’s child care system. 
McMurray, the feminist and child care advocate, was presumably sympathetic to the idea 
of universality. However, she was no longer an advocate, but a city commissioner 
                                                
52 The city’s day care movement also sought to build on its local success by organizing a 
child care coalition at the state level. In 1973, the Day Care Council of New York, the 
organization representing the city’s non-profit child care agencies, spearheaded the first 
state-wide association of child care advocates and child care development councils in the 
country (DDCNY 2012). New York’s day care movement continued to lead the nation in 
innovative organizing and advocacy work, establishing a strong political presence in the 
state capital of Albany to match their work in New York City. 
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accountable to the Mayor and ultimately to the State government, which held ACD’s 
purse strings. As federal child care funding—administered by the State—had grown 
during the 1960s, it came to account for 75 percent of the city’s total child care pot, with 
the city and State each contributing half of the remaining 25 percent (Lacks 1971). 
Federal funds were dispensed under Title 4A of the Social Security Act which defined 
daycare as a social service for which parents must be “income eligible”. To their credit, 
McMurray and Mayor John Lindsay had lobbied the State to relax the new regulations, 
but to no avail (Lacks 1971). With limited funds at ACD’s disposal, McMurray argued 
the city’s priority must be on serving the poor (Feigelson 1973: 42).  
 
On the other side were the CCCDC and the Day Care Forum, both driven by a vision of a 
universal child care (Interview 21). In keeping with this vision, community controlled 
daycare programs, of which there were 75 in the city (out of a total of 200 publicly-
funded daycares), had been enrolling children based on a loose definition of “community 
need”. As a matter of policy, these 75 programs, run by parents but funded by the city, 
did not require families to disclose their earnings, “considering such questions an 
invasion of privacy and a means of reinforcing class distinctions” (Lacks 1971: 11). As 
Bob Gangi, a coordinator of the CCCDC said, “When a parent tells us they need day care 
for their children … we take their word. It’s not our province to dictate what families 
have a right to day care” (qtd. in Lacks 1971: 11). For the city’s daycare movement, the 
CCCD’s programs were the building blocks of a municipal, universal child care system.  
 
The push for community control in child care services had challenged the old system in 
which established non-profit agencies, such as the YWCA, operated the city’s publicly-
funded daycare centres. As African Americans and Latinos organized to have a say over 
social services, most notably public education, the old system was giving way to “newer 
organizations that were emerging from low-income communities, communities of colour, 
coming together to provide child care as the system expanded” (Interview 21). The 
CCCDC opposed New York State’s new child care regulations—and resented the city for 
adhering to them—on the grounds that low income eligibility cut-offs effectively 
excluded middle-income families from public daycare, cut existing programs that were 
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economically and racially integrated, and rendered child care services a “holding 
operation for the very poor” (Lacks 1971). Shirley Johnson, an African-American 
daycare activist, summed up they daycare movement’s vision: 
 
We think everyone should be allowed to put his or her kids in day care. If you want to leave your 
kid to go downtown to look in Macy’s window you should be able to … I know lots of women got 
off welfare because day care allowed them to work. Not made them. Allowed them. But I don’t 
believe a day care center should be a welfare center. That would change our whole movement. 
That’s what’s at stake in our fight with the city. We want the classes to come together … That’s 
why we’re having so many problems. [Daycare] is good for me and the lady down the street 
whose husband makes $15,000, or even $25,000, and that lady she goes and has tea—like some 
people still do that you know—it’s good for us all to talk together. And our kids talk together. If 
you got kids together in day care really sharing, you got okay kids. And then you got an okay 
society (qtd. in Feigelson 1973: 41). 
 
Daycare activists were incensed that McMurray, whom they considered an ally, had 
threatened to defund their programs for failing to comply with regulations she herself had 
opposed. One activist said she felt “betrayed” by the Commissioner: “I’d always thought 
of her as a friend. She’s black. She had always seemed to support us. What was she 
doing? How could she smash us in such a personal way?” (qtd. in Feigelson 1973: 42).  
 
As the battle between CCCDC and the city dragged on, of the original sixty daycares 
refusing to go along with the regulations, only thirteen held out. The CCCDC staged a 
demonstration on New York City’s Triborough Bridge, temporarily tying up traffic, and 
later set up a one-day model daycare centre on the lawn of City Hall (Feigelson 1973). At 
a press conference, an impassioned Dorothy Pitman Hughes, who had sat on the taskforce 
that led to ACD’s creation, said the State and city’s policies were tantamount to creating 
daycare “concentration camps for minority children” (qtd. in Feigelson 1973: 42).  
 
Despite the fiery rhetoric and demonstrations, unable to operate without ACD funding, 
the CCCDC and its community controlled daycares ultimately lost its battle with the city. 
The city forced all publicly funded daycares, including community-controlled programs, 
to fall in line with the new State regulations. As with the left-wing daycare activists of the 
late 1950s, the dream of a universal child care system in New York City had once again 
been crushed.  According to CCCDC’s Bob Gangi, ACD’s tough stance was evidence 
that the “city had swung to the right” (qtd. in Feigelson 1973: 42). However, things 
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would soon get a lot worse for the daycare movement. New York’s fiscal crisis of 1975 
threatened the city’s reputation as a leader in child care and the existence of public 
daycare all altogether.  
 
4. Disciplining Daycare: Neoliberalism, Child Care, and the Fiscal Crisis 
 
As the previous section illustrates, throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, popular 
movements in New York made numerous claims on local government. Alongside other 
social movements, the struggles of working class women, and particularly poor women of 
colour—whether through the welfare rights movement, the daycare movement, or 
female-dominated unions like Local 205 Day Care Employees—pushed the city to 
expand social welfare programs and underwrite more of the costs of and responsibilities 
for social reproduction. As with the post-war fight to save public child care, the social 
organization of care work had emerged as a key site of contestation in the urban welfare 
regime.  
 
With the roll out of the federal government’s Great Society programs (including 
Medicare and Medicaid), the expansion of social services, and free tuition in the 
municipal university system, New York’s urban social democracy had reached its apex. 
Over a period of a decade, the city government had dramatically increased its spending 
on welfare, child care, and on the municipal payroll (see Moody 2007). Nationally, 
welfare, health care, and education had come to make up the largest portion of big city 
budgets (see Piven and Cloward 1977). But as politics took a turn to the right—and as the 
daycare movement’s fight for universal child care had clearly demonstrated—the project 
of building a social democratic “welfare state in one city” was pushing up against 
political constraints.  
 
The fiscal crisis of 1975 marked a turning point in the history of post-war New York. As 
Harvey (2007: 8) remarks, “New York City was heading towards becoming a social 
democratic, almost socialist, kind of municipality. The big businesses were terrified 
politically. So they launched a financial coup against the city.” In the midst of the crisis, 
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governance of the city was effectively transferred from democratically elected politicians 
to state appointed technocrats and financial elites insulated from popular pressures 
(Harvey 2005). According to Harvey (2005: 48), the terms on which the fiscal crisis was 
resolved “pioneered the way for neoliberal practices both domestically under Reagan and 
internationally through the IMF in the 1980s.”   
While the causes of the crisis are complex (see Tabb 1982), economic elites and 
conservative politicians blamed the city’s woes on its extensive welfare state, the 
“dependent” poor whom it benefitted, and “greedy” public sector unions, including 
municipal workers who delivered social services (Freeman 2000).53 When the city needed 
loans to meet its debt obligations, Wall Street bankers refused to continue lending unless 
New York curtailed some of its “generous” social policies, restructure its welfare state, 
and essentially offload costs of social reproduction onto families/households. When John 
Lindsay’s successor in the Mayor’s Office, Abe Beame, bypassed Wall St. and went to 
the White House to ask for financial assistance, President Gerald Ford refused. Ford 
offered “as support for his decision the data on supposed welfare frauds that had become 
common fodder in the city’s political discourse” (Kornbluh 2007: 181-182).  
                                                
53 On the causes of the crisis see Tabb (1982), Moody (2007), Freeman (2000), and 
Phillips-Fein (2013). According to Phillips-Fein: “Many observers in the early ’70s had 
noticed that New York was entering a period of difficulty and falling tax receipts, as the 
city’s economy was rocked by the decline of manufacturing and the flight of the white 
middle class to the suburbs. New York did provide more services than most other 
American cities … although contrary to the railing of conservatives at the time, its public 
workers were not paid wages out of line with those of workers in other cities. During the 
Great Society years, the expenses of the city climbed, particularly those for Medicaid (for 
which it bore almost 25 percent of the cost, in accordance with state law) and welfare. At 
first, increases in federal and state aid helped fuel this expansion. But when the economy 
turned south in the early 1970s, New York turned to borrowing to make up the budget 
gaps. The tacit assumption of city leaders … was that the borrowing was merely a 
temporary measure. Perhaps national healthcare would pass and the city would no longer 
have to foot a massive Medicaid bill. Once the economy recovered, the city would regain 
its fiscal footing. But by 1975, as recession enveloped the American economy, the banks 
that marketed New York’s debt … became increasingly wary about the city, as did 
investors around the country … By the spring, the banks told the city that the bond 
market had closed. As soon as its credit was cut off, it became apparent that New York 
did not have the money to pay its debts—or even to continue to cover payrolls without 
access to more borrowed funds.” 
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In return for bailing out New York, the federal government, the State, and Wall St. 
demanded austerity and a reorientation of the role of city government. As Harvey (2007: 
9) states, “The municipal government was no longer about benefiting the population; the 
municipal government had to address creating a good business climate.” Tuition was 
charged for the first time in the city’s university system, user fees were introduced for 
previously free public services while other services were privatized outright, fire stations 
were closed, city employees laid off en masse, and social welfare spending was 
significantly curtailed (Tabb 1982; Harvey 2007). Poor women on welfare were subject 
to increasingly punitive reforms and new eligibility restrictions (see Kornbluh 2007). And 
the daycare services many low-income families relied upon were among the social 
services targeted for restructuring.  
Daycare Default 
 
At the onset of the crisis, New York State froze $23 million in child care funding to the 
city (“Day-Care Default,” 1975). State administrators charged ACD with falling behind 
on its licensing regulations and health and safety standards. But the primary source of 
tension between city and State was the gradual expansion of daycare services to include a 
growing number of children from working class families. As mentioned in the previous 
section, these families’ incomes exceeded subsidy eligibility limits under the federal 
Social Security Act and State regulations. While the income eligibility ceilings had been 
raised in the early 1970s, some publicly-funded centres had begun to operate using even 
higher income thresholds, leading to expanding enrolments and rising daycare costs 
(“Day Care Default,” 1975: 24). Although the fight between ACD and the Committee for 
Community Controlled Day Care showed that the city had reined in this practice, in the 
midst of the fiscal crisis, the State government pushed for drastic action, instructing ACD 
to phase all non-eligible children out of the system by attrition (Weisman 1975). The New 
York Times called it a “Day-Care Default” and “a blow to a city desperately in need of 
more and speedier state and Federal assistance for a wide range of services” (“Day-Care 
Default,” 1975: 24).  
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The likes of Georgia McMurray and other progressive voices at ACD were criticized for 
their “mishandling” of the agency’s finances (see Weisman 1975: 1). Of course this 
“mishandling” was really McMurray’s willingness, at least for a time, to expand the 
city’s public child care system beyond the narrow parameters set by the State and federal 
government, responding to the demands of the daycare activists. State and federal 
government child care funding, as with other urban social services, became conditional 
on the city imposing austerity measures, forcing ACD to rollback the expansion of 
daycare and further contain the ambitious agendas of the CCCDC, the Day Care Forum, 
and the daycare workers’ union.  
 
Austerity measures would severely impact New York’s child care sector and the ability 
of working class families, particularly poor single mothers, to meet their care needs. For 
instance, ACD reported a “rising fear by many day-care mothers that they would be 
forced to return to welfare rolls for lack of an alternative to child care” (“New Federal 
Rules,” 1976: 33); other women said they would scale back their work hours from full-
time to part-time in order to care for their family (Sheppard 1976a: 35). In desperation, 
ACD and the city’s daycare movement made the case that cutting child care funding ran 
counter to the other major initiative of the austerity agenda: slashing the city’s welfare 
rolls (see Sheppard 1976a). The argument fell on deaf ears and as the fiscal crisis 
escalated, further efforts were made to restructure the city’s child care system along 
neoliberal lines and shift costs of social reproduction onto households.  
 
In 1976, “emergency” arrangements for governing the city effectively weakened the 
power of the Mayor and City Council (see Tabb 1982). Control of the city’s finances 
shifted from City Hall to the State and a cabal of bankers, bondholders, and other Wall 
Street interests known as the Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB) (Moody 2007). 
The federal government proved unwilling to bailout New York and the city flirted with 
default. Municipal politicians had to prove their willingness to impose massive austerity 
before the city would qualify for federal aid and bankers reopen the bond markets (Tabb 
1982).  
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With city finances now under the control of the EFCB, rollbacks came fast and furious 
and had an immediate impact on social services. By late 1975, the city was forced to 
close twenty-eight daycare programs due to budget cuts and ACD’s $159 million budget 
was cut by $31 million (Maitland 1975: 18).  New child care subsidy eligibility limits 
eliminated 7,200 children from the city’s daycare programs, rolling back the gains made 
by community control (Maitland 1975: 18).54 A mayoral-appointed special taskforce on 
child care—the first since the Lindsay administration’s Early Childhood Task Force—
was tasked with “cutting waste” in the system and transferring responsibility for 
determining eligibility for subsidies from local daycare programs to a newly disciplined 
ACD (Maitland 1975).  
 
In addition, rather than adopting administrative measures that would ensure the full 
utilization of existing daycare spaces, programs running under capacity had their budgets 
cut or were threatened with closure. According to members of the taskforce, these 
measures were taken in the name of “efficiency”, “addressing mismanagement”, and 
“improving productivity” (Sheppard 1976b: 27).  The city’s extended day (i.e. ten hour) 
child care programs, one of the most progressive reforms of the early 1970s, were 
eliminated (see “New Rules Sought,” 1976: 32). Furthermore, the State introduced 
parental co-payments for families now deemed ineligible for free child care (“New Rules 
Sought,” 1976: 32), effectively imposing user fees, further shifting child care costs onto 
households.  
 
Eroding Quality Care and Quality Care Work 
 
By the spring of 1976, the city had closed another 49 daycare programs that served 3,000 
children.  75 percent of these children were transferred to “underutilized” daycares, 
resulting in severe overcrowding (Kihss 1976a: 1). These measures undermined the high 
standards the daycare movement had long fought to establish and threatened New York’s 
                                                
54 Federal funds paid 75 percent of the city’s day care costs mainly under Title XX of the 
Social Security Act. The city and New York State shared the remaining 25 percent. 
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exceptionalism in child care. The closures also meant that 1,500 unionized daycare 
workers, members of Local 205, lost their jobs (Kihss 1976a: 1).  
 
An audit by the city’s comptroller stated that daycares were “required to have too many 
employees with overly high qualifications” (qtd. in Kihss 1976b: 97). ACD subsequently 
increased staff-child ratios, which impacted both working conditions and child care 
quality. Furthermore, the audit quoted research reports that found high qualifications and 
low staff-child ratios had “little impact” on the quality of care and openly questioned 
ACD’s adoption of professional qualifications for program directors and child care 
providers that exceeded those of New York State’s (and most others states’) requirements 
(Kihss 1976b). Austerity in child care was taking the form of cuts to services, an erosion 
of quality, and an attack on daycare workers, eliminating their jobs and undermining their 
wages and working conditions, while questioning their skills and professional status.  
 
Daycare activists and Local 205 organized to the resist this agenda (Interview 21). More 
than 1,000 angry daycare workers, parents, and children took to the streets and marched 
on the headquarters of the EFCB to demand it stop “the hatchet job on the day care 
program” (qtd. in “Day Care Cuts,” 1976: 40). Local 205 and the Day Care Forum 
worked to bring together child care activists, providers, parents, and unions to lobby the 
State government with a grassroots movement to fight the cuts (Interview 21). They 
framed their struggle as one of ensuring children had access to good quality care by 
protecting the city’s traditional commitment to high standards and tough regulations. As 
one activist involved in the Day Care Forum puts it: 
 
The union’s vested interest was they didn’t want their members to lose their jobs. The Forum was 
very focused on parents losing access to subsidies. The Day Care Council of New York, 
representing the boards of directors, was concerned with the agencies losing resources to provide 
the services in their communities. So while each organization had something they were concerned 
about, they all agreed that they would be stronger working together. The union would bring its 
political clout, the Forum its ability to organize parents and low-income communities, and the 
Council its ability to interface with the 350 or so program sponsors to get them behind whatever 
efforts were going on. (Interview 21) 
 
The most powerful of the three actors in this coalition appeared to be organized labour. 
Despite the fiscal crisis, New York’s municipal unions had made some headway in the 
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child care sector. In 1976, DC 1707 had organized and chartered Local 95, a union of 
daycare workers employed in the city’s Head Start agencies (DC 1707, 2012). Union 
power in the sector expanded even further when the Council of School Supervisors and 
Administrators (CSA), the union representing principals and vice-principals in the city’s 
public schools, organized the directors and co-directors of publicly funded daycare 
programs (CSA 2012).  
 
However, these successes were countered by union trade-offs with City Hall and the 
State. New York’s public sector unions agreed to no wage or benefits increases in return 
for state legislation granting them an agency shop, guaranteeing a regular flow of union 
dues (Moody 2007: 47). Such “sweetheart” deals were hardly the makings of a successful 
fight back against austerity. While the unions had initially organized large demonstrations 
against the banks and the Emergency Financial Control Board—even hinting at a general 
strike—they eventually fell in line with the program of retrenchment (Moody 2007; see 
also Freeman 2000).  
 
The weakness of public sector unions, illustrative for Local 205 in particular, was 
demonstrated in the tepid response to State changes to child care funding arrangements. 
In 1977, two years into the crisis, New York State withheld federal child care dollars 
from the city unless it develop its family daycare sector i.e. home-based providers that 
were non-union and required less state funding than centre-based programs. In addition, 
ACD had to agree to contract with private, for-profit agencies for daycare services (“New 
York Human Resources,” 1977: 43). These changes effectively allowed public funds to 
escape the municipal child care system for private, for-profit operators and was one step 
toward the funding arrangements that facilitated the expansion of non-union home child 
care following welfare reform in 1996. As part of a municipal labour movement on the 
defensive, Local 205 appeared to do little to resist these changes. Thus in addition to 
funding cuts, daycare closures, staff lay-offs, and an erosion in standards, the city’s 
public child care system was being increasingly deregulated and privatized. 
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From the “Best Legacy We Have” to New Neoliberal Normal 
 
Four years into the crisis, New York City’s daycare programs had learned to do “more 
with less”, adjusting to neoliberal austerity (see Brozan 1979: C13.). The Agency for 
Child Development’s new commissioner, Lewis Frankfort, said the city’s child care 
system had undergone a metamorphosis that it was “ill prepared for when the fiscal crisis 
first struck” (qtd. in Brozan 1979: C13). While Frankfort called New York’s public 
daycares “the best legacy we have of the 1960s Great Society,” the State and EFCB 
continued to impose retrenchment in social provision and cuts to standards. While some 
federal funds had become available for child care, enrolment only recovered to 1974 
levels and inflation ate up much of the new funding (Brozan 1979).  
 
The impact of neoliberal restructuring on the city’s child care system was clear: In 
addition to outright closures, twenty daycare programs that lost their funding in 1976 
were, three years later, receiving a two-year start-up grant from the State to “demonstrate 
economic alternatives to publicly funded day care” (Brozan 1979: C13). In other words, 
public funding became increasingly premised on the privatization of service delivery. 
Furthermore, subsidy eligibility ceilings remained low, and while some money for 
training had come forth to bolster the child care workforce, staffing cuts had not been 
reversed. These cuts intensified the workload of daycare workers and eroded child care 
quality: as one program director explained, “[child care] aids have been cut from working 
38 hours a week to 20, so instead of having three adults per classroom, we have two and a 
half” (qtd. Brozan 1979: C13). And like all municipal employees, the wages of city 
daycare workers did not grow in either nominal or real terms during this period (see 
Moody 2007: 81). 
 
In the midst of austerity, the victories of the childcare movement were ultimately 
defensive in nature. As one advocate put it “we were successful in staving off a number 
of cuts; they weren’t as bad or as draconian as they would have been if there was no 
action at all” (Interview 21). There were some important victories: for instance, the city 
committed to contribute more of its own tax levy dollars for child care to complement 
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federal and State funds—essentially a modest renewal of arrangements won by the 
daycare movement after the war. Daycare activists had been successful in beating back a 
wholesale withdrawal of municipal support for child care (Interview 21).  
 
Beyond public child care, the neoliberal discipline imposed on New York’s urban social 
democracy had overwhelmed the political forces of the left (see Moody 2007; Freeman 
2000). With the federal government steadily withdrawing aid from big cities, cuts were 
imposed on a range of municipal services and the city’s public sector unions were 
weakened as result. Neoliberal restructuring negatively impacted the municipal university 
system, the city’s public hospitals, public housing, and the provision of other social 
services, such as home care (see Moody 2007). In terms of the municipal payroll, the 
number of police officers and teachers dropped by around 6,000 and the number of 
firefighters by about 2,500 (Tabb 1982). According to Kornbluh, “Two fifths of African 
American municipal employees, and half of the Latino/a employees, were dropped from 
the city payroll” (2008: 182). 
 
In 1975, welfare rights organizer Beluah Sanders had led the city’s International 
Women’s Day march, demanding child care available twenty-four hours a day, regardless 
of family income (Kornbluh 2007: 182). In the context of the fiscal crisis, a weakened 
welfare rights movement, and a daycare movement on the defensive, Sanders vision 
seemed little more than a pipe dream. The city’s fiscal crisis afforded New York’s 
political and economic elite the opportunity to roll back the gains of popular struggles, 
restructure the urban welfare state, and neutralize the power of public sector unions. 
Ruling elites insisted on the municipal government slashing its payrolls, wages, and 
benefits, in addition to curtailing public services and social welfare programs.  
 
The ramifications of the city’s restructuring went far beyond the five boroughs. As Piven 
(2011: 159) has argued, New York City “was only the exemplary case, the means that 
was used to instruct poor and working-class groups in other cities not to resist similar and 
even more drastic cost-cutting campaigns by local elites.” The crisis was employed as 
rationale for an elite mobilization against the urban working class, and particularly poor 
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people of colour who had successfully forced concessions from the state in the 1960s and 
early 1970s (Piven and Cloward 1977).55  
 
With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1981, the neoliberal turn in New York would be 
scaled up to the national stage with deleterious consequences for the city’s working class 
and poor women of colour especially.56 Through the city’s daycare and welfare rights 
movements and care workers’ unions, poor and working class women of colour had 
asserted the value of their care work and mobilized to demand state investment in social 
reproduction. Through retrenchment, deregulation, and the increasing marketization of 
social welfare services, the neoliberal restructuring of New York had reprivatized more 
of the costs of and responsibilities for social reproduction, shifting them back onto the 
city’s families/households and communities, and especially the women within them. 
 
5. Federal State Restructuring and Child Care and Welfare in New York 
 
With New York City as a neoliberal test case, the election of Ronald Reagan in 1981 
marked the beginning a full-scale assault on the welfare state (see Piven and Cloward 
1985; Block et al. 1987). The Reagan administration attacked organized labour, cut taxes 
for the wealthy, deregulated labour markets, eliminated environmental controls, and 
made significant cuts to federal funding for cities, limiting the scope of services they 
could provide urban populations (Katz 2008).57 Social supports for the poor were 
significantly diminished throughout the 1980s as the federal government slashed income 
support programs and cut funding for social services.58 For the Reagan administration, 
                                                
55 As Piven (2011: 160) writes: “Under the guise of the urban fiscal crisis, in short, local 
and national business interests joined to reassert control over the municipal level of the 
state apparatus, for it was on the municipal level that popular struggles by working-class 
groups had forced some concessions in the 1960s.” 
56 As Harvey (2005: 44) notes, New York pioneered the way for neoliberal practices 
domestically under Reagan and internationally through the IMF. 
57 In what became known as the New Federalism, policy authority was increasingly 
devolved to states and redesigned along market models (see Katz 2008). 
58 For instance, in Reagan’s first two years in office alone, means-tested programs were 
cut by 54 percent, housing assistance by 47 percent, and job training by 81 percent 
(Danziger 1983). 
 
 
98 
the nation’s social problems could be solved through deregulation, privatization, and 
retrenchment.  
 
Neoliberal restructuring at the national scale began in earnest with the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981, which Boris and Klein (2012: 152) have called the 
“probably the most significant piece of social legislation since the Great Society.” The 
Act restricted eligibility for welfare, cut benefit levels, and reduced funding for a range of 
social services. It also marked a significant shift in urban policy as the federal 
government dramatically withdrew support from cities, ending a federal aid program that 
provided more than half the money for some municipal budgets (Katz 2008). 
Furthermore, in place of matching state expenditures, after an across the board cut of 22 
percent the OBRA capped federal funding for social programs and introduced block 
grants, giving states the means to displace social welfare programs run by big cities.59 
Lastly, the OBRA placed the funding of community services directly under state 
governments, reversing a key legacy of the Great Society in which the federal 
government had bypassed states to directly fund urban anti-poverty initiatives (Piven and 
Cloward 1985).  
 
The OBRA was designed to roll back the gains made by popular movements in the 
previous decades. According to Boris and Klein (2012: 152), the legislation “blindsided 
big cities and rebuffed their recently mobilized constituencies of African Americans, 
Latinos, poor people, feminists, and public employees.” Under the new funding 
arrangements, states had to choose which social services to reduce or eliminate, and 
administrators shifted costs to users through increased fees and eligibility restrictions 
until programs served only the poorest of the poor (Boris and Klein 2012: 152).  
 
In doing so, the Reagan administration effectively downloaded the costs of and 
responsibilities for key aspects of social reproduction from the federal government onto 
state and local government, rolling back many aspects of the New Deal and Great 
                                                
59 Federal aid to state and local governments declined in real dollars for the first time in 
two decades (Boris and Klein 2012: 152).  
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Society. In turn, state and local governments shifted more of these costs onto households 
(see Abramovitz 2010). For working class women, and poor women of colour in 
particular, these reforms meant less state support for care work—whether the unpaid 
work of caring for their families or their paid work providing social services like daycare 
and home health care. 
 
New York City Child Care Under Reagan 
 
The impact of the OBRA on New York City’s public child care system was drastic.  
New York’s publicly-funded daycare programs lowered their nutritional standards for 
children’s meals, raised their co-payments for low-income families, and further reduced 
the income level at which families qualified for child care subsidy (“U.S. Cuts Limiting 
Day Care,” 1982). At the time, the city was serving 43,000 children from low-income 
families—down from 45,000 in 1975—70 percent of whom were near or below the 
poverty level. And over 7,000 families were on ACD’s waiting list for subsidized care; a 
number that grew steadily throughout the 1980s (CCI 1990). More and more of New 
York’s low-income families had to rely on exclusively private means to meet their child 
care needs. 
 
In addition to funding cuts, the Reagan administration sought to use public dollars to 
further expand the private child care market, privatizing social services by marketizing 
their delivery. To this end, the federal government passed legislation permitting the states 
to use federal funds for child care voucher programs (Interview 8).60 Federal regulations 
governing social service provision previously mandated states to spend federal dollars on 
either state-owned and operated child care centres or for contracts for child care spaces 
with selected not-for-profit providers (Meyers 1990). In the name of “parent choice”, 
federal policymakers ended these restrictions and encouraged states to expand what had 
previously been very small child care voucher programs (see Savas 2002). The move 
                                                
60 This shift entailed a change to Title XX of the Social Security Act of 1935, which 
provides for funding for social services through the Social Services Block Grant. Under 
Reagan, states were more discretion in the use of SSBG funds. Each State determines 
what services are provided, who is eligible to receive them, and how funds are used. 
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reflected the neoliberal emphasis on decentralization, deregulation, and privatization, and 
“profoundly altered public financing for child care” (Meyers 1990: 562). At the local 
level, privatization was accompanied by “a reduction in child care standards, monitoring 
and enforcement” (Meyers 1990: 567). 
 
In New York City, these changes had the intended effect. In 1984, the city introduced 
child care vouchers for low-income families. ACD cited efforts to make child care 
coverage available in neighbourhoods with few or no daycare programs, and with cuts to 
federal child care funding, the agency sought to maintain service levels (Interview 8). For 
the city, vouchers were one way containing both capital (building maintenance etc.) costs 
and labour costs. Public dollars would be increasingly channelled away from the city’s 
unionized, centre-based daycare programs. 
 
While the number of vouchers offered by the city was initially small, ranging from 1,000 
to 1,500 annually (McCall 1997), it marked an important shift in how the city dealt with 
rising demand for child care. During the welfare state expansion of the 1960s and early 
70s, child care funds went into new contracts with non-profit child care providers, 
expanding centre-based care in poor neighbourhoods. Vouchers on the other hand could 
be used to purchase services from for-profit centres, family daycares, or unlicensed 
informal child care, representing a fundamentally different way of meeting low-income 
families’ child care needs. The new emphasis on vouchers stood to erode the child care 
system founded in the New Deal, saved in the post-war period, and expanded during the 
1960s and ‘70s.  
 
However diminished, New York City’s public daycare centres weathered Reagan’s cuts. 
While voucher use expanded as a percentage of overall subsidies, unlike other cities, 
New York continued to contract with non-profit agencies for the provision of daycare 
services (arrangements that had been in place since the war). In the few big cities that had 
managed to hang onto to their New Deal and wartime day nurseries, and expand child 
care programs in the 1960s, vouchers marked the end of this model of service delivery 
 
 
101 
(Interview 21). While battered by years of cutbacks, New York’s system of quality, 
centre-based, unionized daycare programs stood alone in the country.  
 
Child Care and the Family Support Act 
 
Reagan was elected in part on racially coded promises to end “welfare dependency” and 
restore the “work ethic” (see Piven and Cloward 1985). Although the proportion of single 
mothers on welfare had declined significantly since the early 1970s, and remained steady 
since 1980, the forces calling for more widespread reform were not satisfied with the 
draconian measures of the OBRA (Piven and Cloward 1985). In 1988, the US Congress 
passed what was arguably the most important welfare reform legislation since the Social 
Security Act of 1935 created ADC (Katz 2008: 57). The Family Support Act (FSA) 
transformed welfare from an “income maintenance program designed to help single 
mothers stay home with their children into a mandatory work program designed to 
channel welfare recipients into the low wage labour market” (Rose 1990: 18).  
 
The FSA expanded federal requirements for states to shift their welfare caseloads into 
work-related programming and increased obligations on welfare recipients to work in 
subsidized and unsubsidized jobs, enter job training, or enrol in education (Peck 2001: 
97).61 The legislation also increased state discretion in the design of welfare-to-work 
programs, provided they met federally set participation requirements of 7 percent of their 
welfare caseload by 1991 and 20 percent by 1996 (Collins and Goldberg 2004). States 
were threatened with funding cuts if they failed to meet these targets. In states such as 
New York, where counties and municipalities had always maintained a significant degree 
of autonomy in program design and delivery, devolution gave more room for New York 
City to experiment with workfare (Krinsky 2007a).  
 
The FSA also marked a shift in the definition of employability for poor mothers. Work-
related activities were now mandatory for welfare recipients whose youngest children 
                                                
61 This was done under the auspices of the new Job Opportunities and Basic Skills 
(JOBS) program. 
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were 3 years of age or older.62 However, the federal government gave states the option to 
include mothers with children as young as 12 months (Naples 1991). In addition, all 
teenage parents were required to participate in a “learnfare” component regardless of the 
age of their children. The new rules and expectations raised the question of “who will 
care for the children of mothers engaged in welfare to work?”63 
 
The FSA revisited the paradox of cost-cutting welfare reforms that required public 
investment in child care to be successful.64 To meet rising demand for child care services, 
the FSA required states to provide subsidy for up to one year for families transitioning 
from welfare to paid work, known as Transitional Child Care (TCC). In addition, states 
were required to guarantee child care to welfare mothers participating in training or 
education programs approved by the state under another federal program, called AFDC-
Child Care. Under both programs states were authorized to operate their own daycare 
programs or issue grants and contracts with private agencies. But in keeping with the 
reforms of the OBRA, states were also authorized to provide parents with vouchers or 
even cash for child care (Besharov and Samari 2001: 196).  
 
Despite these policies, a significant increase in federal child care funding was not 
forthcoming and by 1990 TCC and AFDC-Child Care programs were limited to such an 
extent that the implementation of the FSA was at a virtual standstill in many states. As a 
result, local welfare bureaucracies exempted many welfare recipients with children 
younger than school age from welfare to work (Levy and Michel 2002: 244). A growing 
                                                
62 Down from 6 years of age under the previous major welfare reform legislation, the 
Work Incentive Program or WIN passed in 1969. 
63 Policymakers argued that these expectations mirrored those facing other women: 
according to Lurie and Sanger (1991: 48), “Given the labor-force participation among 
mothers with young children in the country as a whole, Congress felt similar expectations 
for welfare mothers were appropriate.” 
64 As Levy and Michel (2002: 256) point out, the very political forces that were intent on 
reducing welfare rolls were also opposed to expanding government services like child 
care, which encouraged maternal employment. 
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number of participants were placed on child care waiting lists, which grew rapidly as a 
rising number of working poor mothers were also applying for subsidized child care.65 
 
The lack of federal funding for the FSA meant only a small fraction of welfare mothers 
actually participated in locally administered workfare programs (Katz 2008: 75). 
However, the failure to adequately fund child care should not be understood as a failure 
of welfare reform. If the goal was to reduce the welfare rolls and discipline poor mothers 
into the labour market, the FSA was a success. As benefits became stingier and states 
were emboldened to make life on welfare more difficult than it already was, workfare 
participants and welfare leavers were often reliant on kith and kin for the care of their 
children (Levy and Michel 2002: 244).66 The neoliberal state continued to shift costs of 
and responsibilities for care work onto low-income families/households and 
communities.   
 
Despite the child care rhetoric that accompanied the FSA, almost all of the increases in 
child care spending during the Reagan administration went to middle- and upper-income 
families (Michel 2004).  Forms of indirect child care support to these families, in the 
                                                
65 The FSA exposed other paradoxes at the intersection of welfare and child care policy: 
For instance, a shortage of public transportation in low-income areas, a lack of child care 
options available during non-traditional hours of work, or child care that was flexible 
enough to accommodate part-time JOBS participation hours, were all be barriers to 
securing adequate child care arrangements. Most day care centres would only enroll 
children on a full-time basis and few were open during non-traditional hours. These facts 
would later be marshalled in the argument for the expansion of vouchers under TANF 
and the expediency of family day care and informal care. See Levy and Michel (2002).  
66 This policy tilt was also evident in the FSA’s focus on ‘marriage promotion’, also a 
precursor of TANF. These measures sought to reassert patriarchal norms and ‘traditional’ 
family forms in keeping with conservative claims that overly ‘generous’ welfare 
payments and ease of access to AFDC had led to the breakdown of two parent families, 
African-American families (Katz 2008). The measures included a requirement for states 
to establish paternity and garnish the wages of non-custodial parents (Collins and 
Goldberg 2004: 83). Under the FSA, women were subject to new rules which forced 
them to identify the fathers of their children as a condition of receiving assistance and 
employers were required to withhold child support payments from the pay checks of 
absent fathers. However, like other aspects of the FSA, implementation of child support 
policies varied from state to state (Katz 2008: 74-75). 
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form of tax incentives and deductions increased, stimulating the growth of for-profit child 
care (Michel 2004: 156). In contrast, by the end of the decade, only 18 percent of low-
income families used child care centres or preschools, with family, friends, and 
neighbours the most common source of child care (Levy and Michel 2002). According to 
Michel (1999: 259-64), this meant a large percentage of children were in unlicensed 
home settings, possibly under inadequate safety conditions, and with limited educational 
and developmental opportunities.  
 
The Family Support Act in New York City  
 
Under the FSA, New York City initiated a welfare-to-work program, Begin Employment 
Gain Independence Now (Krinsky 2007). As previously mentioned, New York State has 
traditionally given local districts considerable discretion in designing and managing their 
employment and training programs. This continued under the new legislation as the city 
took a more workfarist approach and increasingly relied on sanctions, not employment, to 
reduce welfare grants (Lurie and Sanger 1991). Still reeling from the fiscal crisis, 
policymakers saw the reduction of New York’s welfare caseload as vital to the health of 
the city’s finances (Moody 2007).  
 
Child care played an important role in the design of BEGIN. As welfare mothers without 
adequate child care arrangements could be exempted from participation under FSA 
regulations, how child care was secured had a significant impact on the compulsion 
welfare recipients felt to participate in the program (Lurie and Sanger 1991). According 
to Lurie and Sanger (1991: 60), New York City and State welfare bureaucrats “debated 
over how much the burden of finding and choosing satisfactory child care should rest 
with the client and how much compulsion there should be to accept any available 
arrangement.”  
 
As this discussion indicates, the city’s welfare bureaucracy saw child care as a tool to 
discipline AFDC clients into accepting low-wage employment and federal regulations 
guaranteeing parent choice in child care as a potential barrier to welfare-to-work 
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programs. As pressures to slash the welfare rolls intensified, developing front-line 
practices that restricted a recipient’s child care options and limited their choices could 
function to push poor mothers into workfare or low-wage employment. These discussions 
would inform the practices of the city’s welfare bureaucracy under TANF.  
 
Mandating Marketization and the Rise of “Parental Choice”: Child Care and Welfare in 
the Early 1990s 
 
Despite the shift towards workfare, the Family Support Act did not have the drastic 
impact on the welfare rolls that policymakers had anticipated (Quadagno 1994). For 
many, the law’s failure to move welfare mothers into paid work demonstrated that 
“successful” welfare reform must include significant levels of public investment in child 
care. Without this key employment support in place, many policymakers argued, any 
attempt at far-reaching welfare reform was doomed to failure (Levy and Michel 2002).  
 
With this in mind, Congress passed the Child Care and Development Block Grant 
(CCDBG) in 1990. The centrepiece of the CCDBG was a block grant allocating $825 
million to individual states for child care services. Yet while the rhetoric was promising, 
CCDBG did little to reverse the funding cuts of the 1980s (Michel 2004: 156).67 In 
addition, the CCDBG marked further moves to deregulate and marketize public child 
care: under the legislation, a portion of child care dollars transferred to the states had to 
give parents the option of receiving a child care voucher with which they could purchase 
any form of child care, including unregulated, license-exempt care (i.e. informal care) or 
home-based family daycare (Besharov and Samari 2001: 196). Thus, unlike under the 
Family Support Act, in which states were authorized to provide child care vouchers, 
under the CCDBG the federal government made vouchers mandatory.  
 
                                                
67 The legislation had four main components: expanded funding for Head Start; a new 
entitlement program that increased child care assistance for families deemed “at-risk” of 
welfare receipt, At-Risk Child Care; an expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
designed to help low-income families with their child care costs; and the block grant 
(Michel 2004).  
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In essence, the CCDBG marked the deregulation and privatization of local and state child 
care programs from above. As mentioned previously, by the late 1980s, fewer and fewer 
states and cities could offer parents the option of child care in a non-profit, regulated, 
centre-based setting. Informal child care and family daycare had become the default 
“choice” for many of the nation’s poor families (see Levy and Michel 2002). And while 
the portion of funds subject to these new regulations was initially small, by 1997 nearly 
half of all federal child care dollars fell under the “parental choice” requirement 
(Besharov and Samari 2001).  
 
Combined with welfare reform, these changes would increase the proportion of public 
dollars flowing to the home-based sector of the child care market. For the neoliberal 
policymakers and powerful think tanks pushing these measures, the CCDBG was a 
victory, further introducing market forces into a key program of the post-war welfare 
state, and encouraging competition among for-profit child care providers. In the words of 
researchers affiliated with one such think tank, the legislation marked the end of 
government “instructing parents on how to care for their children” (Besharov and Samari 
2001: 217).68  
 
The CCDBG in New York City 
 
The impact of the CCDBG in New York was gradual but significant. The number of child 
care vouchers issued by the Agency for Child Development grew from between 1,000 
and 1,5000 annually (from 1984 to 1990) to 12,660 in 1995, just six years after the 
passage of the law (McCall 1997). Not all child care advocates were opposed to 
vouchers: vouchers made child subsidies available in neighbourhoods that did not have 
publicly-funded daycare programs and therefore stood to benefit families in underserved 
                                                
68 Child care vouchers were concomitant with the Reagan and Bush administrations’ 
broader emphasis on decentralization, deregulation, and privatization. Voucherization 
was increasingly tied to federal funding in a range of programs such as education and 
housing, reflecting the broader neoliberal shift toward private responsibility for social 
reproduction. 
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low-income communities (Interview 21). Thus, even for advocates of high-quality public 
child care, in the neoliberal context of a municipal child care system battered by years of 
underfunding, vouchers held a compelling logic.  
 
Yet the federal mandate for “parental choice” would contribute to a fundamental 
reshaping of New York City’s child care system, perhaps far beyond what advocates 
expected. As a harbinger of this change, up until 1994 ACD had prohibited the use of 
child care subsidies for informal child care, reflecting its commitment to developmentally 
appropriate child care and strong regulations. However, the agency was forced to change 
this practice after the passage of the CCDBG (Interview 21). Parents could now use 
vouchers to purchase care in unregulated settings such as the homes of family, friends, or 
neighbours. The city’s commitment to high-quality, centre-based child care programs, 
undermined by a decade of neoliberal austerity, had suffered yet another blow.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to elevate the contextual embeddedness of neoliberal restructuring 
and resistance in Giuliani-era New York by highlighting its historical context. I have 
explored how popular struggles over the social organization of care work—as part of 
broader struggles over social reproduction—shaped the historical development and 
character of New York City’s post-war welfare regime. The chapter also situates 
contemporary struggles at the intersection of welfare and child care, discussed in Chapter 
Four, within a long tradition of struggles by working class women, and especially 
working class women of colour, over welfare, child care, and the value of women’s care 
work. Finally, the chapter has illustrated how neoliberal restructuring has created crisis 
tendencies in social reproduction for poor and working class families/households in New 
York City and detailed contested state efforts at their mediation. 
 
From the post-war campaign to save public day nurseries and the efforts of the United 
Parents’ Association, to the fight for universal child care in the early 1970s, working 
class women’s activism played a central role in fostering New York City’s child care 
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exceptionalism. While the principle of child care as a social right was never realized, 
between 1945 and 1975 New York built the largest public child care system in the nation, 
one recognized for its commitment to high quality, centre-based programming delivered 
by non-profit community agencies. By the late 1960s, the women on whose labour this 
system rests had formed a union and struck for three weeks, part of the wave of 
municipal unionism that swept New York. The city’s daycare workers came to set 
national standards for wages and working conditions in the child care sector. While never 
fully breaking from the liberal-residualist model of child care provision, in its 
combination of affordable, regulated, quality child care with quality care work, New 
York’s municipal child care regime reflected the city’s social democratic ethos.    
 
Like New York’s daycare workers, the women of the welfare rights movement demanded 
their care work be socially recognized and economically valued, while also insisting on 
access to public child care services and decent wages for women working as professional 
child care providers. Against the backdrop of the civil rights movement and widespread 
urban unrest, poor women of colour claimed a right to public assistance on the basis of 
the work of raising and caring for their children. The militancy of welfare rights activists 
contributed to the liberalization of welfare policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as 
thousands of New York’s poor single mothers gained access to the city’s welfare rolls. 
Overall, the women of the welfare rights movement demanded access to benefits and 
services long enjoyed by working class white New Yorkers. In response to their 
demands, the state extended social citizenship entitlements to poor women of colour.    
 
These movements—welfare rights, care worker unionism, and the child care 
movement—were part of broader struggles over social reproduction that shaped the 
distinct trajectory and character of New York City’s welfare regime. From the era of the 
New Deal to the Great Society, popular struggles pushed the city government to 
underwrite more of the costs of and responsibilities for social reproduction than any other 
municipality in the US. Supported by federal funds, but also dependent on the local tax 
base, New York’s “urban social democracy” came to include a wide range of social 
welfare programs and social services. Yet the fiscal crisis of 1975 revealed the escalating 
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contradictions inherent in the city’s social democracy and in Fordist-Keynesian 
capitalism more broadly. This crisis was quickly seized upon by political and economic 
elites as an opportunity to roll back the gains of popular struggle, contain the power of 
social movements and municipal unions, and increasingly shift costs of social 
reproduction away from the state and onto families/households and communities.  
 
With the election of Ronald Reagan, the neoliberal practices pioneered in response to 
New York’s fiscal crisis were elevated to the national scale. The Reagan administration 
drastically cut aid to cities, reduced funding for social welfare programs, and passed 
welfare reforms that tied benefits to participation in welfare-to-work programs, while at 
the same time failing to provide poor mothers with requisite child care supports. 
Reflecting the broader neoliberalization of social policy, when the federal government 
did provide limited investment in child care supports, funding was framed by a neoliberal 
rhetoric of “parent choice” and tied to demand-side subsidies such as vouchers. In place 
of the direct delivery of child care services by local government, the voucherization of 
child care reflected the marketization and privatization of urban social services more 
broadly.  
 
And yet despite more than a decade of neoliberal restructuring, by the early 1990s many 
of the institutional legacies of New York’s social democratic welfare state remained, 
however diminished. Welfare rights struggles had contributed to making public 
assistance comparatively more accessible in New York than in other locales: by 1993, the 
city remained home to one in ten of the nation’s welfare recipients (DeParle 1998). Poor 
New Yorkers continued to have access to a range of social welfare services and supports 
that were not available elsewhere. Furthermore, whereas most municipal child care 
systems had withered away after successive rounds of retrenchment—the legacy of 
wartime childcare all but erased—thanks to the resistance of the city’s child care 
movement, New York’s publicly-financed daycare programs had weathered the 
neoliberal storm. As for the city’s municipal unions, while fighting mainly defensive 
battles, unions such as Local 205 Day Care Workers remained influential actors in local 
politics, and continued to defend public services and protect the wages and working 
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conditions of their members. 
 
These were the institutional legacies of popular struggle at which the Giuliani 
administration’s project of neoliberal restructuring took aim. For the political and 
economic elite who had driven the neoliberalization of New York, the city’s social 
programs remained too generous, its taxes too high, and its public sector unions too 
powerful. In an era of neoliberal rule, New York was a reminder of politics done 
differently. As presidential candidate Bill Clinton campaigned on a promise of “ending 
welfare as we know it”, Republican politician Newt Gingrich (1992) said of New York: 
“the malignant combination of machine politics, bankrupt welfare statism, and rapacious 
unionism … is contributing to the slow-motion suicide of the once world’s greatest city.”  
 
Against the backdrop of federal welfare reform, thousands of the city’s poor single 
mothers would soon be called into a notoriously punitive workfare program, one 
designed to push them into the lower reaches of the labour market, heightening the need 
and demand for non-parental child care. As welfare reform escalated the city’s child care 
crisis, the neoliberal preference for privatization and a militant anti-unionism would 
combine as a new mayoral administration sought to provide social services “on the 
cheap”. It is to these reforms and their impact that the dissertation now turns.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
“BUT WHO WILL CARE FOR THEIR CHILDREN?” WELFARE REFORM AND 
THE NEOLIBERAL RESTRUCTURING OF CHILD CARE IN NEW YORK CITY,  
1994-2005 
 
 
“The new social contract with welfare recipients will require many more mothers to take jobs. But who will 
care for their children while they work?” – Editorial, New York Times, October 21 1996 
 
“In the Bronx, a city caseworker searching for licensed baby sitters finds only six names in her computer, 
and all six have let their certification expire. She prints the useless list for a welfare mother with worried 
eyes and says, ‘You’ll just have to do the best you can.’ In Brooklyn, a harried caseworker refuses to even 
hunt for openings, offering her welfare clients an outdated child care directory instead. But of the providers 
listed in Brownsville, where nearly 900 children need care, the only two available centres have room for 
15. And in Queens, a caseworker nods impatiently as a nervous mother ticks off the twelve places she has 
called, none of which could watch her baby son. But instead of excusing the mother from workfare, the 
caseworker leans across his desk and threatens her, slowly and deliberately and in violation of state law. 
‘They’re going to reduce your benefits if you can’t find anyone,’ says the worker, Anthony Sweeny. ‘Can 
you survive on less money? No? Well, you have to find somebody—a neighbour, a friend, somebody. You 
have 10 days. No more excuses.’”69 
 
“If a welfare mother went and looked at a daycare program suggested by her caseworker and came back 
and said ‘I’m not happy with it, I don’t like their philosophy’, well they’d just be laughed out of the welfare 
office.” – New York City welfare rights organizer 
 
“Choice suggests the opportunity or privilege of choosing freely.” – Websters Collegiate Dictionary 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Prior to welfare reform, New York City had a shortage of affordable, quality child care 
(see CCI 1990, 1994). Since the 1970s, the erosion of the family wage and decline in the 
real value of welfare benefits saw growing numbers of the city’s poor and working class 
women enter the labour force. Despite boasting the largest municipal child care system in 
the nation, the supply of child care has not kept up with rising demand. As illustrated in 
the previous chapter, austerity policies worked to limit families access to subsidized child 
care, put downward pressure on care quality and standards, and negatively impacted the 
wages and working conditions of the city’s daycare workers. As one of New York’s 
leading child care advocates put it, “long before welfare reform, the city had a child care 
crisis” (Interview 8).   
 
                                                
69 From Swarns (1998: A1) investigative report into welfare reform and child care in New 
York City. 
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As welfare reform dramatically increased need and demand for child care—escalating the 
care crisis—the City of New York revisited a classic neoliberal dilemma over welfare-to-
work: its failure to adequately fund child care provision threatened to undermine the very 
transitions into work it sought to encourage (see Peck 2001: 251).70 As thousands of poor 
single mothers entered workfare programs and the lower reaches of the labour market, the 
question “who will care for their children?” was thrust to the forefront of New York City 
politics.  
 
In this chapter, I argue that under the administration of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, New 
York City’s effort at mediating the child care crisis was grounded in overlapping and 
mutually reinforcing strategies of privatization, which shifted costs of and responsibilities 
for child care onto low-income families/households and communities, and especially the 
women within them. The primary outcome of these strategies was the expansion of the 
home child care market in which a precarious workforce provided publicly-subsidized 
care services “on the cheap.” Prior to welfare reform, only a small number of home child 
care providers—disproportionately women of colour in the city’s low-income 
neighbourhoods—received public dollars to care for the children of welfare recipients 
engaged in welfare-to-work programs. Welfare reform saw the ranks of these providers 
expand dramatically as they became a key workforce in the city’s neoliberalizing welfare 
state.  
 
I map the development and analyze the impact of the Giuliani administration’s policies at 
the intersection of welfare reform and child care, making my argument in five sections. In 
the first section of the chapter, I sketch the contours of “actually existing neoliberalism” 
in New York, providing a brief overview of the Giuliani regime, its ideological 
orientation and approach to urban governance. While occurring against the backdrop of 
                                                
70 Between 1995 and 2003, the city slashed its welfare rolls by just over two-thirds—or 
222,973 cases—with an estimated 450,000 children leaving welfare over the space of 
eight years. Yet at its post-1995 peak in 2003, New York City’s publicly funded child 
care system served only 98,158 children (CCI 2004). Over this period the average number 
of people per caseload was approximately three (a parent and two children). 1995 marked 
the postwar peak of New York City’s welfare caseload (Krinsky 2007a).  
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federal welfare reform, the city’s response to the child care crisis is best understood as 
one component of a broader project of urban neoliberalization in which the Giuliani 
administration transformed the local state through processes of deregulation, 
privatization, and retrenchment, shifting public services to unpaid work in 
families/households, to the third sector, and to the market to provide for a price. In this, 
the administration sought to dismantle the institutional legacies of New York’s urban 
social democracy and curb the power of municipal workers and their unions. 
 
In section two, I analyze the administration’s child care policies prior to municipal and 
federal welfare reform.71 In his first two years in office, Giuliani marketized municipal 
child care services through the expansion of a previously small voucher scheme. The 
Agency for Child Development was instructed to permit the use of child care vouchers 
for informal care, reneging on its historical commitment to quality, centre-based care. 
Furthermore, the Giuliani administration cut child care funding overall and closed a 
number of unionized city-run daycares, cutting capacity in the regulated child care sector 
and putting downward pressure on daycare workers’ wages and working conditions.  
 
In the build up to federal welfare reform, civil society groups and the city’s own child 
care taskforce warned that an aggressive welfare-to-work agenda would intensify New 
York City’s child care crisis. In the third section of the chapter, I discuss the findings of 
these reports and analyze the Giuliani administration’s response. The reports documented 
the city’s increasing reliance on informal, home-based child care providers in the years 
leading up welfare reform and questioned the reliability, safety, and quality of 
unregulated care. The administration responded to critics with a neoliberal of rhetoric of 
child care “choice”, insisting that poor families preferred informal child care. As these 
reports make clear, the administration made no effort to expand the centre-based child 
care system and provide families with a range of flexible, responsive, and inclusive child 
care options. 
 
As predicted, the federal welfare reform act of 1996 dramatically escalated need and 
                                                
71 The former predated the latter by one year (see Krinsky 2007a). 
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demand for non-parental child care. For the Giuliani administration, putting children in 
the care of “family, friends or neighbours”, i.e. home-based informal care, proved the 
quickest and cheapest route to moving welfare mothers into workfare and paid 
employment. However, contrary to the claims of the administration, welfare recipients 
did not overwhelming prefer this type of child care, and furthermore, their right to choose 
among a variety of child care options was protected in New York State and federal 
welfare laws. To overcome these barriers, the city’s welfare bureaucracy engaged in the 
systematic violation of welfare recipients’ legislated child care rights. In the fourth 
section of the chapter, I detail the policies and front-line practices that were in large part 
responsible for welfare mothers’ high reliance on informal child care in the wake of 
welfare reform.  
 
In addition, the city’s welfare administration employed practices that stigmatized and 
deterred welfare receipt, including the public shaming of workfare participants, excessive 
requests for personal information, cumbersome and deliberately confusing application 
and appeals processes, and mandatory drug testing (Krinsky 2007a). These “rituals of 
degradation” (Piven and Cloward 1971) had the effect of both deterring poor people from 
applying for welfare and pushing existing recipients off the rolls. Diverted from welfare, 
thousands of poor mothers eligible for cash assistance and therefore guaranteed a child 
care subsidy, did not gain access to them. These families were forced to rely on 
exclusively private means to meet their child care needs.  
 
In the fifth and final section of the chapter, I document the municipal retreat from child 
care funding in the years following federal welfare reform. Rather than keeping city 
dollars in the municipal child care pot and investing in improvements in quality and 
access, the Giuliani administration cut its child care budget as federal and state funds 
flowed into city coffers. This reversed the post-war trend of strong city government 
support for municipal child care services. From 1996 onwards, federal and state funds 
increasingly supplanted municipal child care dollars, further demonstrating the 
administration’s lack of support for quality, affordable, child care, and preference for 
privatized solutions to the child care crisis.  
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1. “Actually Existing Neoliberalism” in Giuliani’s New York 
 
In November of 1993, Rudolph Giuliani, a neoconservative Republican, won New York 
City’s mayoral election. He succeeded David Dinkins, a liberal Democrat and the city’s 
first African-American mayor. While Dinkins had promised a more socially just New 
York—emphasizing community development, economic opportunity, and racial justice—
his administration was effectively “disciplined by a resurgence of elite mobilization 
aimed at safeguarding the city’s neoliberalization” (Brash 2011: 31). In the context of this 
opposition, and the recession of the early 1990s, Dinkins adopted a more “market-
friendly” approach to urban governance. As a result, his administration failed to provide 
progressive solutions to a number of social crises wrought by neoliberal policies, most 
notably sharp rises in homelessness, street crime, and public disorder (Vitale 2008). 
According to Vitale (2008), Giuliani’s electoral success represented a reaction against the 
perceived failures of urban liberals to resolve these crises and mitigate their impact on 
New Yorkers’ quality of life. 
 
Giuliani’s electoral coalition consisted of conservatives, disaffected upper and middle-
class liberals, and enough outer-borough Jewish and white working-class Democrats to 
secure a narrow victory over Dinkins (Moody 2007: 127-132). The first Republican 
mayor of New York in thirty-odd years, his campaign had the overwhelming support of 
the city’s ruling class, including the backing of banking, insurance, and real estate 
interests, and the endorsements of all three of the city’s daily newspapers (Brash 2011). 
As New York struggled to recover from recession, Giuliani’s austerity agenda and 
promise of fiscal responsibility was heralded by economic elites, including the Wall 
Street bond-rating agencies that had become powerful agents in the neoliberalization of 
New York since the fiscal crisis of 1975 (Hackworth 2007: 33-36).  
 
Transforming the Urban Welfare Regime 
 
Politically, the Giuliani administration sought to roll back what remained of New York’s 
Fordist-Keynesian welfare state and roll out a punitive, neoliberal workfare state (see 
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Wacquant 2009a, 2009b).72 Backed by neoliberal think tanks, such as the influential 
Manhattan Institute, and bankrolled by the city’s corporate elite, Giuliani sought to 
continue the neoliberal counterrevolution in New York, shrinking the size and scope of 
local government and restructuring the institutional legacies of New York’s urban social 
democracy along neoliberal lines (see O’Connor 2008). 
 
Many of the administration’s social policy measures were introduced under the guise of a 
campaign to improve New Yorkers’ “quality of life” (Vitale 2008). Giuliani took a “zero-
tolerance” approach to the behaviours of the so-called “urban underclass”, manifest in 
aggressive policing tactics targeting marginalized populations; especially the homeless, 
sex workers, and Black and Latino youth. The street life of these populations was said to 
be undermining the quality of life of “average New Yorkers” and harming the 
marketability of the city abroad (Vitale 2008). Social services for these most 
marginalized segments of the urban poor were cut and new methods of social control—
such as strict by-law enforcement around loitering, sleeping in public spaces, and graffiti 
writing—were rolled out in their place (see Wacquant 2009a).  
 
Welfare recipients featured prominently in the new mayor’s urban imaginary. In his 1993 
and 1997 election campaigns, welfare reform was a key plank in Giuliani’s platform, 
employed to rally the support of white working class New Yorkers (traditionally 
Democrats) to the business-friendly agenda of a Republican mayor (Freeman 2000). 
Harkening back to the fiscal crisis of 1975, Giuliani publicly denigrated the city’s 
“welfare dependent” poor and blamed public assistance programs for New York’s fiscal 
ills. Lacking “personal responsibility” and “individual initiative”, welfare recipients were 
contrasted to the city’s “hard-working taxpayers” (see Krinsky 2007a). In a major 
mayoral address on welfare, Giuliani promised to “restore the work ethic to the center of 
city life and transform New York City from the former welfare capital of the world to the 
work capital of the world.” As he proclaimed in a 1998 town hall meeting, “I want to be 
                                                
72 According to Wacquant (2009a: 10), under Giuliani’s tenure, New York became a 
“crucible for the new penal reason”, bringing together “stingy workfare” and “generous 
prisonfare” which together constituted “a single organizational contraption to discipline 
and supervise the poor under a philosophy of moral behaviourism.” 
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remembered as the man that took a city of dependency and made it into a city of 
workers!” (qtd. in Cole 2006).73  
 
The administration blended a neoconservative approach to family and community life—
elevating the (white) hetero-patriarchal family while emphasizing law and order, public 
civility, and personal responsibility—with a neoliberal preference for market solutions to 
problems of urban governance (Vitale 2008). A key element in the transformation of the 
local state was the embrace of strategies to reduce the cost and size of government 
through deregulation, privatization, and managed competition for public services (see 
Weikart 2001; O’Connor 2008; Cooke 2008). In the language of neoliberalism, the mayor 
aimed to improve public services by dissolving state monopolies and introducing 
competition and “choice” for the “clients” of services (Savas 2002).74 
 
To this end, Giuliani implemented over eighty privatization initiatives over his two terms 
in office, including the contracting out of city services and the sale of city-owned assets 
(Cooke 2008; emphasis added).75 In social welfare, the city contracted out services to 
                                                
73 Neil Smith (1998) has characterized the Giuliani regime as a form of “urban 
revanchism”. For Smith, the mayor and his allies sought “revenge” against the public 
enemies of New York’s “bourgeois elite”, namely people of colour, feminists, sex 
workers, gays and lesbians, anti-poverty advocates, welfare mothers, squatters, the 
homeless, and left-wing academics. All of these groups were understood to be associated 
with New York’s progressive political culture and the city’s social democratic leanings. 
They were deemed responsible for the city’s fiscal and social “excess” and “duly 
execrated for having stolen New York from a white middle class that sees the city as its 
birthright” (Smith 1998: 1). Giuliani singled out two academics for particular scorn: 
Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward’s “flood-the-rolls, bankrupt the cities strategy”, 
as conservatives called it, was deemed responsible not only for New York’s welfare 
explosion in the 1960s and early 70s and the city’s ‘culture of welfare dependency’, but 
ultimately the fiscal crisis of 1975. Of course, this represented a gross perversion of the 
strategic impetus behind what was essentially a strategic plan to end poverty developed 
by two activist scholars committed to welfare rights (Schram 2002: 66-69).   
74 Such reforms had been implemented under the Reagan administration and according to 
Weikart (2001) Giuliani dedicated his time in office to bringing the “Reagan 
realignment” to New York.  
75 This included: the contracting-out fleet management in the Parks and Recreation 
Department and custodial work at public schools; franchising private ferries; divesting 
radio and television stations; crafting a public-private partnership for new school 
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private providers in home health care, homeless shelters, and employment training. 
Voucher programs were introduced and/or expanded in a wide range of services, 
including child care, public housing, education, employment, and homeless services (see 
Weikart 2001). Welfare offices were converted into Job Centers and worked closely with 
private for-profit employment agencies mandated to assist welfare recipients with job 
search and skills development on a pay-for-performance basis (Krinksy 2006).  
 
The restructuring of public services had a deleterious impact on the municipal workforce. 
Thousands of full-time positions were eliminated through layoffs and severance programs 
(see Cooke 2008). The cuts included front-line social service providers, with 21,000 jobs 
lost in the city’s welfare bureaucracy alone (Moody 2007: 132-133). Municipal labour 
costs were also lowered by the contracting out of: custodians in public schools; security 
guard services; vehicle maintenance; data-entry services; tax billing; medical labs in the 
public health department; road resurfacing; and a host of other public functions (see 
Savas 2005). In some city agencies, such as the Parks Department, municipal employees 
were replaced with workfare participants, slashing the city’s payroll while weakening 
public sector unions (see Weikart 2001; Krinsky 2006).  
 
This restructuring disproportionately impacted African Americans who had gained access 
to public sector employment in the 1970s and 1980s, and black women in particular, who 
were concentrated in social service jobs. Given some of the shared characteristics of 
home health care and home child care work, including as a site of employment for 
women of colour, Giuliani’s approach to the city’s home care program is instructive. In 
1993, over 67,000 unionized home care attendants were employed in New York City’s 
$1.2 billion home care program (Ness 2009). The program provided care to home-bound 
people needing assistance with daily activities such as dressing, bathing, and taking 
medicine. These services were covered under the federal Medicaid program—overseen 
by the state and city—and jointly funded by all three levels of government. The Giuliani 
administration argued the program was too generous and imposed costs that the city 
                                                                                                                                            
construction; and, privatizing the day-to-day production and management of Central Park 
(Cooke 2008).  
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could not afford (Ness 2009: 59). With the mayor’s backing, New York State governor 
George Pataki cut home care spending by 30 percent, causing thousands of elderly and 
disabled New Yorkers to lose their eligibility for services, while thousands of unionized 
home care aides either lost their jobs or worked too few hours to support their households 
(Ness 2009: 93).76  
 
On the fiscal side, the administration sought to lock-in such reforms by pairing welfare 
state restructuring with property tax reductions and ongoing subsidies to corporate and 
real estate interests—despite inheriting a $2.3 billion deficit (see Moody 2007). 
Giuliani’s fiscal approach effectively limited City Hall’s capacity to spend on social 
welfare (Brash 2011: 37-39). Thus, as the local government withdrew from underwriting 
costs of social reproduction—raising tuition in the municipal university system by one-
third, slashing the homeless services budget, gutting anti-poverty programs and related 
community services, and even making a failed attempt to privatize the city’s public 
hospitals—the administration augmented capital accumulation with tax giveaways to big 
business (see Sites 2003; Brash 2011).  
 
In sum, the restructuring of New York’s welfare state was marked by an emphasis on 
privatization and market models of service delivery, a shift from redistribution to 
punitiveness, and overall shifting of costs of and responsibilities for social reproduction 
onto families/households, the third sector, and the market to provide for a price. This 
transformation had markedly gendered and racialized impacts, with women—and 
particularly women of colour—disproportionately represented among both the 
beneficiaries and providers of welfare services. In the wake of these transformations, 
low-income families, and the women within them, were left to pick up the social 
reproductive slack left by a retreating welfare state, intensifying their unpaid labour in the 
household and community. And as workers in the welfare state, women had to cope with 
                                                
76 The city also alleviated itself of the responsibility of providing foster care payments for 
orphaned children by promoting adoption. Under Giuliani’s tenure, the number of 
children in foster care (who were wards of the city) dropped by 12,000, and the number 
adopted rose by 21,000 (Savas 2005).  
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increasing levels of job insecurity and precariousness as the delivery of social services 
were contracted out to private providers, public sector jobs slashed, and the power of 
municipal unions weakened.   
 
Political Opposition 
 
Despite a slim margin of victory in the 1993 election, political opposition to Giuliani’s 
agenda was weak (Moody 2007). The reasons for this are two-fold: First, New York has a 
“strong-mayor system” in which the mayor has total administrative authority in a 
powerful executive branch of government. He/she is responsible for appointing the heads 
of approximately fifty city departments as well as several Deputy Mayors to head major 
offices within the executive (Berg 2007). Furthermore, in addition to setting the 
budgetary agenda, the mayor has veto power over legislation passed by city council, 
which can only be overridden by a two-thirds ‘super majority’. This structure centralizes 
power in the mayor’s office, giving the executive branch a great deal of influence over 
the direction of municipal government. Furthermore, Giuliani benefited from the 
strengthening of the mayoralty and weakening of council in the 1989 city Charter 
Revision. According to Krinsky (2007), this revision meant there was little effective 
legislative counterweight to mayoral initiatives. 
 
However, the lack of effective opposition to the Mayor’s agenda was not solely down to 
the structure of urban government but broader political dynamics as well. Although City 
Council had a Democratic majority, the neoliberal drift of the Democratic Party under 
Clinton, combined with Giuliani’s public popularity, saw a number of council Democrats 
vote in favour of the mayor’s bills. For example, the city council Speaker, a conservative 
Democrat, voted overwhelmingly with the mayor (Moody 2007: 144). As for opposition 
from organized labour, the city’s unions were deeply divided (see Freeman 2000). Some 
traditionally conservative unions, such as those representing police officers, firefighters, 
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and the building trades, supported the mayor’s agenda.77 And for much of Giuliani’s rule, 
the city’s largest municipal employees union, District Council 37, was mired in a 
corruption scandal and under undemocratic and ineffective leadership (see Moody 2007; 
Krinsky 2007b).  
 
Giuliani did not encounter much opposition from upper levels of government either. Both 
federal and state governments were ideologically aligned with the mayor on key 
policies.78 The neoliberal Clinton administration worked with a Republican-controlled 
Congress to pass legislation that effectively facilitated the mayor’s urban agenda; most 
notably, federal welfare reform and a series of anti-crime bills.79 In addition, a number of 
federal urban policies, such as Clinton’s “urban enterprise zones” and federal housing 
strategy, fit Giuliani’s agenda of urban neoliberalization and an increased role for market 
models in the provision of public services (Hackworth 2007).  
 
At the state level, Giuliani found an ally in New York’s Republican governor, George 
Pataki. Pataki had been elected on a platform of resorting New York State’s 
“competitiveness”, attracting investment and creating jobs through a classic neoliberal 
mix of tax cuts and austerity. According to Duggan (2012: 31), any resistance to a 
neoliberal policy agenda in New York State was “largely swept from many state level 
                                                
77 Police officers stood to benefit from Giuliani’s law-and-order agenda while unions in 
the building trades supported the mayor’s aggressive pro-development policies. See 
Moody (2007) and Freeman (2000).  
78 Actions by both the state and federal government impact New York City’s budget, tax 
base and ability to raise its own revenue. There are few areas of public policy where the 
city can act alone without influence from the federal or state levels of government (Berg 
2007: 13). In the US federal system, municipalities are creatures of the state. However, 
New York State employs the legal principle of home rule to grant local governments the 
limited power to run themselves. From the New Deal of the 1930s through to the New 
Society programs of the 1960s, the federal government directed funds directly to cities, 
bypassing states. Yet federal retreat from an urban agenda and a strict adherence to 
constitutional federalism has characterized the neoliberal era in the US (see Hackworth 
2007). 
79 On the Clinton crime bill, Mayor Giuliani noted, “no one thing in this bill turns around 
the problem of crime … but it helps us in every single area in which we have been doing 
things” (qtd. in Berg 2007: 107). Among other things, the bill provided a significant 
allocation of federal funds for the hiring of additional police officers.  
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institutions as downsizing and privatization, along with tax cutting and ‘welfare’ 
shrinkage became policy priorities.” While Pataki was liberal on social issues, supporting 
gay rights and a woman’s right to choose, he was a firm supporter of welfare reform. As 
evidence, New York State’s welfare reform bill, passed in 1997, ratified nearly all of 
Giuliani’s locally initiated reforms (Krinsky 2007).  
 
In summary, at the federal and state levels, Giuliani found policy agendas closely aligned 
to his.80 At the municipal level, the structure of New York City’s government and the 
rightward shift of the Democratic Party meant legislative resistance to the mayor’s 
agenda was weak. The city’s labour movement was divided and its most powerful 
municipal union mounted weak opposition to Giuliani’s centrepiece policy: workfare (see 
Krinsky 2006). As will be discussed in Chapter Four, at the intersection of welfare reform 
and child care, opposition to the mayor’s agenda was rooted in a diverse group of 
progressive civil society actors: community and welfare rights organizations, child care 
advocates, legal aid lawyers, and some union activists. However, these forces would have 
to navigate an unfavourable political opportunity structure that severely constrained the 
possibilities of collection action, discouraged social movement formation, and made 
difficult the advancement of a progressive policy agenda.   
 
2. Closures, Cuts, and Vouchers: Child Care Policy Before Welfare Reform 
 
Ten months before Rudy Giuliani was elected mayor, and three years prior to federal 
welfare reform, four year-old Matthew Hintzen and seven year-old Terrance Fisher died 
in a fire in an unlicensed home daycare in Queens, New York (“Death and Day Care,” 
1993). The daycare was run by 82 year-old Eleta Brown. Brown cared for up to six 
children or more at a time, charging parents just $60 a week for her services. Hintzen and 
                                                
80 Giuliani did face some opposition at the state level from Comptroller Carl McCall, a 
relationship that was “particularly partisan and conflictual” with the mayor accusing 
McCall of using his office to promote a partisan agenda. The Mayor ordered city 
agencies to stop sharing various types of information with the State Comptroller’s office. 
McCall, on at least one occasion, sued Mayor Giuliani in order to obtain information 
(Berg 2007: 64).  
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Fisher were found in the cellar, next to a pile of mattresses near a non-working smoke 
detector.   
 
At the time of the tragedy, New York City was home to 178,000 children whose parents 
were in paid work and who were cared for outside of the home (“Death and Day Care,” 
1993). The number of regulated child care spaces in the city—including private daycare 
centres, publicly-funded child care centres, and licensed family daycares—was 51,000, 
leaving 127,000 children “at risk in places that are too often unsafe and under-
supervised” (“Death and Day Care,” 1993: A18). For every child under the age of three 
in a regulated child care setting, fifteen children were cared for in unregulated settings. 
 
After the tragedy, The New York Times set about documenting what it called “Nannygate 
for the Poor” (Richardson 1993). Armed with statistics wrested from City Hall, the 
newspaper’s investigative reporters revealed the extensive use of unregulated child care 
by low-income New Yorkers and put a spotlight on the city’s burgeoning underground 
daycare industry. According to reports, subsidized child care served only 13 percent of 
eligible families. An estimated 25,000 daycare providers in New York’s low-income 
neighbourhoods operated without official oversight or licenses (Richardson 1993: 52).  
 
In a scathing editorial, the Times criticized the lack of child care choices available to the 
city’s poor families and urged policymakers to do better:  
 
If parents weren’t so desperate, they could demand more from their caregivers. If an understaffed 
City Health Department were better able to register, train and monitor caregivers, they would 
certainly be able to give more. “It doesn’t matter if they make $500,000 or $5,000,” a union 
official said about the Queens tragedy, “parents have to have child care.” True. But parents who 
make $500,000 have the kinds of choices that the parents of Matthew Hintzen and Terrance Fisher 
did not have.  (“Death and Day Care,” 1993)  
 
As the editorial acknowledged, for moderate and low-income New Yorkers, choice in 
child care was a fiction; their choices constrained by their own economic realities and the 
city’s lack of quality, affordable, regulated child care.  
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By the time Rudy Giuliani was sworn in as mayor, the names of Hintzen and Fisher may 
not have been forgotten, but the call for investment in quality, subsidized child care 
services certainly was. Making good on a campaign commitment to marketize the city’s 
social services, Giuliani announced a “tuition-voucher plan” for child care (Treaster 
1994). The mayor defended his plan to the public: the city could cut costs, serve a greater 
number of children, and give parents more “choice” by reducing child care subsidies to 
city-contracted centres and providing vouchers to parents instead (Treaster 1994). The 
plan sought to shift the city’s child care resources from maintaining buildings and 
operating programs—supply-side subsidies—to an emphasis on demand-side subsidies, 
i.e. vouchers, which would, in theory, increase parents’ purchasing power in the child 
care market. The plan clearly framed child care as a private, not public, responsibility.  
 
One of Giuliani’s earliest and most outspoken critics, the city’s Public Advocate, Mark 
Green, predicted the voucher plan would force the closure of a significant number of the 
445 child care centres funded by the city: “While promising more choice and less 
bureaucracy,” Green explained, “the proposal would actually provide less day care in 
poor neighbourhoods and less choice” (qtd. in Treaster 1994: 26).81 As the city’s child 
care advocates argued, public funding under the new scheme fell below the minimal 
operating costs for many child care centres. Vouchers were set at rates significantly 
below the real cost of child care in a centre-based setting. With direct public funding 
withdrawn in place of vouchers, capital and operating costs would have to be covered by 
increased user fees or co-payments for parents, many of whom could not afford to pay 
more than they already did. From the perspective of critics, it was clear that the new 
administration sought to increase the flow of public dollars to the private child care 
market, including to unregulated, license-exempt providers, while defunding the city’s 
unionized daycare programs (Treaster 1994: 26).  
                                                
81 The Office of Public Advocate is a citywide elected position in New York City, which 
is first in line to succeed the Mayor. The office serves as a direct link between the 
electorate and city government, effectively acting as an ombudsman for New Yorkers by 
providing oversight for city agencies, investigating citizens’ complaints about city 
services and making proposals to address perceived shortcomings or failures of those 
services. 
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Despite opposition from child care advocates, New York City Council adopted the 
voucher plan (Treaster 1994). It was a clear victory for Giuliani and his neoliberal vision 
for child care: while the Human Resources Agency had previously issued a small number 
of vouchers to welfare mothers transitioning to employment, for the first time in its 
history, the Agency for Child Development—with its historic commitment to quality, 
centre-based care—would now issue child care vouchers with no conditions on how they 
were spent. While ACD vouchers could be used to purchase care from regulated, non-
profit providers, the more likely scenario was that they would increasingly be used for 
home-based family daycare and informal care (Kolben 1997: 2). The administration had 
effectively channelled public dollars away from the city’s unionized, centre-based child 
care infrastructure and towards the private child care market and its patchwork of low-
cost, home child care. Public resources would increasingly flow to the least-regulated, 
least-trained, and worst paid sectors of the child care industry.  
 
The introduction of Giuliani’s voucher plan came in the wake of a widely reported 
national study on home child care. According to the New York-based Families and Work 
Institute, home-based daycare “fails children even if by relatives” (qtd. in Chira, 1994: 
A20). The report was the first nationwide study of home child care in more than ten years 
and explicitly made the link between quality care and improved working conditions for 
child care providers: when providers had higher wages, better working conditions, job 
security, training, and education, the result was better quality care. In addition, the study 
directly confronted the neoliberal language of “choice” which surrounded debates about 
family daycare and informal care, noting that of those families relying on home child care 
providers, 65 percent said they had no other choice of care; 28 percent said they would 
prefer to use other care if it was available (Chira 1994).  
 
From Vouchers to Closures 
 
A year after the city’s voucher plan was rolled out, and on the eve of federal welfare 
reform, Giuliani proposed the closure of nine of the city’s unionized public daycares. The 
closures added up to a potential loss of 1,900 quality, affordable, regulated child care 
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spaces (Hevesi 1995: B4). In the face of opposition, the administration reiterated the 
logic behind its agenda: closing centres saved on rent and capital costs, displaced children 
could be moved into other city daycares, and more parents would be provided with 
vouchers to pay for care in the private market. The claim that for-profit centres would 
accept vouchers was questioned by Public Advocate Green: “They [city hall] would give 
a voucher to a woman who could ‘spend’ it in a private daycare facility ... it’s hard to 
believe that a below-market voucher will enable low-income women to put their children 
in an expensive private facility in a different community” (qtd. in Hevesi 1995: B4).  
 
At one of the city-run daycares targeted for closure, a low-income mother, who had 
recently transitioned from welfare to work, pleaded with the mayor to keep the facility 
open: “It took me twenty years to come off welfare and I refuse to go down that road 
again. Self-respect, self-esteem, and independence, because I’m a single parent, that’s 
what this center has done for me” (qtd. in Hevesi 1995: B4). The administration proved 
unconcerned that the realities of child care did not match up to its rhetoric of parent 
“choice”. Nor did it consider the shrinking number of spaces in the city’s publicly funded 
centres a threat to poor mothers’ abilities to transition from welfare into paid work. 
 
These early policy shifts signalled the approach the administration would take as welfare 
reform rolled out the following year. By 1996, thousands of single mothers on welfare 
were being called into the city’s workfare program, putting massive pressure on New 
York’s publicly-funded child care infrastructure, with welfare leavers competing with 
working poor families for regulated child care spaces. The expansion of vouchers early in 
Giuliani’s term in office was clearly made with an eye to welfare reform. Indeed, as two 
supporters of the mayor’s child care policies put it, in expanding vouchers the 
administration sought to create “a responsive market for child care”, encouraging the 
entry of informal providers into the market, “increasing supply and improving parental 
choice during a period of sudden demand for child care services” (Besharov and Samari 
2005: 1).  
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Under the ideological cover of “parent choice”, the city was expanding a low-wage 
labour market in which home child care workers would provide a necessary social service 
“on the cheap”. And in closing a number of the city’s publicly funded daycare centres, 
Giuliani had made clear his preference for the privatized delivery of social services and 
disdain for the unionized workers who had traditionally provided them.   
 
“From a city of dependency ... into a city of workers!” Federal Welfare Reform and  
Child Care Rights in New York City 
 
“From 1960 to 1994, the work ethic was under attack in New York City. New York City viewed welfare as 
a good thing, as a wonderful thing. They romanticized it and embraced a philosophy of dependency, almost 
as if it’s better to have somebody on welfare than to help somebody to work.” 
–Rudy Giuliani82 
 
The Federal Context: PRWORA, TANF and the CCDF 
 
In the year following the New York daycare closures, President Clinton made good on 
his 1992 campaign promise to “end welfare as we know it.” White House negotiations 
with a Republican controlled Congress resulted in the passage of Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in the summer of 1996. 
PRWORA ended any legally enforceable right of individuals to collect welfare under 
federal law, defined time-based benefit limits, and further devolved responsibility for 
welfare programming to state governments. In making these changes, PRWORA 
promised to cut federal expenditures by $55 billion over six years (Bashevkin 2002: 74).  
 
PRWORA replaced AFDC with TANF, a block grant to states that gave state and local 
governments broad flexibility in determining eligibility, methods of assistance, and 
benefit levels. Under TANF, adults can receive welfare benefits for a lifetime maximum 
of five years, allowing states to exempt up to 20 percent of their caseload for hardship 
reasons and to set shorter time limits if desired. Welfare recipients are required to begin 
work within two years of receiving welfare and 50 percent of single-parent families were 
to be working (i.e. engaged in paid work or eleven other work activities) thirty hours a 
                                                
82 As quoted in Schram 2002: 66.  
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week by 2002.83 PRWORA also eliminated federal aid and cash welfare for immigrants 
for five years after attaining citizenship (Peck 2001).  
 
PRWORA introduced a series of measures designed to regulate the conduct of single 
mothers on public assistance. Lone mothers now have to disclose the paternity of their 
children, teenage parents have to live with an adult, and states are offered various 
incentives to reduce out-of-wedlock births without increasing abortion rates (Vosko 
2002). PRWORA framed marriage as an institution that promotes the interests of children 
and the foundation of a healthy society (Vosko 2002: 169). The legislation emphasized 
responsible fatherhood and motherhood as essential to a child’s wellbeing.  
  
In sum, PRWORA told “the poor single mother that if she doesn’t participate in a father-
mother family, she surrenders her right to care for her children” (Mink 1998: 103), or as 
Vosko (2002) puts it, her options are “mandatory marriage or obligatory waged work.” In 
this vein, neoliberal welfare reform should be understood within the broader context of 
privatization as policy shifts such as PRWORA exemplify “the coincidence of social 
conservative and family values rhetoric and the neo-liberal goals of self-reliance in public 
policy” (Fudge and Cossman 2002: 4). As such, the TANF regime marked further 
retrenchment of the state in social reproduction, leaving families and the charitable sector 
to shoulder a greater part of the responsibilities for and costs of social reproduction 
(Fudge and Cossman 2002: 18; see also Abramovitz 2010). 
 
PRWORA also involved a major reconfiguration of federal child care policy and funding 
streams. Four pre-TANF child care programs were merged into a single block grant 
called the Child Care Development Fund (CCDF). Prior to PRWORA, funding for three 
of these programs (serving AFDC families, families at-risk of requiring public assistance, 
and families transitioning from AFDC to work) was open-ended: states were required to 
                                                
83 Under the new law, 25 percent of a state’s adult AFDC caseload was to be working or 
engaged in work-related activities by 1998. This increased incrementally by 5 percent for 
a total of 50 percent participation by 2002 (by contrast, AFDC/JOBS required that 
percent of the caseload be enrolled in work-related activities at any one time).  
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put up matching funds in order to draw down federal dollars, but there was no maximum 
for how much they could access (Levy and Michel 2002: 250). Under TANF, the three 
categories of recipients were absorbed into the larger groups of those who are eligible for 
benefits under federal law but not entitled under state regulations, leaving these groups of 
recipients to compete for a share of limited child care funds with welfare “leavers”, who 
are typically granted the highest priority by states and localities (ibid.). However, only 
lone mothers entering workfare programs were guaranteed child care assistance in law.  
 
Under TANF/CCDF, state-level decision-making became a key determinant of how 
much child care would be available and how it would be distributed. Need, state fiscal 
capacity, and fiscal effort, all factored into the availability and quality of child care under 
TANF. In addition, states varied on income eligibility limits, parent co-payments, and 
maximum payment rates to providers. And while states were given the option of using 
surplus TANF funds for child care as welfare rolls fell, not all have chosen to do so (Levy 
and Michel 2002).  
 
According to the legislation, all children receiving CCDF services were to benefit from 
the health and safety requirements, consumer education, parental choice, and other 
provisions of the statute.  Yet while all children under age thirteen in families with 
incomes below 85 percent of a state’s median income are eligible for child care services 
under the CCDF, in reality levels of funding have meant only a fraction of those eligible 
are actually served (Levy and Michel 2002: 247).  
 
The Local Context: Welfare Reform in New York City 
 
In 1995, New York City anticipated federal welfare reform by initiating the nation’s most 
ambitious work-first welfare program, making the city a workfare pioneer (see Peck 
2001). Without waivers from the federal government, the Giuliani administration 
expanded an existing—but relatively small—municipal workfare program, the Work 
Experience Program (WEP), tightened eligibility procedures for new applicants, and 
introduced a strict sanctions regime to enforce compliance (Krinsky 2007a).  
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At the state level, New York’s welfare reform process (bringing it in compliance with 
PRWORA) concluded in the summer of 1997. As New York City was home to over 70 
percent of the State’s AFDC caseload—and paid half the cost of the state’s share of 
AFDC—state welfare reform was necessarily conceived with an eye to the city (CSWL 
2001: 327). For the state to meet federal work participation requirements under TANF, 
and continue to draw down federal dollars, the city would have to drastically cut its 
welfare rolls. New York State’s Welfare Reform Act (WRA) reproduced much of what 
was already on the ground in the city and extended it to the entire state. The Giuliani 
administration was successful in convincing the State to certify nearly all the parts of 
WEP (Krinsky 2007a: 158).84 By mid-1998, New York City’s TANF regime was fully 
operational. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
84 In a post-passage press release Governor Pataki boasted of “defeating efforts to water 
down welfare reform” by: defeating attempts to unionize workfare participants; repealing 
a provision of law that would have required workfare participants to be paid higher, 
union-level prevailing wages instead of minimum wage; refusing to grant workfare 
participants government employee status, which would have given them all the benefits 
of public employment, including vacation time; turning back demands for more liberal 
definitions of disability in the Americans with Disabilities Act, a change that would have 
expanded exemptions from workfare; defeating other attempts to expand workfare 
exemptions; and repealed current law restriction that workfare participants have 20 hours 
minimum work per week to be eligible for workfare (NYSOG 1997). 
 
 
131 
Table 1.1 
 
NYC AFDC/TANF CASELOAD BY YEAR 
Year # of Cases # of People 
1993 293,962 792,263 
1994 312,127 842,246 
1995 312,220 845,910 
1996 293,303 794,876 
1997 258,387 695,648 
1998* 225,651 609,126 
1999 202,764 556,158 
2000 178,821 480,259 
2001 153,239 403,013 
2002 97,487 227,084 
2003 89,247 202,425 
2004 88,811 201,199 
*TANF 
(Source: New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance) 
 
WEP was part of the broader welfare reform scheme known as Work, Accountability and 
You (NYC WAY). NYC WAY’s stated goal was to engage the entire welfare caseload in 
“activities that reduce dependency and increase employability”, a strategy known as 
“full-engagement” (Besharov and Germanis 2005: 146). Before 1998, the program was 
heavily reliant on public-sector work placements through WEP. WEP went from a 
program requiring just under 10,000 welfare recipients to be engaged in work-related 
activities—including education, training or job search—to one requiring up to 40,000 
recipients to do work for city agencies and contracted non-profits (Krinsky 2007a).85  
 
As Krinsky (2006: 158) notes, WEP was designed with “enormous disincentives to 
remain on welfare, and created more opportunities for the state to sanction—or cut off—
welfare recipients’ grants.” In the year before Giuliani assumed office, 13.1 percent of 
recipients were thrown off the city’s welfare rolls for failure to comply with program 
requirements. Between 1995 and 1996 the rate more than doubled to 30.2 percent 
                                                
85 No other jurisdiction had New York City’s level of commitment to workfare via public 
works programs. In other states and cities the fraction of the caseload in public works 
programs was about one percent; in New York City it was close to 50 percent. See Clark 
(2005: 177).   
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(Krinsky 2006). As the program expanded, WEP workers became increasingly noticeable 
around the city; sweeping streets, cleaning parks, and picking up trash while sporting 
bright orange vests. The Giuliani administration sought to publicly humiliate welfare 
recipients, thereby discouraging potential applicants from applying for public assistance.  
 
However, as New York State and New York City moved to comply with TANF, WEP 
was scaled back and NYC-WAY became increasingly focused on job-search and rapid, 
“work-first” labour-force attachment by denying aid to new applicants until they had 
completed an initial job-search process and by emphasizing “diversion” from benefits 
(Krinsky 2007a). The 1998 arrival of Wisconsin’s welfare guru, Jason Turner, to the 
Human Resources Administration and the conversion of the city’s welfare offices into 
Job Centers marked this shift.  
 
Two features of New York City’s welfare reforms are of particular importance for 
understanding the nexus of welfare and child care: the age of dependents at which a 
mother on welfare is deemed employable and subsequently called into welfare-to-work 
programming;86 and second, welfare recipients’ child care rights under New York State 
and federal law.  
 
Determining the Employability of Lone Mothers 
 
Initially, NYC WAY was applied only to recipients of the state-funded general welfare 
program (known as Home Relief), who were by definition able-bodied childless adults 
and disproportionately men. Yet in March 1996, WEP expanded to AFDC recipients with 
a child over the age of three (Krinsky 2007a: 38). The BEGIN program under HRA’s 
                                                
86 Under TANF, states (and in some instances, localities) have the option of exempting 
mothers with children twelve months or younger from work or work-related activities 
(Urban Institute 2008). Workfare regimes frame particular social groups—at least for 
certain time periods—as having a legitimate claim for non-participation: the elderly, the 
ill, those with severe disabilities, and those with very young children (Peck 2001). As 
illustrated in the previous chapter, and by recent research into TANF (Soss et al. 2011), 
employability is also racialized.  
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Office of Employment Services (OES) administered NYC WAY for AFDC recipients. 
Participants were assigned to a six-month, 20-hour per week WEP assignment, followed 
by four weeks of job search (typically 30 to 40 hours a week) at an approved employment 
services program. If the client had not secured employment at the end of the job search 
period, they were assigned another six months of WEP (Krinsky 2007a).  
 
By the end of 1997, federal and New York State welfare reforms were fully implemented 
by the Giuliani administration (Krinsky 2007a). The city expanded its work requirements 
to include TANF parents with children three months or older. Despite massive shortages 
of infant and toddler care in the centre-based system, as well as growing pressures on the 
system overall as a result of WEP’s extension to TANF recipients, the Giuliani 
administration chose not to exempt parents of children under the age of three months 
from work requirements.87  
 
According to one of Giuliani’s key welfare policy advisors, New York City (and by 
default, New York State) could not meet TANF participation mandates if it exempted 
recipients with pre-school age children (L. Mead, personal communication, June 12, 
2009). Such a scenario would jeopardize the State’s, and thereby the city’s ability to draw 
down TANF funds from the federal government. However, according the Independent 
Budget Office (1998), due to the aggressive nature of the administration’s work-first 
approach, by early 1998 city officials did not have to increase the number of welfare 
recipients enrolled in work programs in order to meet either federal or State mandates. 
Meeting these mandates was therefore not the primary reason for the city’s punitive 
exemption policy.  
 
                                                
87 22 of 50 states exempted single parents from work-related activities if they cared for a 
child under the age of 12 months. Vermont was the most liberal of jurisdictions, 
exempting recipients caring for a child under the age of 24 months. New York City found 
itself in the company of traditionally conservative states such as Alabama, Arkansas, and 
Florida, and of course, the workfare pioneer, Wisconsin (see Welfare Rules Databook 
1996-1999). 
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By 1998, Wisconsin welfare mandarin, Jason Turner, had been recruited by the Giuliani 
administration to head up HRA and oversee the city’s welfare regime. According to 
Turner, New York’s decision to consider welfare mothers employable when their 
youngest child was three months old had to do with “replicating, to the extent possible, 
the conditions and expectations of workers with those of recipients” (J. Turner, personal 
communication, August 29, 2009). Turner argued that for the working population, a 
three-month paid maternity leave “is usually the maximum companies provide, so we did 
the same … After three months, mothers would be required to participate in activities up 
to 40 hours, the same as the working population” (ibid.).  
 
As the next section will show, the administration was unconcerned by the city’s shortage 
of infant and toddler care or the general lack of regulated, subsidized care to meet rising 
demand. An aggressive “work-first” approach for all but recipients with the youngest of 
children was intimately tied to the Giuliani administration’s strategy to privatize the costs 
of and responsibilities for social reproduction by facilitating the expansion of informal 
and family daycare, partly through front-line practices which would push TANF mothers 
to either “choose” this care or divert them from public assistance altogether. 
 
As Turner argued, “there was no shortage of child care in New York City. There was 
ample care, e.g. paid care in the homes of others, or unpaid care with grandmothers” 
(ibid.). For Turner, child care was to be secured with minimum state support (in the form 
of vouchers) via the family or the market. This opinion was echoed by one of welfare 
reform’s key intellectual architects, and sometime advisor to Mayor Giuliani, Lawrence 
Mead. Mead argued, “a lot of (welfare) mothers were already working off the books so 
they had  (child care) arrangements, familial or kinship networks” (L. Mead, personal 
communication, June 12, 2009). Mead had seen Turner at work in Wisconsin overseeing 
the state’s W2 program, which also relied on the expansion of home-based care to meet 
the child care needs of TANF recipients. Reacting to critics of child care outcomes in 
Wisconsin and New York, Mead states: 
 
The assumption of child care advocates is that all child care must be public or there is no care and 
that is false. A lot of the care is private; it’s informal. The belief that child care would not be 
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available should these mothers go to work turned out not to be true … Many mothers had family 
members at home who could take care of their children; they made informal arrangements with 
friends and neighbours.  (L. Mead, personal communication, June 12, 2009) 
 
This perspective cannot be divorced from the politics of race. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, poor African-American, Latino, and immigrant women have long been 
treated as employable by US social policy. Historically, poor women of colour have had 
to rely on kith and kin networks to provide substitute care for their children as they 
worked in fields, factories, or the homes of middle-class white families (Glenn 2010).  
 
In 1998, the racial composition of New York City’s welfare rolls was five percent white, 
33 percent African-American, and 59 percent Latino/a (DeParle 1998). Soss, Fording and 
Schram (2011), have found a correlation between the racial composition of state welfare 
rolls and five disciplinary provisions used under the TANF regime. In addition, they have 
found that under AFDC and TANF, the racial composition of the caseload is a strong 
predictor of welfare restrictiveness and “get tough” policies. There is ample evidence that 
the “blackness” of welfare caseloads matters greatly for the ways states (and counties) 
pursue the disciplinary agenda of PRWORA. States where African Americans make up a 
higher percentage of the welfare rolls are more likely to select and apply tougher rules 
(Soss et al. 2011: 128-140). The most stringent limits and work requirements were 
imposed by states with large populations of African Americans. 
 
Other states which, like New York, exempt only mothers with children three months old 
or younger include Alabama, Arkansas, New Jersey, Michigan, Florida and Wisconsin 
(UI 2002); all states in which a high percentage of the TANF caseload is Black or 
Hispanic (Soss et al. 2011).88 While the evidence is not conclusive, these studies suggest 
that that New York City required single mothers with young children to work because a 
higher percentage of its TANF caseload was Black and Hispanic; mothers who had long 
                                                
88 Exemptions information from Welfare Rules Databook, Urban Institute, 2008, p. 106-
109. There are exceptions to the rule: Idaho and Iowa for example, where Black and 
Hispanic families make up a low percentage of the caseload, maintain no work 
exemptions for single parents caring for a child of any age 
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been treated as employable and for whom kith and kin care was commonly employed in 
the absence of state supported child care (see Stack 1975).  
 
For the likes of Mead and Turner, how New York City was going to meet rising demand 
for child care services was never in doubt: despite parents’ rights to choose among a 
variety of child care options, the cost and responsibilities for care were to be born 
primarily by low-income families/households and communities in the form of home child 
care provision. However, one of the obstacles to hindering the realization of the city’s 
preference for home child care was TANF parents’ legislated child care rights.  
 
Welfare Recipients’ Child Care Rights  
 
Under the new TANF regime, New York State and federal social welfare law established 
certain child care rights for welfare recipients. These laws were intended to ensure 
adequate child care for parents engaged in welfare-to-work programs (Powell and Cahill 
2000).89 In this section, I provide a brief summary of these rights and note how their 
enforcement and protection is largely left up to local welfare administrations, with 
detrimental consequences for poor single mothers.   
 
Under both New York State and federal welfare law, parents on public assistance with 
children under the age of 13 who are required to participate in work-related activities are 
guaranteed child care assistance if they need it in order to work. When a parent is called 
to participate in workfare, the law requires her caseworker to assess her ability to work 
and her need for supportive services including child care. Under the law, caseworkers 
must address child care issues with their clients to make sure they will be able to comply 
with work requirements. If a parent demonstrates that she is unable to find child care 
openings for her child, caseworkers are obligated to provide her with two choices of child 
care providers, at least one of which must be regulated. In addition, if a parent needs help 
                                                
89 Information presented in this section is drawn from Powell and Cahill (2000: 8-9). 
New York City’s TANF regime dates from 1998 as this is when the State welfare reform 
act was passed. 
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obtaining a regulated provider, her caseworker must make phone calls to find two 
accessible and available providers with openings. Should a parent demonstrate that they 
are unable to secure appropriate child care and therefore fail to meet work requirements, 
and their child is six years of age or younger, federal regulations prohibit states from 
sanctioning the parent or terminating assistance (Powell and Cahill 2000).  
 
Furthermore, under both New York State and federal social welfare law, parents who 
participate in welfare-to-work activities and receive federally funded child care assistance 
have a right to choose from a variety of child care options, including formal and informal 
care. According to Powell and Cahill (2000: 8-9), the US Congress promoted “parent 
choice” in the name of “empower[ing] working parents to make their own decisions 
about child care so that they could ensure that their children were cared for in a safe and 
positive environment.”  Accordingly, pursuant to federal law welfare recipients engaged 
in welfare-to-work have the option of either enrolling their child with a child care 
provider that has a grant or contract for the provision of child care services; or receiving a 
child care voucher in order to pay directly for child care services. Under federal law, if a 
parent is in receipt of child care voucher they must be allowed to choose from a variety of 
child care types, including centre-based care, regulated home child care, and unlicensed 
or informal care. Finally, should a parent successfully transition into paid employment, 
they have a right to Transitional Child Care support for up to one year after leaving the 
welfare rolls (Powell and Cahill 200).  
 
With states given a great deal of discretion over the administration of child care, access to 
subsidized care is ultimately determined at the local level, “where widely varying 
bureaucratic practices can determine who receives services and who does not” (Levy and 
Michel 2002: 251). This is especially true for a state like New York, which devolved 
much of its welfare and child care policy-making authority to local counties and cities. 
As the case of New York City demonstrates, how TANF child care works in law is not 
always the reality experienced on the ground. As Levy and Michel (2002: 251) point out 
“the attitudes of local officials and their willingness to extend themselves on behalf of 
their clients can determine access to child care and clients’ prospects for success under 
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the mandatory work program.” Even in states which consistently draw down maximum 
federal child care funds, the front-line practices of local welfare bureaucracies have led to 
the denial of benefits and a lack of availability of child care (see Levy and Michel 2002: 
252). Despite guarantees of “child care choice” in federal and state law, the local state is 
clearly an important site of policy making and administration at the nexus of welfare and 
child care.    
 
Prior to 1998, a number of state and civil society actors warned of imminent escalation of 
the city’s child care crisis and the potential impact of welfare reform and the Giuliani 
administration’s policies on New York’s historical commitment to quality, centre-based 
child care. Many of these reports drew on the experiences of welfare mothers who had 
been called into the city’s NYC-WAY program between 1996 and 1997. The reports 
documented the shortage of spaces in publicly-funded daycare centres, the lack of social 
planning around child care in the lead up to TANF, the overall disorganized nature of the 
child care system, and the child care experiences of welfare mothers participating in 
WEP. It is to these reports that the chapter now turns. 
 
3. A Crisis in Progress, a Crisis Foretold 
 
In 1995, at the behest of child care advocates, city council, and officials in the Agency for 
Child Development, New York City undertook an analysis of the potential impact of 
federal welfare reform on the city’s child care system. The Temporary Task Force On 
Child Care Funding (TTF) was to “suggest ways to maximize and enhance the 
availability, quality, effectiveness and efficiency of child care services in New York 
City” (TTF 1996). The Task Force’s members were appointed by both the mayor and 
council and reflected the input of council Democrats: in addition to high-ranking civil 
servants in HRA and ACD, the TTF included representatives from the city’s child care 
community and unions representing daycare workers and supervisors.   
 
The basic assumptions guiding the TTF’s work in part reflected the city’s historical 
commitment to quality child care and the framing of child care as both a developmental 
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service for children and as an employment support for working families. The report stated 
that the quality of child care and early education offered by the city “has a decisive effect 
on how well they [children] do in school and in their later lives” and that “child care and 
early education must be viewed in a broader context as an issue with workforce, 
economic, social, and educational implications” (TTF 1996: 3). Yet reflecting input from 
the mayor’s office, the report was inflected with the language of “efficiency”, “cost-
effectiveness”, and mentions of “public-private partnership” as a solution to the city’s 
child care crisis.  
 
The report stated that in the context of rising demand for child care, the city should 
ensure use of “all available sources of funds”, including increasing funds through 
“private sources”. In addition, the discovery of “system efficiencies”, and the 
“streamlining” of administration, could result in the delivery of “increased services at 
lower costs without compromising quality” (TTF 1996: 5, emphasis added). The report 
acknowledged that there had never been sufficient funding to meet the child care needs of 
all subsidy eligible families (TTF 1996: 5). Yet despite the growing gap between needs 
and resources in the early 1990s, the TTF noted that the Agency for Child Development 
had “achieved its mission admirably: its high quality assurance standards and its 
educational programs are exemplary. The city’s licensing requirements for all centre-
based early childhood programs … are among the highest in the nation” (TTF 1996: 5, 
emphasis added).  
 
Looking ahead to federal welfare reform, the TTF warned that welfare families could 
potentially push out low-income working families from subsidized care as the city sought 
to meet federal work requirements. The report thus urged the city to maintain its financial 
commitment to child care “at its current level of funding” and “continue to serve low-
income working families who need affordable care so that parents can stay employed and 
children can be safe and well cared for” (TTF 1996: 1). The TTF also observed that child 
care services had become out of line with new needs, such as the growing number of 
parents working irregular hours (TTF 1996: 7). The system was further flawed by the 
relationship between the multiple agencies involved in providing and regulating child 
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care, causing miscommunication and a lack of coordination between agencies, difficulties 
in effectively gathering data, and in implementing and evaluating services. These 
“inefficiencies”, the report suggested, should be addressed prior to the rollout of federal 
welfare reform.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, the TTF highlighted the lack of regulatory oversight of 
informal child care. Referring to the city’s historical commitment to quality care, and 
touting its strong licensing standards for publicly-funded daycares, the report stated, 
“much of the child care used by welfare recipients paid for by public funds is 
unregulated, ‘informal’ care, which requires neither inspection nor licensing. It is 
unknown whether this care meets with basic health, safety, and education standards.” The 
report noted that there were “profound concerns about the quality of this care and its 
effect on children” (TTF 1996: 8).  
 
The report framed informal care as a stopgap employment support and little else. In doing 
so, it reaffirmed ACD’s strong commitment to quality, centre-based care, recognizing its 
developmental value for children. It is here that the report most strongly shows the 
influence of child care advocates and the daycare workers’ union: the taskforce stressed, 
“As welfare reform continues to expand, the need for quality child care and early 
education will increase” (TTF 1996: 8). “In response”, the report continues, “the City 
must develop a plan for prioritizing how funds will be spent and must increase capacity 
by recruiting providers who offer quality services” (TTF 1996: 9, emphasis added).   
 
Overall, the TTF represented the views, and sense of urgency, of both child care 
advocates and civil servants in the Agency for Child Development. While the influence 
of the mayor’s neoliberal agenda is evident in some of the report’s language, the TTF 
concluded with a series of progressive recommendations designed to reshape New York 
City’s existing child care delivery system “to create one that is high quality, efficient, 
consumer-driven, and responsive to communities’ needs.” These recommendations 
included expanding “quality” child care services, delivering centre-based care outside of 
traditional working hours, and assurances that all health, safety and regulation standards 
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are updated and complied with (TTF 1996: 9). While the report acknowledged that the 
early 1990s was an era of “fiscal restraint”, little in the report could be interpreted as a 
call to deregulate and privatize the city’s public child care infrastructure.   
 
The Task Force was not the only actor predicting an escalation of the city’s child care 
crisis. In late 1997, New York City’s Independent Budget Office (IBO)—a publicly 
funded agency that provides non-partisan information about the municipal budget to the 
public and elected officials—also chimed in on welfare reform’s implications for child 
care. In a report titled, “The Fiscal Impact of the New Federal Welfare Law on New York 
City”, the IBO took account of TANF’s work participation requirements to project the 
increase in demand for child care and welfare reform’s broader impact on the system 
(IBO 1997). The IBO estimated that by the year 2002, when federal work requirements 
were to hit 50 percent, “between 33,000 and 84,000 full-time equivalent child care slots 
(40 hours per week) will need to be created, depending upon whether the two year work 
requirement is enforced” (IBO 1997: 22). The annual cost of a regulated child care space 
in the city was estimated at $5000, meaning additional costs per year would range from 
$212 million to $599 million by 2002. While the IBO recognized TANF would increase 
federal funding for child care, the report predicted that the new funds would be 
insufficient to meet rising demand (IBO 1997: 23).  
 
Of particular significance was the IBO’s observation that in response to welfare reform, 
“City officials have publicly stated their intentions to increase the use of lower-cost 
informal daycare by work program participants” (IBO 1997: 22, emphasis added). As 
indicated by the tenor of the TTF’s report, child care advocates understood that the city 
would move in this direction given the voucherization of ACD subsidies in 1994 and the 
high reliance on informal child care providers by those AFDC recipients called into 
welfare to work prior to 1998. Thus, despite “parent choice” being guaranteed by federal 
and state regulations, the Giuliani administration had publicly announced its intent to 
meet rising need by pushing welfare mothers to use informal child care.  
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The Citizen’s Budget Commission (CBC)—a non-partisan, non-profit civic organization 
and fiscal watchdog—also reported on the state of child care in the city. A 1997 CBC 
report noted, “Since informal care institutions are typically less reliable and have less 
educational content, it appears that children of parents who are participating in welfare-
to-work activities or who have recently left welfare for work are receiving inferior care” 
(CBC 1997: 39). Furthermore, CBC stated that the city’s welfare administration was 
failing to ensure that all families eligible for subsidized child care were receiving it: Lack 
of communication, inadequate delivery of applications, and insufficient publicizing of the 
availability of subsidies, all contributed to HRA’s provision of access being “deficient” 
(CBC 1997: 37). In other words, prior to federal welfare reform, the city’s welfare 
agency was systematically denying child care subsidies to eligible families; according to 
the Commission, HRA was “neither assisting parents in securing high quality child care 
for their children nor enabling them to find the type of care they prefer” (CBC 1997: 39, 
emphasis added).  
 
The CBC also commented on the potential impact of increased reliance on informal care 
by low-income families: 
 
“Relying on allowances for informal care could provide cheaper care for larger numbers than 
would expansion of subsidies for center-based and other regulated care. But the former type of 
care is generally less reliable, has far fewer educational benefits, and is virtually unregulated. In 
the face of significant new demand, careful consideration should be given to the choices of how to 
expand child care subsidies and to ensure adequate quality of informal as well as formal care” 
(CBC 1997: 40).  
 
Finally, the State Deputy Comptroller, Carl McCall, echoed many of the findings of the 
IBO and CBC. McCall doubted the city’s preparedness to keep up with the demand for 
child care unleashed by federal welfare reform while also keeping care affordable, safe, 
and reliable (McCall 1997: 2). The city was already operating at capacity with long 
waiting lists for both low-income working families and families transitioning from 
welfare to work. “If the system is poorly designed or badly implemented, and parents 
cannot find a dependable child care placement,” he argued, “the objectives of welfare 
reform are undermined” (1997: 2). Furthermore, McCall confirmed what many of the 
city’s child care advocates had already observed: whereas vouchers had once been a 
small part of the city’s child care subsidy program, the Giuliani administration ramped up 
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their use in the two years prior to New York State welfare reform, from 3,900 in 1996 to 
over 12,600 the following year (McCall 1997).   
 
“On the brink of a major crisis” 
 
By early 1997, the city was “on the brink of a major child care crisis” (OPA 1997: 1). 
The Office of the Public Advocate summed up the concerns of many in the child care 
community, and of welfare recipients themselves, when he asked:  
 
While parents on welfare get the education and skills they need to work, who will take care of 
their children? How can the City best insure that these children get safe, reliable, enriching care 
that sets them on the course toward becoming healthy, capable adults? Ignoring these issues 
jeopardizes both the safety of children and the success of the City’s welfare-to-work program 
(OPA 1997: 1)  
 
As the new TANF regime rolled out in New York, it was apparent that “Now, more than 
ever, the City is counting on the expansion of unregulated, informal child care to serve as 
the primary solution to the child care shortage” (OPA 1997: 25; emphasis added). 
 
In sum, these “crisis” reports documented the city’s increasing reliance on informal child 
care in the years leading up to the implementation of federal welfare reform in New 
York. The criticisms contained in the reports had a dual focus. First, without affordable, 
regulated, quality child care for the children of welfare mothers, the potential 
developmental benefits of child care would be lost. The reports saw developmentally 
appropriate care—as provided in the city’s unionized, publicly-funded centres—as 
essential to breaking the “cycle of poverty” (see Chaudry 2004). This argument had 
undergirded liberal support for programs such as Head Start since the 1960s (Michel 
1999) and was central to critics support for the expansion of regulated child care and 
warnings about the increased flow of public dollars going to informal care. 
 
Second, the criticisms focused on the fact that without stable child care arrangements, 
welfare mothers could not transition to work and welfare reform’s success would be 
jeopardized.  Here the argument against informal care was that it was unstable, 
unreliable, and would not allow welfare mothers to engage in work or work-related 
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activities and meet the necessary participation requirements under TANF. A corollary to 
this argument was that the children of welfare families stood to displace the children of 
low-income working families, leaving the latter to turn to welfare as their child care costs 
rose with declining subsidies, increased co-payments, and an overall lack of subsidized 
spaces. Lastly, as all of the reports note, while focusing on the questions of quality and 
stability, the question of cost was paramount. Informal child care was attractive to the 
city because it was two-thirds the cost of regulated family daycare and far less costly than 
unionized, centre-based care. 
 
In the build up to the “end of welfare as we know it”, there was no shortage of voices 
drawing attention to the impending escalation of the city’s child care crisis. Numbers 
differed from report to report, but most estimates put the projected number of New York 
City children needing child care provision as a result of welfare reform at over 100,000 
by the year 1999 (CBS 1997). The city’s Office of the Public Advocate argued that under 
TANF approximately 74,000 New York City parents receiving public assistance were to 
be working by 2002. By 1997, already 30,000 eligible families were on waiting lists for 
child care subsidies (CCI 1998). These projections assumed that all such families would 
not only qualify for subsidies—which they would—but that they would receive them—
which they did not.  
 
The writing was on the wall as to how the city would meet the increased demand for 
child care resulting from federal welfare reform. As the reports above illustrate, the 
Giuliani administration had channelled poor mothers into relying on informal providers 
to care for their children. The New York Times observed: “New York City spends 
millions of dollars a year paying for child care for welfare recipients without any quality 
control, safety oversight or basic information about the people being paid to care for 
thousands of the city’s most vulnerable children” (Sexton 1996: B1). One-quarter of the 
children in the city’s subsidized child care system were already cared for in informal 
settings (CCI 1996).  
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The Times echoed Giuliani’s critics who questioned the wisdom of allowing public 
dollars to flow to informal care “without a concentrated effort to improve the early 
development of many of the city’s impoverished children” (Sexton 1996: B1). As 
President Clinton signed welfare reform into law, Barbara Blum, president of the 
Foundation for Child Development and former high-ranking official in social services, 
said “The tendency for public administrators will be to create the cheapest kind of care, 
and that is exactly the opposite of what these children need” (qtd. in Sexton 1996: B1). 
But creating the cheapest kind of care is exactly what the Giuliani administration had 
been doing. And in defense of its strategy, it relied on the neoliberal rhetoric of choice. 
 
By Choice or Necessity? The Giuliani Administration Responds 
 
In response to the mounting public criticism of his administration’s child care policies, 
Giuliani repeated his mantra of parent choice: “decisions on day care are made by parents 
themselves,” the mayor exclaimed (qtd. in Sexton 1996: B2). The mayor’s spokespeople 
argued that expanding the number of city-contracted child care centres was both costly 
and difficult; as such, informal care must be part of solution to address rising demand. 
The administration’s position mirrored that of state officials in Albany who argued that 
expanding state-subsidized informal care would have to be part of any plan to put more 
welfare mothers to work. According to the director of early childhood services in New 
York State’s Social Services Department, “The reality is that well over half of the 
subsidized child care used in the state is informal. Those decisions we feel rest with 
parents” (qtd. in Sexton 1996: B2). Yet the neoliberal language of choice was uneasily 
juxtaposed with claims that financial considerations constrained the city’s ability to 
provide a variety of child care options from which welfare families could in fact choose 
(see Sexton 1996: B2).   
 
Officials at HRA tried to assuage critics, pointing to state laws which said welfare 
recipients reporting for workfare assignments were to be provided with the names of two 
registered daycare providers—included a regulated provider—and welfare recipients 
could not be sanctioned for lack of adequate childcare (Sexton 1996). Yet daycare 
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providers, elected officials tasked with investigating the city’s welfare-to-work program, 
and welfare mothers themselves, all said their early experiences with NYC WAY showed 
that referrals to regulated care were often not given, or that recommended providers often 
had no vacancies. Welfare mothers described the experience as a “bureaucratic 
nightmare, replete with misinformation, misdirection, even outright hostility” (Sexton 
1996). A New York Times editorial bemoaned the shift in the city’s child care policies: 
“Historically, New York City has been a leader in providing adequate child care for low-
income children whose parents need to leave the home for education or training. It will 
face a formidable task as the workfare experiment proceeds” (“Workfare’s Missing 
Link,” 1996: A16).  
 
By mid-1997, it was evident that the Giuliani administration was intent on facilitating the 
expansion of home-based child care, channelling dollars away from the city’s centre-
based system, in order to meet the growing demand for care fuelled by welfare reform. 
Upwards of 80 percent of AFDC mothers called into the city’s pre-TANF welfare-to-
work program were relying on informal providers (CCI 1998). The administration had 
ignored the recommendations of its own child care taskforce and its policies were 
roundly criticized by child care advocates, municipal budget watchdogs, the city’s Public 
Advocate, the New York State Deputy Comptroller, and The New York Times. As federal 
and state welfare reforms were enacted, the city’s child care and welfare rights advocates 
set about documenting the routine violation of welfare families’ legislated child care 
rights and deconstructing the “choice” discourse which shrouded the city’s plans to 
download costs of and responsibilities for care work onto low-income households and 
communities, relying on a precarious home-based workforce to deliver child care services 
“on the cheap”.   
 
4. TANF Child Care Rights and the Welfare Bureaucracy    
 
After their participation on the Temporary Task Force, and as the city ramped up 
workfare, child care advocates found municipal policymaking channels closed. Openly 
critical of the administration’s child care policies, it became increasingly difficult for 
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advocates to access city data on welfare and child care (Interview 8). The days of 
working collaboratively with the municipal child care bureaucracy appeared to be over. 
Speaking in 1996, Nancy Kolben, director of New York City’s foremost child care 
advocacy organization, summed up the views of advocates: 
 
Right now, government officials have gone behind closed doors, and child-care experts are on the 
outside. I don’t think the city really knows what it is going to be going on with day care. But if 
they plan to expand the informal care system used by their welfare-to-work office, it is going to be 
a tremendous waste (qtd. in Sexton 1996: B2).  
 
A former Deputy Commissioner of ACD echoed Kolben’s remarks: “No one would argue 
that informal care is developmental child care. We’re spending tens of millions of dollars 
in purchasing that kind of care, and it is an awful waste” (qtd. in Sexton 1996: B2). 
 
Shut out of City Hall, between 1998 and 2003 welfare rights groups, child care 
advocates, and women’s organizations set about documenting the routine violation of 
TANF recipients’ legislated child care rights and questioned the Giuliani administration’s 
repeated insistence that the growth of publicly-subsidized informal care was simply a 
matter of parent choice. Advocates also worked with TANF recipients to inform them of 
their child care rights, assist families with child care referrals, and pushed HRA to 
acknowledge and address, albeit with limited results, the growing number of TANF 
children in informal care.  
 
New York City’s Street-Level Bureaucrats  
 
In New York City, the introduction of TANF saw the further separation of what were 
essentially two parallel child care systems.90 In contrast to the small increase in funding 
made available to ACD/ACS, between 1996 and 2003 HRA’s child care expenditures 
tripled, rising from $43 million to approximately $143 million (CCI 2003). As previously 
mentioned, ACD/ACS was responsible for providing child care subsidies to working poor 
families, in addition to deciding where to invest public child care funds.  HRA provided 
subsidies to TANF recipients participating in welfare-to-work and those transitioning 
                                                
90 See Appendix A for more details.  
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from public assistance to paid employment. Under New York City’s TANF regime, HRA 
Job Centers were welfare mothers’ primary source of information regarding child care 
options and availability. 
 
The Job Center was a key component in the punitive edifice of workfare in New York 
City. Under TANF, changing the culture of the “street-level bureaucracy” (Lipsky 
1980)—the case managers who are the primary face of decision-making authority for 
welfare recipients and those seeking assistance—was an object of policy makers and 
administrators across the country (Soss et. al 2011). Case managers are responsible for 
evaluating client cases, distributing services and supports, and applying penalties and 
sanctions (Watkins-Hayes 2009). In a city like New York, with a welfare administration 
long considered one of the most liberal in the country, “culture change” among street-
level bureaucrats took on added impetus for the Giuliani regime (see Turner 2005).  
 
As previously mentioned, the mayor had imported Jason Turner and his team from 
Wisconsin as New York City sought to replicate the “Wisconsin miracle”, that is a steep 
decline in the welfare rolls over a short period of time (see Mead 2005). While Turner 
inherited WEP, under his guidance a number of changes were made to the appearance, 
organization, and operation of the city’s welfare offices (see Turner 2005). First, welfare 
offices were converted into Job Centers (and physically refurbished with new computers 
and furniture) and run on a new data management system that measured welfare-to-work 
outcomes (Tuner 2005). A series of new public management practices were also 
introduced: for example, merit pay for mid-level bureaucrats and caseworkers, along with 
new performance measures to govern promotions. For front-line welfare case managers, 
productivity was measured by how many cases they closed in a given period of time. A 
case manager with high productivity could earn up to a 20 percent bonus on top of their 
regular pay (Turner 2005). In line with the principles and objectives of neoliberal public 
administration, these changes aimed to create a competitive culture both within and 
between Job Centers.  
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As a number of scholars (see Watkins-Hayes 2009; Soss et al. 2011) have observed, 
under the new TANF regime, case managers are under intense pressure to push clients off 
the welfare rolls in as short a period as possible, while deterring potential applicants from 
applying for assistance. Under politically conservative administrations, these pressures 
are even greater (Soss et al. 2011). As Soss et al. (2011: 207) observe, poverty 
governance under TANF is grounded in “a market calculus designed to raise the odds that 
preferred paths will be freely chosen.” Case managers are subjected to new tools for 
securing compliance with benchmarks and outcomes that are tied to financial incentives 
and penalties. In this way, new techniques of management strive to shape the ways case 
managers govern themselves. An illusion of autonomy and decision-making choice 
conceals the architecture of coercion governing the practices of street-level bureaucrats. 
This was the on-the-ground context for the delivery of child care services to TANF 
mothers in New York City. 
 
Choice in Law, Coercion in Practice  
 
The process by which HRA ‘activated’ welfare recipients typically proceeded as follows: 
TANF mothers received a call-in letter from HRA advising them to report to a designated 
Job Center for assessment and work activity within two weeks of the date of notification. 
The letter advised clients to make child care arrangements for the day of their 
appointment, and if necessary, for their work assignment. However, the letter did not 
provide child care recommendations or advice (CCI 1999: 5).  
 
In the case that parents reported to their appointment without child care in place, they 
were given two days to make arrangements. As per state and federal welfare law, 
caseworkers were required to provide clients with two child care referrals, one of which 
was to be a regulated provider. Typically, caseworkers had a list of regulated programs 
from which they were to make a referral in addition to a list of TANF mothers the agency 
had designated to care for the children of other welfare recipients (CCI 1999: 5). 
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For new applicants, protocol required TANF recipients to conduct a job search on the day 
of application—an up-front strategy of ‘hassle’—while searches were to continue 
throughout a WEP placement for those already on the rolls. In New York, TANF 
applicants were encouraged to seek assistance from private sources, such as kith and kin, 
charities, and churches, prior to filing an application. Such diversion tactics left many 
applicants unaware of their procedural rights under welfare law, including their right to 
child care assistance (CSWL 2001: 330). 
 
As a series of reports released between 1999 and 2003 concluded, HRA systematically 
violated the child care rights of TANF recipients and provided inadequate child care 
supports (see CCI 1999 and 2003; CSLW 2001; Powell and Cahill 2000 and 2001; Scharf 
and Carlson 2004), producing a high reliance on informal care among TANF families 
(see Table 1.2). As the Office of the Public Advocate had observed as early as 1997, case 
managers were channelling increasing numbers of parents to use informal child care 
arrangements and to a lesser extent, family daycare providers (OPA 1997: 26). Under 
New York City’s TANF regime, these practices continued.  
 
The findings of these reports can be summarized as follows.91 Given the shortage of 
regulated, subsidized child care in New York City, the two-week timeline allotted to 
parents to search for and evaluate child care options was grossly inadequate. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, TANF mothers’ call-in letter provided no advice or 
support in regard to child care. There was also no guarantee that the timing of a parent’s 
summons to the Job Center would correspond with the enrolment schedule of child care 
programs, making securing regulated care extremely difficult (CCI 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
91 These findings were corroborated in interviews with welfare rights caseworkers in two 
legal clinics (Interview 1 and Interview 5). 
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TABLE 1.2 
 
USE OF INFORMAL CARE: TANF Families vs. Subsidy-Eligible ACS Families 
 HRA (TANF or 
TCC) vouchers 
 ACS (low-
income working 
families) contract 
care + vouchers 
 
Year Total # of children % of children in 
informal care 
Total # of 
children 
% of children in 
informal care  
1995 20,634 
 
83 
 
46,660 
 
>1 
 
*1998 14,458 
 
83 
 
63,613 
 
3 
 
2000 38,000 
 
89 
 
56,549 
 
2 
 
2002 30,824 
 
84 
 
55,962 
 
N/A 
 
2003 40,779 
 
77 
 
61,643 
 
7 
 
2007 45,766 
 
71 
 
56,754 
 
14 
 
*TANF 
 (Source: Child Care Inc.) 
 
Caseworkers also failed to assist TANF parents in securing child care services. NOW’s 
Legal Defence and Education Fund found that more than half of parents surveyed 
received no assistance (Powell and Cahill 2000: 2). If caseworkers asked a client “Do you 
have care for your child?” and the client replied in the affirmative, no further child care 
options would be discussed (Powell and Cahill 2000). Clients may have secured 
temporary arrangements for the day of their first appearance at the Job Center, yet 
caseworkers systematically interpreted this response as indicating that a client’s child 
care needs were met (CCI 1999; 2003).  
 
Furthermore, NOW found that 79 percent of respondents were not shown the mandated 
“Important Information About Child Care” notice that accompanied TANF enrolment 
forms (Powell and Cahill 2000). Many TANF mothers reported leaving Job Centers 
thinking that there were no alternatives to informal care arrangements (CCI 1999: 4). 
Indeed, HRA’s guidelines for caseworkers read: “Encourage the client to consider family, 
friends and neighbours,” with the proviso that caseworkers should show parents “how to 
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identify licensed child care, if needed” (Richie and Epstein 1997; emphasis added). In 
failing to provide adequate child care information, the city was routinely violating state 
and federal laws regarding the distribution of information and assistance in finding 
appropriate child care.  
 
Additionally, in contravention of welfare regulations, TANF recipients were routinely 
sanctioned, or threatened with sanction, if they were unable to engage in work activities 
for lack of adequate child care. NOW found that almost half of surveyed parents reported 
being threatened with sanctions if they could not secure child care arrangements (see 
Powell and Cahill 2000, 2001). Furthermore, 95 percent of surveyed parents were not 
informed of their right not be sanctioned for failure to secure adequate child care (Powell 
and Cahill 2001: 2). A report by the Office of the State Deputy Comptroller found case 
managers at one of two HRA Job Centers visited by the Office were not aware that 
recipients were exempt from work-related requirements if unable to find appropriate 
child care (McCall 2000: ii), suggesting the regulation had not been adequately 
communicated to Job Center staff by senior bureaucrats in HRA. 
 
Finally, TANF parents whose cases were closed were not given information about 
Transitional Child Care (TCC) to which they were entitled under federal and state law 
(CCI 1999 and 2003; Scharf and Carlson 2004; Stohr 2002). Reports found that parents 
were not aware of TCC benefits. Although an entitlement, TCC benefits were available 
only on request. Thus, if a case manager or a client had not been informed of them, the 
benefit would not be issued. A study by the Community Service Society of New York 
found that seven out of ten public assistance families were not aware of their eligibility 
for TCC or were outright denied the benefits (Stohr 2002). In addition, parents had to 
reapply for TCC, adding yet another administrative hurdle to receipt. In some instances, 
caseworkers closed cases improperly, leaving transitioning recipients ineligible for TCC 
benefits (Scharf and Carlson 2004).  
 
According to reports, the above issues were exacerbated by the inadequate training of 
case managers, high turnover in Job Center staff, and antiquated child care information 
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systems (CCI 1999, 2003). Case managers were found to have “a very limited 
understanding about the City’s complex child care system and the range of regulated 
programs and services that are available to parents” (CCI 1999: 4). Case managers’ 
workload, the time constraints in which they operated, and the intense pressure to close 
cases, all factored into the lack of information regarding child care options and 
availability, and to caseworkers’ preference for informal child care arrangements.  
 
The reports stressed two others factors, not directly related to front-line practices, which 
figured into the high reliance on informal care by TANF mothers: First, regulated 
providers were discouraged from serving TANF recipients due to ongoing delays in 
payments from HRA. Delays and non-payment of services were common and providers 
were often paid retroactively. Regulated providers reported having to write letters, make 
telephone calls, or obtain legal assistance to receive payment from the city (CCI 1999). 
While there is no evidence that this mismanagement was intentional and designed to 
discourage regulated providers from taking on TANF children, it unquestionably had 
some impact.  
 
Second, and not a factor particular to New York, was simply a lack of affordable, 
regulated child care spaces. Although the growth in family daycares met some of the 
demand for regulated care, openings in family daycare programs and child care centres 
became increasingly difficult to find in low-income communities such as the South 
Bronx, parts of Upper Manhattan, and poorer sections of Brooklyn (CCI 1999, 2003). 
This lack of supply was exacerbated after 2000 when the Giuliani administration 
announced it would expand workfare participation beyond federal requirements, despite 
the fact that WEP participants were already experiencing great difficulty obtaining 
regulated child care (Powell and Cahill 2000: 2).  
 
The research reports included a number of recommendations which, while broad in 
scope, can be broken down into three points: First, TANF parents should be provided 
with written information concerning child care, including TCC, a month in advance of 
their “activation” so that they have ample time to consider their options and make 
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arrangements. Second, case managers should be trained about their clients’ child care 
rights. Written procedures were inadequate and case managers should be required to 
undergo specific training to ensure they provide written and oral information regarding 
child care and also inform parents that they cannot be sanctioned for failure to find child 
care. Third, the reports recommended that some form of advisory committee or 
ombudsman be created to ensure the city live up to its mandate to fully inform parents of 
their child care rights and options. These specific recommendations accompanied more 
routine calls for the expansion of regulated child care slots in family daycare and centre-
based programs, for the regulation of informal providers, and for the resolution of 
payment issues and subsidy rates which worked to discourage regulated providers from 
accepting TANF children.  
 
As the evidence presented in this section illustrates, far from being a matter of “parent 
choice”, the high reliance informal child care arrangements (and to a lesser extent family 
daycare) by welfare mothers in New York City was the product of Giuliani 
administration policies and the front-line practices of its welfare bureaucracy. For the 
administration, the quickest and cheapest route to child care—putting a child with family, 
friends or neighbours—was welfare mothers’ shortest route off the welfare rolls and into 
workfare programming and the labour market. The city’s welfare bureaucracy engaged in 
the systematic violation of welfare recipients’ legislated child care rights, denying 
mothers’ information about regulated child care and a true choice of child care options. 
The administration engaged in a deliberate strategy to provide child care “on the cheap”, 
channelling public child care dollars to an expanding and precarious home child care 
workforce, effectively deregulated the city’s publicly-funded child care services and 
privatizing more of the costs of and responsibilities for caregiving.  
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5. The Municipal Retreat from Child Care Funding 
 
The Giuliani administration’s commitment to an agenda of privatization was further 
illustrated by the municipal government’s retreat from child care funding amidst 
escalating demand for services. To understand this final point, it is necessary to examine 
some of the minutiae of the child care funding formula. In New York, subsidized child 
care services have always been financed through a mix of city, state, and federal dollars 
(IBO 2002). Under the CCBG, and most of the federal child care programs which 
preceded it, the city and state must spend a fixed amount of its own money in order to 
“draw down” federal child care dollars. These funds are referred to as “maintenance of 
effort” or “matching funds”. Historically, as discussed in the previous chapter, one of the 
markers of the city’s commitment to public child care has been that New York City has 
spent more municipal dollars on child care than is required under its “maintenance of 
effort” (IBO 2002: 3).  
 
In keeping with this tradition, in the initial years following the passage of PRWORA and 
State welfare reform, New York City spent more municipal dollars on child care than was 
required by under the CCBG and the corresponding state child care program (IBO 2002). 
Between 1996 and 1999, federal dollars paid for a third of the city’s childcare need with 
the city paying two-thirds (Nyary 2004). However, citing municipal budget constraints, 
the Giuliani administration reversed this pattern in 2000 (IBO 2002), withdrawing 
municipal dollars from the overall funding mix.   
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the year 2000 was a period of escalating demand 
for child care services in New York as the Giuliani administration ramped up welfare 
participation rates beyond those required under PRWORA. By 2003, as New York 
exceeded the federally set target to reduce welfare rolls by 50 percent, the city was 
providing approximately 96,000 children with subsidized child care (IBO 2002). 
However, since 2000 almost all of the growth in child care spending was attributable to 
rising levels of federal funds. In the years 2000 and 2001, the city’s contribution to the 
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municipal child care pot fell below 1999 levels (IBO 2002), effectively cutting a key 
social service at a time of peak demand.  
 
Between 1998 and 2003 federal funds grew from 34 to 64 percent of the city’s child care 
budget (IBO 2002). By 2004, federal funds made up 75 percent of all spending on child 
care in New York, with the municipal government paying only a quarter—down from 
two-thirds—of the costs (Nyary 2004). This trend showed no sign of abating: For fiscal 
year 2005, for example, New York City was slated to receive another $65 million 
increase for child care under the CCBG. However, rather than put this money into 
improving child care quality and access, the city proposed using approximately $40 
million of federal funds to reduce the city’s share of child care expenditures, shrinking 
the city’s burden of child care costs (Kaufman 2004: B1). 
 
These cuts had a significant impact on the availability of child care for poor families in 
New York City, both TANF recipients and low-income working families. For example, 
from 1999 to 2003, overall enrolment growth in ACS and HRA child care was limited to 
8 percent (CCI 2004). The number of slots allocated to TANF families actually declined 
from 37,569 in 2001 to 35,563 in 2002 (IBO 2002). While the city was projected to 
expand child care capacity by around 10,000 slots in 2002, after the city cut its 
contributions to the child care funding mix, the expansion was limited to just 3000—a 
difference of 7,000 subsidized child care spaces (IBO 2002).  
 
The cumulative effect of the Giuliani administration’s retreat from child care funding was 
expanding waiting lists. By 2003, there were 46,000 eligible families on the waiting list 
for subsidized child care services (CCI 2003: 6). Yet municipal retrenchment had an 
impact on the city’s unionized daycare workers as well. According to union officials, 
Giuliani fought giving fair and equitable contracts to all unionized municipal employees, 
but daycare workers and centre directors were particularly vulnerable (Interview 17). As 
the city’s child care budget was scaled back, daycare workers and centre directors went 
four years without a contract—from January 2001 to 2005 (when a new collective 
agreement was reached with Giuliani’s predecessor, Michael Bloomberg).  
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The unions accused the Giuliani administration of siphoning off funds allocated to 
childcare in order to pay for other budget items (Nyary 2004). As union officials argued, 
federal funds from the CCBG were intended to not only allow local governments to 
increase the supply of child care, but also to ensure child care workers’ compensation 
levels kept pace with the cost of living. And as Sandy Socolar, a senior policy analyst 
with the daycare workers union, has argued, the administration’s failure to invest in New 
York’s centre-based system produced a staffing crisis: “People who stay in daycare do it 
by choice, but how long can they stand it if their pay is frozen at levels four years old? If 
you can’t attract qualified people, there’s higher turnover and the children pay for it with 
teachers who have inadequate preparation” (Socolar as qtd. in Nyary 2004). The 
siphoning off of federal funds intended to boost centre-based child care workers’ wages, 
without regard for its effect, was clear evidence of the administration’s antipathy to this 
unionized workforce and public sector workers in general.  
 
Child care advocates and unions alike were incensed at the municipal retreat from child 
care funding in the midst of an child care escalating crisis. Child Care Inc. (2003: 5-6) 
criticized the Giuliani administration for its “pronounced pattern of divestment of local 
funds.” As Nancy Kolben noted, the city had lost an opportunity to expand subsidized 
care: “If we started at the base at the time we got additional funding and all that funding 
had gone to child care, we would have been able to serve 30,000 more children” (qtd. in 
Kaufman 2002: B11, emphasis added). Bill de Blasio, then chairman of the general 
welfare committee on City Council, echoed Kolben’s concerns: “For years now, federal 
and state money has come into New York to create more slots, but the city has been 
supplanting those dollars”  (qtd. in Kaufman 2004: B1).  
 
In sum, at a time of peak demand for child care services, the Giuliani administration 
disinvested from child care, allowing federal and state dollars to increasingly supplant 
city funds in the municipal child care pot. The administration refused to expand the city’s 
publicly-subsidized child care system, illustrating its preference for market solutions to 
the city’s escalating child care crisis. It also refused to bargain with the unionized 
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workforce so essential to that system’s reputation for quality child care. While perhaps 
not as well documented as the channelling of public dollars to informal child care, the 
municipal retreat from child care funding was but another manifestation of the Giuliani 
administration’s privatization agenda. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, cuts 
to child care were paralleled by retrenchment and job losses in a range of municipal 
social services. 
 
For the thousands of low-income families on the city’s child care waiting list, 30,000 
subsidized spaces—mentioned above by Kolben—could have eased the tensions between 
paid work and social reproduction, providing a necessary employment support. Instead, 
these families were left to meet their child care needs through private means, either 
purchasing child care on the market or relying on kith and kin networks. For those 
families who did gain access to child care subsidy, the administration’s failure to invest 
available municipal dollars in the city’s public child care infrastructure, and its unionized 
workforce, left them with few choices in child care.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
“They had no desire to increase public sector child care. They were ideologically opposed to the public 
sector.” – Ajay Chaudry, Deputy Commissioner of the Administration for Children’s Services, 2004-2006 
 
Seven years into New York’s welfare-to-work regime, Nancy Rankin of the Community 
Service Society asked of the city’s child care system, “One wonders sometimes whether 
the system is intentionally complicated … systems can and do pose barriers even when 
the [child care] placements are guaranteed and the funding is there” (qtd. in Stohr 2002). 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that New York City’s child care system 
was not only “intentionally complicated”—diverting thousands of poor families from 
accessing the subsidies to which they were entitled—but that HRA, through front-line 
practices and under the ideological cover of parent choice, channelled welfare mothers 
into relying on low-cost, informal child care. Not much had changed since the last days 
of AFDC when the Citizens Budget Commission (1997: 39) proclaimed, “It appears that 
HRA is neither assisting parents in securing high quality child care for their children nor 
enabling them to find the type of care they prefer.”  
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Reflecting on these trends, the city’s most authoritative voice on child care, Nancy 
Kolben, expressed deep disappointment at what she and other advocates saw as a missed 
opportunity:  
 
By spending limited public resources on informal care, we are failing to invest in the programs 
that give the poorest children the best opportunities for gaining fundamental learning skills. We 
could have created child care centres with trained teachers, equipped playgrounds and enriched 
learning environments. Instead, more children are in unsafe environments or parked in front of a 
TV. (qtd. in Kaufman 2004: B1 and B5)  
 
Echoing these sentiments, one of the founders of Head Start, the child psychologist Dr. 
Ed Zigler, called New York’s approach to child care “a disaster in the making”. “What 
good does it do to keep telling people about the importance of the first few years in life,” 
he asked, “when policymakers in New York tell people, ‘Here’s some money. Go find 
something’?” (qtd. in Kaufman 2004: B5). Responding to the criticism, officials at HRA 
repeated the claim that welfare recipients preferred leaving their children in unregulated, 
license-exempt settings, “despite encouragement from social workers [to use licensed 
care]” (qtd. in Kaufman 2004: B5).  
 
Yet notwithstanding the city’s public line on “parental choice”, a high-ranking official in 
the child care division of HRA privately claimed that senior bureaucrats came to 
recognize the importance of better child care as advocates pressured the city to educate 
and inform TANF families about their child care rights and options (Interview 25). And 
while in public HRA officials argued that the city’s child care centres were not 
responsive to TANF families’ needs, behind closed doors some acknowledged that 
welfare caseworkers were failing to inform clients of their child care options. As one 
senior bureaucrat put it:  
 
It was difficult to educate welfare workers on child care rights. Child care was a quarter inch of 
five inches of paper they had to go through with an applicant or recipient. It’s not as if workers are 
resistant to that information, just how much information can you cram in? And often recipients 
know what’s coming and already have in mind ‘oh my mom’s going to take care of the baby or 
my grandmothers going do it’ … Also, it’s an old story, I hope it doesn’t happen anymore, but the 
case workers would say to the parent ‘who’s taking care of your child right now?’  (Interview 25) 
 
Having said this, according to this source: 
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People in HRA did not want the crummiest, cheapest care they could get. They wanted care that 
would best support families in their work. It wasn’t a fight within HRA to make this happen. Not 
with management … it wasn’t the policy of the agency. It was very committed to building a strong 
child care system to support families and their work. (Interview 25)   
 
Others intimately familiar with the city’s child care system disagree. Ajay Chaudry was 
ACS’s Deputy Commissioner for Child Care and Head Start from 2004 to 2006. He led 
the first comprehensive study and redesign of New York City’s child care system in the 
post-Giuliani era and researched TANF mothers’ experiences with child care (Chaudry 
2004). Chaudry sums up the Giuliani administration’s policy logic like this:   
 
The cost of regulated, quality child care is a lot more than the cost of welfare so the only way it 
[welfare reform] was going to work was to encourage the cheapest kind of care possible. It [the 
expansion of informal care] was a conscious choice. First, you give parents very little time to 
arrange child care. And so any type of child care you can get will do. So there was a huge push 
toward informal child care … mothers were pushed to use as inexpensive child care arrangements 
as possible, pushed to use informal care and they had very little or no time to arrange child care 
before beginning work. (A. Chaudry, personal communication, December 5, 2010) 
 
While Chaudry acknowledges that federal funding levels were nowhere near what they 
needed to be, had funding substantially increased, “they [the Giuliani administration] 
wouldn’t have expanded it [regulated child care] regardless. Even if the funding was two 
or three times as much … neither the Giuliani or Bloomberg administration’s 
demonstrated a strong will to expand the formal child care market in New York.” He 
continues: 
 
Giuliani’s preference for informal care was because a) it’s easier to turn on and off and b) they had 
no desire to increase public sector care. They were ideologically opposed to the public sector. If 
they could of, they probably would have said [to TANF mothers] ‘we are providing you with no 
child care assistance and you still have to go to work.’ It just so happened to be federal law that a 
family had to get child care assistance in order to meet work requirements … so essentially they 
said ‘we’re going to set it up that your only real option is informal care but you have no excuse, 
whether you find care or not you’re going to work.’ (Personal communication, December 5, 2010; 
emphasis added) 
 
And while Chaudry notes that welfare reform incentivized the choice of informal care—
as poor families could keep subsidy money within their kith-and-kin networks, making 
up for reductions in benefits (“child care as the new welfare”)—all in all, he determines 
that “from how the city budgeted for anticipated increased demand for subsidies to how it 
structured, facilitated, and encouraged child care enrolment by WEP families, it was an 
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intentional policy of HRA to push TANF clients to use informal care” (personal 
communication, December 5, 2010; emphasis added).  
 
One of the city’s most well respected child care advocates, and social policy analyst, 
agrees. During Giuliani’s time in office, this individual worked as the Office of the Public 
Advocate’s Director of Social Services. Responding to the city’s claims that HRA did not 
direct TANF mothers to informal care, they said:  
 
The city’s primary concern was with getting mothers off of welfare. HRA was not concerned with 
ensuring very young children were in environments that are going to foster healthy child 
development ... The city created a substandard child care voucher system for welfare families 
rather than looking at child care resources overall and what makes most sense for families, welfare 
reform, and kids … It [child care] was not the focus of the city or mayoral administration. 
(Interview 6) 
 
As have other child care advocates, they argue that the increase in federal child care 
funding that accompanied welfare reform—while inadequate to meet growing demand—
could have been used to build on New York City’s historical commitment to quality, 
public child care:  
 
They [the Giuliani administration] didn’t view it as an opportunity. Here we have all this 
additional child care money coming down from the federal and state governments and the city 
didn’t ask ‘how can we build a really strong program?’ Instead it was ‘let’s just get kids into 
whoever’s house we can and get those parents into a work activity.’ (Interview 6)  
 
Again, work enforcement, not child care, was the main priority of the Giuliani 
administration. In agreement with Chaudry, this advocate believes the city’s use of 
informal care to meet growing demand “was not by default, but by design” (personal 
communication, July 13, 2009; emphasis added). 
 
Child Care on the Cheap 
 
In the wake of welfare reform, and despite a significant increase in federal child care 
spending, there was little to no growth in the regulated, unionized, centre-based public 
childcare system which had made New York City an outlier amongst municipal childcare 
regimes (see Chapter 3). From 1995 on, upwards of three quarters of welfare mothers 
receiving child care subsidy placed their children in informal care settings, one-third of 
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the cost of regulated care.92 Overall, the total number of children in unionized, centre-
based care remained stable, while the number of children in home-based, non-union, 
family daycare increased by 7,000 and in license-exempt, unregulated (i.e. informal) 
child care by 13,500 (see Table 1.2).93  
 
Furthermore, beginning in 1999, New York City’s financial commitment to child care 
steadily declined, diminishing its capacity to increase the supply of regulated spaces and 
improve both the quality of care, and the quality of working conditions, in publicly-
funded daycares. The impact of retrenchment was clear: By 2004, 36,000 families were 
on the waiting list for subsidized child care (CCI 2004). Countless other families were 
diverted from applying for welfare benefits or unfairly sanctioned off the rolls and 
therefore denied the child care assistance to which they were entitled. These families 
were forced to rely on exclusively private means to meet their child care needs.  
 
For the Giuliani administration, the answer to the question of “But who will care for their 
children?” was never in doubt. New York City’s effort at mediating the child care crisis 
was grounded in overlapping and mutually reinforcing strategies of privatization, which 
shifted more of the costs of and responsibilities for child care onto low-income 
families/households and communities, and especially the women within them. Through 
its welfare bureaucracy, the state played an active role in configuring the care 
arrangements on which poor mothers depended in order to engage in workfare and paid 
work. Welfare mothers “choice” of informal child care, and to a lesser extent family 
daycare, was made in a context of a punitive workfare program designed to push them 
into the lower reaches of the labour market as quickly and as cheaply as possible. The 
primary outcome of these strategies was the expansion of a home child care market in 
which a precarious, racialized workforce provides state-subsidized child care “on the 
                                                
92 This is not including uncalculated savings to the city in regulatory costs such as 
licensing and health and safety inspections; both a responsibility of city agencies, neither 
of which applied to informal providers. 
93 In the space of a decade, the number of family daycares in the city more than doubled, 
from 3,400 to 8,500 (Sen and Thompson 2006).  
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cheap.” This public care work in the “private” sphere of the home was central to the 
state’s mediation of the child care crisis.  
 
Furthermore, channelling public resources to the least-regulated, least-trained, and worst-
paid sector of the child care industry fulfilled the Giuliani administration’s desire to 
restructure the institutional legacies of New York’s social democratic welfare state. 
While introducing a punitive workfare program and restricting access to cash assistance, 
the administration’s policies at the intersection of welfare and child care led to further 
erosion of the city’s already inadequate public child care infrastructure and undermined 
its unionized workforce. These dynamics played out in a broader political context of a 
project of urban neoliberalization, which included the privatization, marketization, and 
deregulation of social services, and of the public sector more generally. 
 
From Restructuring to Resistance 
 
New York’s home child care providers tended to share the same social and geographic 
location as the mothers they served i.e. poor women of colour in the city’s low-income 
neighbourhoods. Working for low wages and no benefits, these providers—who Sen 
(2006) has called “poor mothers’ nannies”—effectively subsidized a poorly funded child 
care system. Classified as independent contractors, they were excluded from key 
employment protections and labour rights, including the right to unionize and collectively 
bargain. Unlike their peers in New York City’s publicly-funded daycares, home child 
care providers were isolated and unorganized. The home-based location of their work 
contributed to their invisibility (see Boris and Klein 2008).  
 
For the Giuliani administration, this precarious workforce performed the care work of a 
neoliberalizing welfare state “on the cheap.” However, as the next chapter illustrates, the 
administration’s privatized remedies aimed at mediating the child care crisis unleashed a 
number of contradictions, providing openings for resistance. Progressive actors in New 
York’s civil society took advantage of these contradictions to contest the neoliberal 
restructuring of the city’s welfare regime and mediate the child care crisis on grounds 
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more favourable to both providers and the low-income families they served. It is to the 
theme of resistance that the study now turns.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
FROM RESTRUCTURING TO RESISTANCE: WELFARE RIGHTS AND CHILD 
CARE STRUGGLES IN NEW YORK CITY, 1995-2007 
 
 
“A comprehensive child-care policy must represent not only the interests of the children who need care, 
and their families, but also the interests of child-care workers, as workers, who should be fairly 
compensated and provided with workplace benefits. Yet, for too long, child-care policies in the United 
States have privileged the consumers of child care while ignoring the economic interests of women who 
labour as child-care workers.”94 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the wake of welfare reform, struggles over child care in the US have taken the form of: 
small and mostly unsuccessful campaigns to defend poor mothers’ right to stay home to 
care for their children; campaigns to improve child care providers’ rights as workers, 
including higher wages, better working conditions, and the right to influence the 
development of child care programs through collective bargaining; and coalitions of 
providers, low-income families, child care and welfare advocates, demanding 
improvements in the availability of subsidized child care services (Reese 2011: Chapter 
6).  
 
As these struggles have arisen in a number of US states and cities, they have exhibited 
place-specific characteristics (see Reese 2011; Krinsky and Reese 2006). To recall 
Krinksy’s observation, wherever neoliberal governance is tried, “its ‘roll-back’ 
moment—i.e. the point at which it uproots the existing social policy infrastructure—
generates specific sorts of opposition depending upon the existing configuration of, and 
division of labour in, the state and civil society groups” (2006: 159). Like the 
restructuring it confronts, resistance is contextually embedded in political-economic 
space.  
 
Neoliberal restructuring at the intersection of welfare and child care in New York 
generated “specific sorts of opposition” with varying levels of success in securing more 
socially just outcomes for welfare mothers and child care providers. While there are 
                                                
94 Smith (2010: 112). 
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numerous studies of resistance to New York’s workfare regime in general, little has been 
written on the contestation of neoliberal restructuring at the intersection of welfare reform 
and child care.95 This chapter aims to fill this lacuna. 
 
A number of the city’s progressive civil society actors rejected the Giuliani 
administration’s attempt to mediate the child care crisis by shifting costs of and 
responsibilities for child care onto low-income families/households and communities. 
Welfare rights organizations, child care advocates, women’s groups, legal-aid lawyers, 
and some elements of the city’s labour movement, developed resistance strategies that 
pushed the state to socialize more of the costs of and responsibilities for child care. In this 
chapter, I focus on five campaigns in the decade following welfare reform. I trace their 
development, detail their strategies and tactics, and assess their effectiveness.  
 
The first section explores the child care activism of New York City’s largest anti-
workfare coalition, WEP Workers Together! (WWT). For reasons I discuss, WWT did 
not give high priority to child care in its organizing. However, the coalition did engage in 
a brief direct action campaign targeting HRA, demanding reforms to the agency’s child 
care policies. While the campaign produced only modest results, WWT pushed the issue 
of child care to the forefront of welfare rights organizing in New York.  
 
The second section explores the extensive public outreach efforts of child care advocates, 
welfare rights groups, and legal-aid lawyers, as they attempted to make welfare mothers 
aware of their legislated child care rights. Some of these groups took the city to court 
over rights violations and lobbied HRA to end the front-line practices that contributed to 
TANF families’ over-reliance on informal child care. As the evidence suggests, this 
outreach and legal activism had some impact on the city’s policies, including prompting 
HRA to introduce some regulation of informal care. There was also a decline in the 
number of TANF families using vouchers for unregulated, license-exempt arrangements.   
 
                                                
95 See Krinsky (1998, 2006, 2007a, 2007b), Goldberg (2001), Tait (2005), Krinsky and 
Reese (2006). 
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In the third section, I discuss the joint efforts of child care advocates and labour 
movement activists to leverage federal welfare-to-work grants to establish an innovative 
child care program, Satellite Child Care. In fulfillment of their work participation 
requirements, Satellite trained women on welfare as family child care providers and 
equipped them with the resources necessary to establish a licensed family daycare in their 
place of residence. Satellite’s providers became part of a non-profit family childcare 
network, and were unionized and covered by a collective bargaining agreement with their 
employer, the Consortium for Worker Education (CWE)—the workforce development 
arm of the New York City Central Labor Council. Sattelite sought to address two issues 
at the nexus of welfare reform and child care: the lack of affordable, quality child care 
available to poor mothers and the precarious character of home child care work. In doing 
so, the program articulated the link between quality care and improved working 
conditions for child care providers that became central to further campaigns to organize 
the city’s home child care workforce. 
 
In the fourth and fifth sections, I examine two such campaigns. Families United for 
Racial and Economic Equality (FUREE) is a community organization led by poor women 
of colour with welfare recipients and home child care providers included amongst its 
members. FUREE set about organizing home-based providers around a range of issues, 
beginning with unfair city inspection practices that were resulting in the closure of 
licensed family daycares. These closures threatened the livelihoods of home child care 
providers and contracted the supply of regulated care in some of the city’s high-needs 
neighbourhoods. Building from a shared social location, and shared experiences with the 
city’s welfare bureaucracy, FUREE organized around the common interests of home 
child care providers and the welfare mothers they served.   
 
By making the work of the “poor mother’s nanny” visible, breaking their isolation, and 
building their political capacities, FUREE’s organizing laid the foundations for an 
ambitious campaign to unionize the city’s home childcare workforce, spearheaded by 
New York City’s largest teachers’ union, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), and 
the community organization, Association of Community Organization for Reform Now 
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(ACORN). ACORN and UFT sought to challenge the policies that contributed to home 
child care work’s devaluation by winning providers recognition, respect, and better 
wages and working conditions from the state, mitigating the precarious nature of their 
work.  
 
There were also some important absences in the politics of resistance at the intersection 
of welfare and child care; namely, groups supporting the rights of welfare mothers to stay 
home to care for their children and the union representing the city’s centre-based child 
care workforce whose jobs were threatened by successive mayoral administrations’ 
agendas of privatization, deregulation, and retrenchment. I address these absences in the 
chapter’s conclusion.  
 
Overall, this chapter demonstrates that neoliberal remedies for the child care crisis can— 
paradoxically perhaps—open space for contestation and resistance (see Vosko 2006). 
While the Giuliani administration restructured the relationship between poor women, the 
state, and the market along neoliberal lines—pursuing an agenda of privatization—
progressive actors in New York’s civil society sought to reshape this relationship on 
terms more favourable to welfare mothers and the women who care for their children.  
 
First, child care advocates and welfare rights activists took seriously the neoliberal 
mantra of “parent choice” in child care. If the Giuliani administration truly believed in 
“choice”, advocates and activists argued, then it would adhere to the laws and regulations 
governing TANF child care which guaranteed welfare recipients’ a choice of child care 
arrangements, including care in a regulated, centre-based setting. 
 
Second, Satellite Child Care leveraged state funds designated for punitive welfare-to-
work programs—designed to move poor mothers into work at any wage—to develop a 
new model of child care. This model provided both quality care for the children of low-
income families and quality care work for welfare recipients transitioning into careers as 
family daycare providers. In doing so, Satellite addressed the precariousness of home 
child care work while enhancing the quality and stability of the child care services relied 
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upon by welfare mothers.  
 
And finally, by channelling public resources to the least-regulated, least-trained, and 
worst-paid sectors of the child care industry—in an effort to provide child care services 
“on the cheap”—the Giuliani administration expanded the ranks of a precarious, but 
publicly-funded home child care workforce. Many previously “private-pay” providers 
now received state funds for the care of children of low-income families, emerging as a 
quasi-public sector workforce performing the care work of a neoliberalizing welfare state. 
This quasi-public status opened the legal and discursive space for home child care 
workers to collectively organize and make claims on the state as public employees 
providing an essential social service and deserving of better wages and working 
conditions. From an invisible, isolated, and unorganized workforce, home child care 
providers emerged as a political force in the wake of welfare reform, demanding greater 
socialization of the costs of and responsibilities for social reproduction, and more socially 
just solutions to New York City’s child care crisis.   
 
Before exploring these resistance strategies in depth, I give a brief overview of welfare 
rights organizing in Giuliani-era New York. The following section helps situate struggles 
at the intersection of welfare and child care in the broader context of New York City’s 
welfare reform and the resistance it engendered.   
 
Welfare Rights Organizing in Giuliani’s New York 
 
Welfare recipients and welfare rights groups had no shortage of grievances with New 
York City’s workfare regime. As the New York City Bar Association’s Committee on 
Social Welfare Law put it, the city’s welfare-to-work strategy was one of “diversion, 
misinformation, and discrimination” and the Giuliani administration “seemed to violate 
welfare law with impunity” (CSWL 2001: 328). However, while New York was once the 
centre of a militant welfare rights movement, according to Dulchin and Kasmir (2004: 2) 
“by the 1990s welfare organizing in the city had been largely anaemic for ten years.”  
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In terms of strength and effectiveness, resistance to welfare reform in New York was 
uneven, as it was across the country.96 Most welfare rights activism was defensive in 
nature; what social movement scholar Mimi Abramovitz (2000: 142) has called “damage 
control.”  While the city’s welfare rights advocates and activists sought to limit the harm 
inflicted on the poor by a punitive welfare bureaucracy, city officials argued that these 
efforts had little impact on HRA’s policies and practices. According to Jason Turner, the 
city’s welfare rights movement “was ineffective … they [welfare rights groups] did very 
little that slowed us down” (personal communication, August 25, 2009).  
 
Due to its centrality in the punitive architecture of New York’s workfare regime and the 
degree to which it threatened well-paid union jobs, the Work Experience Program 
became the primary target of the city’s welfare rights movement (see Goldberg 2001; 
Tait 2005). This organizing focused on the harsh working conditions and maltreatment 
experienced by welfare recipients forced into unpaid public sector employment. Some 
unions and community organizations made attempts to unionize these workers. However 
their efforts faced numerous obstacles, including lukewarm support from the city’s labour 
movement, particularly key municipal unions, and a series of legal decisions that 
cemented the legal status of WEP workers as public assistance recipients not employees 
of the state (Krinsky 2007a). Welfare rights campaigners did however win a number of 
important changes to WEP, including around health and safety and dignity on the job 
(Goldberg 2001; Krinksy 2007a). 
 
Beyond WEP, welfare rights organizing produced a number of small, but important 
victories. Movement lawyers launched legal challenges at both the administrative level—
representing welfare recipients in HRA’s “fair hearings” procedures—and in the court 
system (Interview 1). These challenges brought about some changes to the front-line 
practices of welfare case managers, and to state laws and regulations. HRA was forced to 
change aspects of policy, including around eligibility determination, the appropriateness 
of work assignments, and the ease of access to welfare benefits and support services 
                                                
96 For an excellent overview of welfare rights organizing in the wake of TANF see Reese 
(2011), and also Abramovitz (2000) and Krinsky and Reese (2006). 
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(Krinsky 2007a). Such victories struck a blow against the rampant and illegal use of 
sanctions by welfare caseworkers and the various diversion strategies employed by the 
city’s welfare bureaucracy.  
 
While again, these were small victories, and the punitive architecture of the city’s 
workfare regime was largely left intact, the concerns raised by welfare rights activists and 
advocates pushed the Giuliani administration to address issues of access and equity it 
would have otherwise ignored. In other words, welfare rights activism ensured that a 
punitive and inhumane workfare regime was made a little less punitive and slightly more 
humane. The gains made by activists and advocates organizing at the intersection of 
welfare and child care were more far reaching. It is to these campaigns that the chapter 
now turns.  
 
1. “Guerrilla Daycare”: The Child Care Activism of WEP Workers Together! 
(1996-1997) 
 
In 1996, three community groups active in welfare rights organizing came together to 
form a coalition under the banner of WEP Workers Together! (WWT).97 Among the 
membership of these organizations were welfare recipients who had been called into 
WEP and had alerted their organizations to the program’s exploitative working 
conditions. WEP required welfare recipients to “pay off” their welfare benefits by 
working menial jobs for the city at well below the minimum wage. Recipients were 
assigned to a variety of unskilled jobs regardless of their work experience and level of 
education. In addition, they were deprived of basic labour rights, including the right to 
unionize (Krinsky 2007). WWT set out to document these abuses and organize the nearly 
40,000 WEP participants in their communities and at their job sites (Dulchin and Kasmir 
                                                
97 These groups were Community Voices Heard, a membership-based organization 
composed primarily of women on welfare; the Urban Justice Center, a legal advocacy 
group; and the Fifth Avenue Committee, a tenants rights organization based in Brooklyn.  
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2004).  At the time, it was the largest campaign to organize workfare workers in the 
country (Tait 2005).98  
 
WWT initially focused on “work-related issues”, such as WEP workers subminimum 
wages, their lack of rights on the job, and routine health and safety violations at WEP 
jobsites.99 Child care, however, was not a priority of the group. The reasons for this are 
complex: first, as WEP initially drew welfare recipients from the General Assistance 
program, and only later from TANF, the first wave of workfare participants were single 
individuals without children. Thus, from the campaign’s inception to the peak of anti-
WEP organizing in 1998, child care was not an immediate concern for the majority of 
WEP participants (Interview 16).  
 
Second, in contrast to the welfare rights organizing of the 1960s and 70s, which saw 
women on welfare mobilize around a multi-layered political identity—as welfare 
recipients, mothers, tenants, members of a racial group, and community members (see 
Nadasen 2005)—for strategic reasons, WWT sought to organize workfare participants by 
focusing on their identity as “workers”. This strategy was designed to advance the 
coalition’s initial claim on the state, which was to have WEP participants reclassified as 
employees of the city under labour law, opening the way for their unionization (see 
Krinsky 2007a). Furthermore, according to organizers the identity of “worker”, as 
opposed to “welfare recipient” or “welfare mother”, was understood to be “gender-
neutral” and more likely to foster solidarity between WEP workers and potential allies in 
the city’s labour movement (Tait 2005).  
 
Yet according to Krinsky (2007: 17), by the end of 1997, WWT’s focus on “WEP 
workers’ rights and identity as workers was giving way to, or at least coexisting with, a 
                                                
98 This organizing intensified as participation in WEP peaked around 1998 and then 
resided as the city became less reliant on public sector job placements to reduce its 
welfare rolls and more focused on strategies of diversion. For an extensive analysis and 
discussion of this campaign, see Krinsky (2007a) and Goldberg (2001).  
99 WEP workers were classified as trainees, not employees, under federal law. Therefore 
they were neither covered by the National Labor Relations Act, nor were they permitted 
to form a union or bargain collectively (Dulchin and Kasmir 2004: 3). 
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focus on WEP workers as potential workers, whose primary needs were education, 
training, and child care.” The group’s failure to successfully challenge WEP workers’ 
misclassification under labour law necessitated this shift. With unionization off the 
agenda, unlike the identity of worker, “potential worker” opened space to make claims on 
the state that took into consideration the needs of single mothers in WEP as gendered 
subjects, that is as mothers with child care needs that had to be met in order for them to 
participate in welfare-to-work programming.  
 
In addition, by early 1998 an increasing number of TANF recipients were being called 
into the program, changing the balance between single mothers and childless adults. Over 
the next year, WWT organizers gained a heightened awareness of the systemic violation 
of welfare mothers’ child care rights, including the illegal use of sanctions to push 
mothers to rely on informal child care. Lacking stable, adequate child care arrangements, 
increasing numbers of WWT members were failing to show up for their WEP 
assignments and were sanctioned by their caseworkers as a result (Interview 16).  
 
With these dynamics at play, WWT turned its attention to child care. In June of 1998, the 
coalition organized a demonstration at HRA’s headquarters in downtown Manhattan, 
demanding a meeting with then commissioner Lilliam Barrios-Paoli. The demonstration 
took the form of a “guerrilla” daycare centre (Interview 16). Fifty children and adults 
“marched into the building, hung up a sign declaring the space a day-care centre, and 
passed out jump ropes and balls to the children” (Dulchin and Kasmir 2004: 5). 
According to organizers, the action effectively shut down the entrance to HRA’s office 
(Interview 16). After a period of negotiation with lower-level staff, the commissioner 
agreed to meet with a WWT delegation at a later date (Interview 16). 
 
At that meeting, WEP workers aired their child care related grievances (Interview 16). 
The commissioner agreed to work with activists to compose a two-page child care fact 
sheet to be included in HRA call-in notices and to develop a child care checklist for 
welfare caseworkers. Barrios-Paoli also agreed to a small increase in the value of child 
care vouchers allotted to WEP participants (Interview 16). Responding to reporters after 
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the meeting, the commissioner stated that the delegation’s “ideas were valid and their 
suggestions very good.” For their part, WWT organizers believed the commissioner was 
“genuinely committed to improving the system so that HRA can provide people with 
better child care options” (Brooke and Epstein 1997: 4).  
 
However, by late 1998 Barrios-Paoli had been replaced by Jason Turner. With Giuliani’s 
handpicked commissioner in place, many of WWT’s child care grievances went 
unaddressed. While the group was eventually successful in forcing the city to create a 
transitional jobs program that emphasized training and education instead of public-sector 
job placements (perhaps the coalition’s most important victory), the guerrilla daycare 
centre was the only direct action that focused exclusively on the issue of child care. 
According to a lead organizer, WWT admittedly “didn’t do that much around the issue of 
child care” as the coalition’s focus “was on jobs”. If this focus necessitated action on 
child care, then the issue would be incorporated into WWT’s work (Interview 16). As a 
member-driven organization, WWT claimed to organize around those issues that most 
troubled its members and according to this organizer: 
 
Child care just wasn’t the issue that was raised the most … the issues that came up were worksite 
violations, health and safety concerns and that people wanted a paycheck. The thing is if you’re at a 
job that doesn’t pay, you might be concerned about child care but your fight isn’t to get better child 
care at an unpaid job, but to get a paid job. (Interview 16)  
 
To summarize, in making claims on the state, WWT initially organized around a 
masculine construct of “work” and “worker” that precluded the child care needs of TANF 
participants as mothers. When the campaign’s demand to have WEP participants 
reclassified as employees failed, WWT shifted its organizing to focus on the needs of 
WEP participants as “potential workers”, including training and education. This shift 
opened the space to organize around the demands of welfare mothers as gendered 
subjects, including the need for adequate child care. However, throughout the WWT’s 
campaign, child care was not prioritized by WWT members, the majority of whom were 
single adults without children.  
 
Yet in its “guerrilla daycare centre”, WWT made an important contribution to future 
struggles at the intersection of welfare and child care. Prior to the city’s implementation 
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of federal welfare reform, little attention had been given to the connection between child 
care and welfare rights. WWT’s direct action was one of the first public events to centre 
child care in welfare rights organizing and put the media’s spotlight on the escalation of 
the city’s care crisis and the inadequacy of the welfare bureaucracy in dealing with it. As 
child care advocates, welfare rights groups and legal-aid lawyers ramped up their 
activism and advocacy efforts, child care would come to take a prominent place in social 
movement resistance to the city’s workfare regime.  
 
2. Contesting “Choice”: Advocacy at the Intersection of Child Care and Welfare 
Rights (1996-2000) 
 
In contrast to the tactics of WEP Workers Together, child care and welfare rights 
advocates took a less confrontational, and more sustained, approach to defend poor 
mothers’ welfare and child care rights. Organizations such as Child Care Inc., NOW, and 
South Brooklyn Legal Services employed outreach, popular education, and “know-your-
rights” workshops to make TANF mothers aware of their child care rights under state and 
federal law. They also represented welfare recipients in “fair hearings” procedures—
where TANF mothers could contest their case manager’s decisions—in addition to 
producing research reports with the intention to publicly shaming the city into action on 
child care. In their activism and advocacy work, child care and welfare rights groups 
invoked the Giuliani administration’s rhetoric of “parental choice” to claim that real 
choice in child care required public investment, an expansion of affordable, regulated, 
quality care, and an end to the policies and practices that played a role in poor mothers’ 
over-reliance on informal child care.    
 
Pathways to Success  
 
By 1998, HRA was facing sustained public criticism from child care advocates and 
negative media coverage for its failure to provide welfare mothers with adequate child 
care (see previous chapter). In response to this criticism, in October of 1999 HRA agreed 
to fund Child Care Inc. (CCI), along with four other child care resource and referral 
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agencies, to provide on-site child care information and referral services at selected 
welfare offices (Interview 9). Under this project, a “child care councillor” spent one day a 
week at an HRA Job Center providing advice and support to welfare recipients. The 
nature of this support ranged from making sure recipients were aware of the child care 
benefits to which they were entitled in law and informing recipients that they could not 
be lawfully sanctioned for failure to comply with work requirements due to a lack of 
adequate child care arrangements. The councillor also assisted welfare mothers in 
locating a child care provider of their choice, playing a role in which welfare caseworkers 
had proven to be negligent (see previous chapter).  
 
Over the length of this project, CCI child care councillors served 400 welfare recipients 
with 700 children (CCI 2003). Belying the city’s rhetoric of “parental choice”, the project 
found that 90 percent of parents who received child care assistance from CCI’s on-site 
councillor opted for a regulated child care setting (CCI 2003). These findings 
contradicted the Giuliani administration’s line on child care and apparently caused some 
embarrassment for HRA’s top brass (Interview 9). Yet in a move that further revealed the 
administration’s commitment to facilitating the expansion of the informal child care 
market, HRA did not renew CCI’s contract and the information and referral program was 
effectively ended due to “lack of resources” (CCI 2003: 11). While CCI had connected 
with a few allies in the child care division of HRA—bureaucrats who were concerned 
about the widespread use of unregulated, license-exempt care—these voices were 
marginalized by the agency’s senior administrators (Interview 17; Interview 9). 
 
Following this experience, CCI embarked on a child care referral project of its own. The 
project, called Pathways to Success, had a dual function: first, to ensure welfare mothers 
had access to regulated child care through outreach and a telephone support line; and 
second, and a more expressly political function, to further demonstrate that low-income 
families’ over-reliance on informal child care was not reflective of their preferences i.e. it 
was not simply a matter of “parent choice” (Interview 9). With no funding from the city, 
CCI secured financial support for the project from a philanthropic foundation (CCI 
1999).  
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Pathways ran over two phases between 1996 to 1999 and provided child care counselling 
to close to 3,000 TANF families (CCI 1999). Under the project, advocates conducted 
citywide outreach to welfare mothers in Job Centers, employment programs, and 
community agencies. They tracked the progress of around 1,800 parents who called the 
Pathways child care phone line for assistance (CCI 1999).  The project confirmed what 
CCI and other agencies had found during their HRA-funded research: while 83 percent of 
TANF families placed their children in informal care, 85 percent of Pathways families 
opted for regulated settings. Furthermore, for TANF parents looking to access transitional 
child care (TCC), 75 percent were not aware of their eligibility, or even the existence of 
TCC, before calling Pathways. CCI concluded that HRA caseworkers were 
systematically failing to notify their clients about transitional child care benefits (CCI 
1999).  
 
As an advocacy group, which occasionally relied on contracts with municipal agencies, 
CCI had to decide the most effective way of mobilizing this knowledge while not 
jeopardizing its precarious relationship with the city (Interview 9). While the 
organization’s tactics may have been less confrontational than WWT, they nonetheless 
proved to have some impact. In an attempt to publicly shame the Giuliani administration, 
CCI issued a press release stating that their research had conclusively demonstrated that 
informal child care arrangements did not work long-term for women transitioning into 
work from public assistance. With the proper information and support to make “good 
child care choices”, CCI argued, TANF families could access “child care that meets their 
child’s developmental and education needs, and supports their transition to employment” 
(CCI 1999: 3).  
 
While the press release garnered media interest, changes were not immediately 
forthcoming. However, representatives from CCI did win an audience with HRA 
administrators, who agreed to look into the procedures surrounding the issuance of child 
care information and advice by the agency’s caseworkers (Interview 17). While this may 
seem like a small victory, the Giuliani administration’s doors were typically closed to any 
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agency or community group perceived to be critical of the mayor, including CCI. 
Advocates believed that the positive media coverage given the Pathways program, and 
ongoing coverage of welfare mothers’ child care predicaments, pushed the administration 
to at least invite child care advocates to the table (Interview 17).  
 
CCI’s work was complemented by the legal advocacy of the New York chapter of the 
National Organization of Women (NOW). The feminist organization’s Legal Defence 
and Education Fund took up the cases of TANF mothers whose child care rights had been 
violated by HRA caseworkers, particularly the illegal sanctioning of welfare recipients 
for failure to work due to lack of child care. Much to the chagrin of the city’s welfare 
bureaucracy NOW was successful in almost all of its cases (Interview 17). As the 
organization’s lead lawyer put it, “The city was counting on people not to complain, but 
we did. If you had a representative, you could take them [HRA] on over child care” 
(Interview 17). This legal advocacy, along with popular education and outreach to 
welfare recipients, was sustained between 1998 and 2002 (Interview 17). 
 
NOW’s work helped other welfare rights groups and legal aid organizations identify and 
act on child care/welfare rights violations (Interview 5). For instance, organizations like 
the South Brooklyn Legal Services (SBLS) were granted a two-year fellowship, funded 
by the National Association of Public Law, to focus on the child care rights of welfare 
recipients. As SBLS’s lead lawyer commented, “there were all kinds of procedures that  
[HRA] weren’t following that they should have been” (Interview 5).100 SBLS built on the 
work of NOW and CCI, representing hundreds of TANF mothers at individual “fair 
hearings” procedures and conducting “know your rights” workshops with welfare 
mothers and low-income community groups (Interview 5). This work had a significant 
impact on individual welfare recipients, repealing sanctions and allowing them the time 
needed to find better child care. It also held the city’s welfare bureaucracy accountable 
for the most egregious violations of poor mother’s welfare rights (Interview 5). Yet 
                                                
100 As the TANF rolls dropped, much of the casework around access to child care benefits 
morphed into individual legal services to home-based child care providers. NOW and 
SBLS increasingly took up cases around licensing and payment/reimbursement issues for 
home daycare providers (a point to which I will return). 
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despite hundreds of successful interventions by NOW and SBLS, the institutional culture 
of HRA, and systemic nature of the violations, showed few signs of changing.  
 
Regulating Informal Child Care 
 
Frustrated with the intransigence of HRA, child care advocates and welfare rights 
lawyers made the decision to “jump scale” and lobby the State government and State 
child care bureaucracy (Interview 17). Armed with the findings of CCI’s research reports, 
as well as case law, NOW convinced the state agency responsible for child care to issue a 
Local Commissioner’s Memorandum advising all New York county welfare 
administrators (including Jason Turner in New York City) of their responsibility to 
inform parents on public assistance that they could not be sanctioned due to lack of 
adequate child care. The state issued a second notice that apprised welfare recipients of 
their child care rights and obligations. In response to the memorandum, HRA reissued a 
policy directive informing staff of the availability of the notice and providing instructions 
for conveying child care information to TANF clients, including a written notice about 
their child care rights (NOW 2001: 3). 
 
However, as lawyers with NOW remarked, “While the issuance of the memorandum and 
the policy directive are significant in that they reiterate the city’s pre-existing obligation 
to inform parents of their child care rights, it is important to point out that the city has a 
record of ignoring precisely these rights” (Powell and Cahill 2000: 8). Indeed, a 2001 
follow up report found that the city had all but ignored the directives and that many 
parents were not given “adequate information about child care” and were “actually 
wrongly threatened with sanctions, i.e. a reduction or termination of their welfare 
benefits, if they could not work due to lack of child care” (Powell and Cahill 2001: 2).  
 
With the city still failing to live up to its obligations under both state and federal law, 
child care and welfare rights advocates continued to lobby the state and found an 
important ally in the Office of the State Deputy Comptroller, a Democrat by the name of 
Carl McCall. McCall had been one of the key voices warning of the escalation of the 
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city’s child care crisis in the years leading up to welfare reform (see McCall 1997). An 
elected office, the State Comptroller is responsible for auditing New York’s local 
governments, hence McCall’s interest in how state TANF monies were being spent.  
 
McCall had publicly opposed the use of TANF funds for informal child care, arguing that 
unregulated, license-exempt care was not developmentally appropriate and lacked 
regulatory oversight (McCall 1997). In a series of reports, the deputy comptroller 
criticized the city for its use of child care-related sanctions, its failure to expand regulated 
daycare slots despite the increase in state and federal child care funding, and its failure to 
reimburse home and centre-based child care providers promptly—a common occurrence 
when parents used vouchers to pay for child care services (Hevesi 2002; McCall 2000). 
The Office of the State Comptroller also criticized the State child care bureaucracy for 
doing too little to regulate the health and safety of informal child care settings (Hevesi 
2002). 
 
This sustained criticism from advocates, state officials, and activists finally seemed to 
have impact on the Giuliani administration’s child care policies. The response to the 
groundswell of criticism came in the form of a report detailing the Administration for 
Children’s Services commitment to a new regulatory regime for informal child care. The 
agency was to implement new state health and safety regulations that required criminal 
background checks, and clearance by a child abuse and negligence registry, for all 
informal providers caring for children outside the child’s home. ACS staff was to monitor 
compliance by visiting the informal provider within 60 days of receiving voucher 
payments. In addition, staff were instructed to provide informal providers with 
information on health and safety, link interested providers to technical assistance and 
nutrition training, and offer providers assistance and advice on how to become licensed 
should they be interested (ACS 2005). According to ACS, the goal was to “Assure that 
care provided through informal and license-exempt caregivers and supported with public 
funds provides a healthy and safe environment for children” (ACS 2001: 1).  
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Overall, advocates believed that these changes would have a positive impact on the 
quality, safety, and stability of informal child care. And in offering informal caregivers a 
pathway to becoming licensed family daycare providers, the new regime would expand 
the supply of regulated child care in the city as well as raising the incomes of those 
providers who choose this path. If one outcome of the Giuliani administration’s strategies 
of privatization was deregulation of the child care industry, advocates had successfully 
fought to bring greater regulation, and more responsibilities for the state, into the 
informal child care sector.   
 
There were other signs of progress. By the year 2003, 77 percent of HRA families were 
using vouchers to purchase informal care; down from 84 percent in 2001 and a high of 89 
percent in 2000 (see Table 1.2). This meant thousands more children were now in 
regulated care settings. While it is difficult to draw a one-to-one correlation, child care 
advocates and welfare rights groups believed the decline was a direct result of their 
ongoing efforts (Interview 8; Interview 9). According to a senior child care official in 
HRA, sustained advocacy and activism pushed the welfare bureaucracy to place greater 
emphasis on regulated child care, informing caseworkers of its importance and making 
sure there was compliance with State-issued memorandums (Interview 25). 
 
Advocates (CCI 2003: 4) reported that HRA had indeed made “extensive efforts to 
increase the agency’s responsiveness to child care concerns.” CCI cited progress in the 
way HRA operated in a number of areas, including: improving parents’ access to 
information regarding child care options; improving the timeliness and consistency of 
payments to regulated and informal providers; enhancing the quality and safety of 
informal care (discussed above); and perhaps most importantly, increased and continuous 
child care training for HRA caseworkers. While acknowledging this progress, CCI noted 
that “questions remain about how much consistent information and access HRA families 
have about their range of child care options … families may continue to lack information 
about or access to other regulated child care options that meet their needs” (CCI 2003: 4). 
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Thus, while advocates recognized that progress had been made, they also realized that 
they were up against an entrenched culture in the city’s welfare bureaucracy.101  
 
From Welfare/Child Care Rights to Organizing the “Poor Mother’s Nanny” 
 
Overall, child care advocates and welfare rights activists had pushed for greater 
regulation of the informal care sector and fought to ensure welfare mothers’ had real 
choice in child care—with an increasing number of mothers gaining access to subsidies 
and regulated child care—with some degree of success. However, as the city’s welfare 
rolls continued their drastic decline, advocacy and activism at the intersection of child 
care and welfare began to shift. As one of the city’s leading welfare rights lawyers 
recalls: 
 
From 1998 to 2000 we were helping welfare recipients get access to child care benefits. But as 
time went on, we started getting calls from child care providers who weren’t being paid … many 
of these providers were barely indistinguishable from our clients on public assistance. They were 
very low-income women of colour. By 2002, our work had almost completely shifted from 
recipients to providers. (Interview 5) 
 
South Brooklyn Legal Services and other welfare rights organizations increasingly began 
to serve home-based child care providers—primarily family daycare providers—helping 
these women navigate municipal daycare regulations and licensing, win back pay owed 
by negligent city agencies, and aiding providers with auditing and taxation issues.  
 
Part of this shift—from welfare recipients to home child care providers—had to do with 
the nature of funding in welfare rights advocacy. According to some advocates, as 
welfare reform moved from political controversy to the “new normal”, funding for 
welfare rights casework began to dry up (Interview 1; Interview 5). While welfare rights 
work continued, there was a reluctant acceptance that welfare reform could not be rolled-
back. Bill Clinton had in fact ended welfare as the country had known it.   
 
                                                
101 Furthermore, advocates did not have the capacity to document how many poor 
mothers had been turned away from public assistance altogether and thereby denied 
access to TANF and subsidized child care. 
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Yet there was another logic driving this shift. By 2000, the flow of public child care 
funds to informal and family daycare providers seemed irreversible. As was the case 
across the country, the demand for child care unleashed by welfare reform had been met 
by a precarious, home-based child care workforce (Reese 2011). Organizing these 
workers to push for higher wages and better working conditions would articulate the 
linkages between welfare mothers’ need for affordable, quality, regulated child care, and 
child care providers’ demands for recognition, respect, and better compensation.  
 
Rather than lamenting the shift in public resources from the city’s publicly-financed 
daycare programs (and their unionized workforce) to the least-regulated, least-trained, 
worst-paid sectors of the industry, community groups and labour movement activists set 
about organizing informal and family daycare providers to challenge the devaluation of 
their work, raise standards in home child care sector, and fight for a better deal from the 
state. In this they sought to make the work of home child care providers visible, break 
providers’ isolation, and build their collective power and political capacities. It is to these 
efforts that the chapter now turns.  
 
3. Towards Quality Care and Quality Care Work: The Satellite Child Care 
Program (2000-2005) 
 
Precarity and the “Poor Mother’s Nanny” 
 
While welfare reform abrogated poor mothers’ rights to care full-time for their own 
children, caring for the children of welfare recipients’ engaged in welfare-to-work is 
recognized as a work activity under TANF (Mink 2002: 108). 102 More generally, care 
work is considered both an acceptable and a viable career option for mothers 
transitioning from welfare to paid work (Chaudry 2004). And there is evidence to suggest 
that welfare administrators and caseworkers in New York City, as well as other locales, 
                                                
102 PRWORA recognizes “the provision of child care services to an individual who is 
participating in a community service program” as a defined work activity (H.R. 3734 29). 
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saw the child care industry as a potential source of employment for TANF mothers.103 As 
Whitebook observes, over half of states have encouraged former welfare recipients to 
become child care providers “often without the necessary training or support that leads to 
quality care or decent child care jobs” (1998: 16-17). 
 
As was the case in other major jurisdictions (such as California and Wisconsin), the 
majority of activists and advocates organizing at the intersection of welfare and child care 
in New York City accepted—perhaps reluctantly—the gendered logic of the new TANF 
regime. Rather than directly challenge the devaluation of poor mothers’ care work, “a 
goal that appeared unwinnable in the short term” (Reese 2011: 20), progressive civil 
society groups—welfare rights activists, child care advocates and some unions— 
challenged the devaluation of poor women’s paid care work, and the work of home child 
care providers in particular. Their efforts aimed to improve subsidized child care for both 
low-income families—by improving access and quality—and the home child care 
workforce—by raising wages and improving working conditions (Reese 2011: Chapter 
6). 
 
These efforts took into consideration the demographic overlap, and grounds for 
solidarity, between home child care providers and welfare recipients. Welfare mothers 
were overwhelmingly reliant on home-based providers who were, like them, 
disproportionately low-income women of colour, often with experiences of public 
assistance. Some child care providers had recently transitioned from welfare to work as 
family daycare providers while others were family, friends, or neighbours who may have 
been on public assistance themselves (see Chaudry 2004). Sen and Thompson have 
(2006: 20) called these child care providers the “poor mother’s nanny”, noting that “few 
things distinguish her from her clientele—they live in the same neighbourhood, they are 
the same color and they’re all occupying the lower shelves of the economy.”  
 
                                                
103 Statistics on how many TANF mothers moved into home health care and home child 
care work in New York City are not available. However, Jason Turner pushed child care 
as a viable career option for mothers transitioning from welfare to work under the W2 
program in Wisconsin.  
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In short, welfare mothers pushed into workfare and the labour market relied on a pool of 
precarious, home child care providers who were more often than not of the same race and 
economic circumstances, and lived in the same communities.  By 2003, the pool of home 
child care providers caring for publicly subsidized children in New York City numbered 
around 28,000, approximately 7,000 family daycare providers and around 21,000 
informal providers.104 And between 1993 and 2003, the number of family daycares in the 
city had more than doubled (Sen and Thompson 2006).  
 
Unlike their unionized peers in the city’s publicly-funded daycares, home child care 
providers experienced a high degree of precariousness in employment with low-wages, 
non-existent benefits, and limited access to statutory entitlements and collective 
representation.105 Unlike a centre-based child care worker, a home child care provider’s 
job tenure was directly dependent on their work relationships with multiple parties (i.e. 
the parents of children in their care). Families are under no obligation to leave their child 
in the care of an individual provider for any particular length of time and can withdraw 
their child with little notice. For providers, this means low levels of job certainty with 
incomes fluctuating depending on both the number of children in their care and the 
duration of care. With parents often working non-standard hours, providers had little 
control over their hours of work, and given the nature of the work, had few opportunities 
for breaks. Due to the differing work schedules of parents of children in their care, 
providers may work up to 15 hours a day without a break. They also have little respite 
from occupational injury and illness, caring for sick children, jeopardizing their own 
health, and typically lift and manoeuvre children throughout the day, making them 
susceptible to back and muscle strain (Black 2012). 
 
In addition, state and federal labour laws exclude independent contractors, and persons 
providing domestic services in another person’s home, from the legal definition of 
“employee”. Under labour law, home child care providers are either independent 
                                                
104 52,000 home child care providers state-wide in New York (Sen and Thompson 2006) 
and 1.8 million in the US (Boris and Klein 2008). 
105 This understanding of precariousness in employment as “generalized labour market 
insecurity along multiple dimensions” is drawn from Vosko (2006).  
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contractors (i.e. self-employed business owners) or, in the case of the small number of 
informal providers who are providing care in a child’s home, otherwise not deemed to be 
in an employer-employee relationship (Blank et al. 2010). These workers were thus 
excluded from basic labour and employment protections in New York State, including 
minimum wage, prevailing wage, overtime, and employment insurance. In the US, union 
representation rests on the assumption of a shared worksite and an unambiguous 
employer-employee relationship, neither of which exists for home-based care workers 
(Boris and Klein 2008: 35). Thus, New York City’s home child care providers were 
excluded from the right to organize into a union and the right to collectively bargain.106  
 
Lastly, home child care providers had low incomes and no access to benefits. Due to the 
low reimbursement rates set by the state (the “market rate”), many providers had average 
hourly earnings below the minimum wage and it was not unusual for providers to have 
annual incomes that put them below the poverty line (UFT 2005). Delays in 
reimbursement payments from city agencies exacerbated providers’ financial difficulties, 
leaving them unable to pay rent or other household bills on time. Providers received no 
vacation pay or paid time off for illness or injury. Nor did they have access to health, 
dental, life/disability insurance or a pension plan through their work. Given their income 
levels, many home child care providers qualified for government assistance such as food 
stamps, the Earned Income Tax Credit, or even cash assistance through TANF (UFT 
2005). 
 
By channelling public monies—in the form of subsidies—to home child care providers, 
the state created a precarious, low-wage labour market while denying the home was a 
workplace (Boris and Klein 2008). The expansion of child care funding that accompanied 
welfare reform expanded this particular labour market. Excluded from basic labour and 
employment protections, and in receipt of public subsidies set at rates which kept them at 
or below the poverty line, the “poor mother’s nanny” performed the care work of a 
                                                
106 Self-employed persons, or businesses, are “competitors” and therefore subject to state 
and federal antitrust laws which prohibits them from “combining” and agreeing on 
matters such as rates (Blank et al. 2010). 
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neoliberalizing welfare state “on the cheap”. But alongside their allies in the welfare 
rights, labour, and child care movements, these care workers decided to fight back. The 
following three sections of this chapter provide an in-depth examination of these 
struggles.  
 
The Satellite Child Care Program 
 
The Satellite Child Care program was a subversive attempt to harness public funds to 
organize the “poor mother’s nanny”, mitigate their precariousness, and reverse the trends 
towards privatization, deregulation and retrenchment which characterized the Giuliani 
administration’s child care agenda. Satellite was the brainchild of labour movement 
activists at the Consortium for Worker Education (CWE), a non-profit education and 
training organization, which is an arms-length body of the New York City Labour 
Council (Interview 13). Seed money for the program came in the form of a welfare-to-
work grant from the federal government, one of many competitive grants awarded 
directly to local entities by the US Department of Labour with the purpose of developing 
workfare programming. These grants were intended to promote experimentation, and 
discover “best-practices”, in welfare-to-work. More often than not they were used by 
local governments to demonstrate how quickly, and cheaply, they could push welfare 
mothers into the lower-reaches of the labour market, thereby drawing down more TANF 
dollars from upper levels of government (see Peck 2001).  
 
Many such initiatives encouraged welfare recipients to become paid child care providers 
(or home health care aides) themselves (Whitebook 2001). Yet as Whitebook (2001: 16-
17) observes, “the majority of these programs place limited emphasis on skill training and 
education and are thus unlikely to prepare participants for the limited number of better-
paying child care jobs.” As a result, such programs did not provide the necessary training 
or support that leads to quality care or decent child care jobs. However, Satellite sought 
to leverage government funds to subvert this model of welfare-to-work, promoting 
professional development in child care work that would advantage both the children 
receiving care as well as the women who provide care (Interview 13).  
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CWE pitched Satellite as a welfare-to-work program that would provide welfare mothers 
with supports to enable their transition from public assistance to paid work as family 
daycare providers. The Consortium applied its significant union-backed lobbying power 
to convince New York State legislators to help fund the project and recognize Satellite 
Child Care as a distinct category of child care from family day, centre-based, and 
informal care. Seeing its potential as a workfare initiative, HRA and New York State’s 
Office of Children and Family Services provided technical support (Interview 13). 
Welfare recipients eligible for Satellite were recommended to the program by HRA case 
managers or through CWE’s community contacts. Despite these partnerships, CWE 
remained the sole sponsor and manager of the program.  
 
For Satellite’s founders, the program sought to address two fundamental problems that 
arose from welfare reform: the lack of “good jobs” for women leaving welfare and the 
lack of affordable, quality child care for low-income families, particularly women 
engaged in welfare-to-work activities (Interview 13). To this end Satellite established a 
comprehensive training and professional development regime for its participants. Satellite 
trainees underwent an assessment process to determine their suitability for the program, 
including a background check and a two-week job-readiness course. In partnership with a 
child care resource and referral agency, participants were then placed in a 12-week long-
internship (500 hours) of which 60 percent of the time was spent in supervised, hands-on 
work activity at a partnering daycare agency. The rest of their time was spent in in-class 
early childhood education and care instruction. This extensive professional development 
counted towards trainees’ welfare-to-work requirements under TANF and was the 
equivalent of earning an associate’s degree (i.e. a college diploma) in early childhood 
education. After completing their training, Satellite set up family child care programs in 
participants’ homes (called “off-site classrooms”) and affiliated providers with a daycare 
agency.  
 
In terms child care quality, Satellite was designed to match the developmental aspects of 
centre-based care and included organized activities, high-nutrition meal plans, structured 
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parental involvement, and of course, ECE-trained providers. Bi-monthly visits were paid 
to participants’ homes by CWE staff to ensure that program requirements were being 
met, yet providers maintained relative autonomy in determining programming for the 
children in their care (permitted it met the high-quality requirements established by 
Satellite). And although Satellite received funds from all three levels of governments, 
providers were made employees of CWE, not independent contractors like their 
counterparts in home child care.  
 
Furthermore, as a labour council affiliate, the CWE ensured that Satellite providers were 
unionized and represented by District Council (DC) 1707 of the American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). As unionized employees they were 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement between CWE and DC 1707. Once their 
family child care program was established, this new employment model meant that 
Satellite providers—although working in-home like family daycare providers—were 
given assistance in site preparation, a start-up kit of safety and educational supplies, and 
received biweekly visits from qualified support staff. Providers were also encouraged to 
work towards further professional accreditation.  
 
At its peak, Satellite had over 150 providers on its books (Interview 13). The program 
sought to mitigate the precariousness experienced by the “poor mother’s nanny”. In terms 
of job certainty, the tenure of Satellite providers was tied to a single job, i.e. that of 
Satellite employee, and it was up to CWE, not providers, to recruit children to the 
program. Crucially, if providers did not have the maximum number of children in their 
care for any length of time, they remained full-time employees (40 hours/week) and were 
not subject to reduced pay. If a child’s parent pulled them from Satellite care, CWE,  not 
the individual provider, was responsible for filling the slot. In addition, under their 
collective bargaining agreement, Satellite providers were covered by seniority provisions. 
Working with a sympathetic employer in CWE, the employer and union ensured that 
providers’ overtime was recorded and paid, health and safety conditions met, and 
vacations covered. And with union status, providers had access to traditional means of 
exerting control in the workplace, such as grievance and arbitration procedures.  
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Perhaps most importantly, providers starting salary was $18,200 per year—regardless of 
the number of children enrolled—and under their collective agreement they received cost 
of living allowances of two percent each year for three years and then a three percent 
increase in year five of the contract. Providers were paid approved overtime for hours 
worked beyond 40 a week and could earn up to $25,000, bringing them above the federal 
poverty threshold for a two-adult, two-child family. Providers received benefits, 
including full health insurance, pension, vacation and sick leave, as well tuition 
reimbursement for their professional development. While Satellite providers annual 
incomes remained low, especially given the cost of living in New York City, these 
benefits greatly enhanced their economic security and their wages, benefits and working 
conditions was comparable to that of workers in the city’s unionized, publicly-funded 
daycare centres—and markedly better than that of a typical home child care provider.    
 
Against “Child Care on the Cheap”: The Demise of Satellite 
 
Satellite ultimately ran up against political and economic constraints imposed by a 
municipal and State government committed to deregulation, privatization and the 
provision of low-cost child care. In order for the model to be successful, the 
reimbursement rates paid by the State to CWE for children in Satellite care—which in 
turn paid the salaries of the program’s providers—had to be set at or near the rate paid to 
the city’s daycare centres. In effect, Satellite was to be home-based child care subsidized 
at the rates of centre-based care. Yet despite intense lobbying by the programs’ directors, 
this rate was never realized and eventually alternative-funding streams—such as 
legislative line items from the State government—dried up. CWE incurred significant 
debts to keep the program afloat and closed in 2005 due to lack of funding.107  
 
                                                
107 Some employees of Satellite, due to their training and professional development, were 
able to find employment in child care centres while others turned to providing informal or 
family day care. 
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Through its innovative model of home child care, pairing quality care with quality child 
care jobs, Satellite sought to shift some of the costs of and responsibilities for social 
reproduction from low-income households back onto the state. Yet it for this reason, the 
program sat in direct contradiction to the Giuliani administration’s neoliberal agenda: 
unlike the unregulated, license-exempt care favoured by the administration, Satellite’s 
staff provided well-regulated, publicly-financed, high-quality child care services. And 
like the workers in city-subsidized daycare centres, Satellite providers were members of 
one of New York’s most powerful municipal unions—sworn enemies of Giuliani. In 
short, Satellite failed to meet the administration’s test of delivering child care services 
“on the cheap” and the program was defunded.  
  
However, Satellite was only the first shot across the bow in a protracted struggle that pit 
the city (and New York State) against a coalition of community organizations and labour 
unions seeking to raise wages, working conditions, and quality standards, in the city’s 
home child care sector. Whereas the program sought to organize the “poor mother’s 
nanny” on a small-scale, other activists dreamt big. By 2002, community organizations 
such as ACORN and FUREE were strategizing citywide home child care worker 
organizing campaigns (Interview 12; Interview 15). Two years later, ACORN would be 
joined by one of the city’s most powerful unions, the United Federation of Teachers. 
Together, they set out to give voice to the grievances of the “poor mother’s nanny” and 
raise wages, working conditions, and standards in the New York City’s home child care 
sector.108 
 
4. In Defense of Family Daycare: The FUREE Child Care Campaign (2001-2005) 
 
Founded in 2001, Families United for Racial and Economic Equality (FUREE) is a 
Brooklyn-based community organization led by poor women of colour. According to its 
mission statement, FUREE is “committed to fighting structural racism, classism and 
sexism” and believes “that those directly affected by the policies we are seeking to 
                                                
108 By 2007, campaigns to unionize home-based providers had occurred or were 
underway in at least fourteen states (Reese 2011).  
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change should lead the organization” (FUREE 2008). In its organizing with poor Black 
and Latino women, its focus on popular education and the development of grassroots 
leadership, and recognition of the intersections of race, class, and gender justice, FUREE 
is grounded in the legacy and traditions of the welfare rights movement. And like that 
movement, FUREE demands that all women’s work be socially recognized and 
economically valued: “we organize low-income families to build power to change the 
system so that all people's work is valued and all of us have the right and economic 
means to decide and live out our own destinies” (FUREE 2008).  
 
FUREE was founded as a welfare rights’ organization when fifteen women on public 
assistance came together to demand access to education and training in WEP. Towards 
this end, the group participated in one of the city’s first anti-WEP coalitions and built its 
base amongst women on public assistance in downtown Brooklyn. The group’s founding 
membership included a number of family daycare providers, some of whom had recently 
transitioned from welfare to paid child care work, while others were experienced 
providers (Interview 11). Since the early 2000s, FUREE has taken on a range of issues 
affecting low-income families in Brooklyn, including welfare justice, health care, 
gentrification and the protection of public housing. While the organization engages in 
lobbying and advocacy, FUREE places a strong emphasis on direct action and 
community mobilization. Through these tactics, the organization seeks to pressure local 
and state politicians to pass progressive, pro-poor policies (Interview 11).  
 
“Us child care providers are treated just like women on welfare … not in a respectable 
way”: The Stop the Shutdowns! Campaign 
 
In June 2001, at the height of welfare reform, FUREE held its annual leadership retreat 
where members strategized future campaigns and set the organization’s agenda for the 
coming year. In small groups discussions, women talked about the connections between 
the interests of welfare mothers and home child care providers (Interview 11). On the one 
hand, FUREE members who were on public assistance expressed frustration at the lack of 
stable, quality child care arrangements in their neighbourhoods. The shortage of adequate 
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many had been sanctioned by their case managers as a result. On the other, members who 
were family daycare providers complained that they were not being reimbursed by the 
city in time to pay their bills, if reimbursed at all. A consequence of this was a growing 
number of family day providers who were refusing to accept HRA vouchers, 
exacerbating the shortage of regulated care in the Brooklyn neighbourhoods FUREE 
members called home (Interview 12).   
 
While this dynamic might have been a source for tension between the two groups, 
FUREE organizers built solidarity between providers and TANF mothers rooted in their 
shared lived experiences as poor women of colour and their mistreatment by the city’s 
welfare bureaucracy. Engaging in feminist consciousness-raising, providers and welfare 
recipients shared stories and found common ground for collective struggle. According to 
one FUREE member who was a family daycare provider, “us providers are treated just 
like women on welfare … not in a respectable way” (Interview 12). As an organizer 
observed, some of FUREE’s home child care providers “had come off the welfare rolls, 
so they understood the needs of those members still on public assistance” (Interview 12).  
 
After these discussions, FUREE decided to organize at the intersection of welfare and 
child care and launch a campaign that centred on economic justice for welfare recipients 
and home child care workers. The campaign sought to bring low-income parents together 
with family daycare providers to fight “so that all work is valued and respected equally” 
(FUREE 2004). In researching the home childcare sector, FUREE quickly learned about 
other issues facing providers—their lack of health insurance, sick days, overtime pay, and 
paid vacation time—which impacted their livelihoods and ability to “do their jobs” (ibid.) 
According to one organizer, “we came to realize how connected parents and providers 
issues were, because when providers are treated poorly, parents can’t keep their jobs, go 
to school, or comply with workfare requirements” (Interview 12).  
 
By 2004, FUREE’s home child care campaign had began in earnest. The organization 
devoted one of its staff organizers—a former welfare recipient—full-time to the 
campaign. She was joined by a well-respected family child care provider and veteran 
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FUREE activist (Interview 12). In the campaign’s initial stages, FUREE members who 
were home child care providers conducted outreach to friends, family and acquaintances 
who also operated home daycares. In addition, members with children in home child care 
encouraged their providers to attend organizing meetings and get involved in the 
campaign. In a sector in which workers lack a common worksite, this outreach and 
popular education was vital to breaking providers’ isolation and building a grassroots 
network of activist child care providers.  
 
According to organizers, the common grievances of family daycare providers, 
particularly the issue of late payments from the city, fuelled the rapid growth of the 
campaign. While only three providers attended the campaign’s founding meeting, within 
a few months time FUREE was organizing with just over two hundred dues-paying child 
care providers and an additional number who did not pay dues (Interview 12). Prior to the 
campaign, FUREE’s total membership stood at approximately three hundred—family 
daycare providers now made up the bulk of the organization’s membership.  
 
The child care campaign was to centre on two issues considered “vital to providers’ 
survival” (FUREE 2008). First, the late reimbursement payments from HRA and ACS, 
and second, the matter of the city’s aggressive health and safety inspections. The latter 
issue took priority as city inspectors were threatening to close hundreds of family 
daycares on the grounds that they were “unsafe”. While FUREE was steadfast in its 
support for quality child care, members argued that the New York State Office of 
Children and Family Services, working with the city’s fire and health departments, were 
targeting family daycares in poor neighbourhoods and unfairly applying new, and very 
unclear, safety regulations (Interview 12). Most of these daycares were housed in older 
buildings, including the public housing projects in which many providers resided. New 
rules around “methods of egress” (i.e. exiting a building) put hundreds of daycares in 
violation of the city’s fire code.  
 
According to one organizer, the closures threatened to displace “thousands of children 
who come from low-income households already living with a salary that is way below 
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what is now minimum wage and cannot find other services with the same quality of care 
or better” (Interview 12).109 The aggressive inspection campaign left 600 daycare 
providers on the brink of being shut down, “without regard to how this will affect 
providers, parents, and the financial stability of the community” (Gaton 2008: 5). Given 
their low-incomes, providers could not afford to renovate their places of residence to 
bring them to code; even if they could, most family daycare operators were tenants and 
would have to negotiate renovations with their landlords  (Gaton 2008: 5). Closures on 
this scale would drastically reduce the supply of regulated child care in a number of 
Brooklyn’s poorest neighbourhoods, just as the city ramped up efforts to push poor 
mothers off public assistance. Ironically, the closures threatened the livelihoods of 
women who had transitioned from welfare into paid care work, struggling to establish 
their own home daycares (Interview 12).  
 
FUREE devised the “Stop the Shutdowns!” campaign and set about organizing with 
South Brooklyn Legal Services, their allies on city council, and daycare networks to 
which some of the providers were affiliated. FUREE made a three-pronged argument 
against the new inspection regime. The new regulations and inspection process not only 
threatened subsidized child care slots, but also jeopardized child care quality as new 
providers stood to lose their licenses. Low-income children were already at risk of being 
placed in unregulated and unsafe child care settings due to the lack of subsidies; the mass 
closure of family daycares would only exacerbate the city’s child care crisis.  Second, 
appealing to the logic of welfare reform, FUREE argued that the state’s policies 
threatened to undermine the very employment supports poor women needed to get off 
welfare and into paid work, “as there will be no one to care for their children.” 
Organizers pointed out that “family daycare is an extremely flexible personalized type of 
daycare that is an essential support for many low-income families to exit poverty” 
                                                
109 For instance, providers were being shut down for using a small underpass at the side 
of their homes for an exit and the state required a backyard have at least fifty feet of 
space to qualify as an emergency exit. Such regulations did not fit most of Brooklyn’s 
housing stock, including public housing projects—which are fireproof buildings—and 
most housing in low-income neighbourhoods. As co-chair of FUREE’s board, Beverly 
Corbin, argued, “If it is unsafe to provide child care in these buildings then it is unsafe to 
live in them” (FUREE nd.: 3).  
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(FUREE 2004: 1). Finally, organizers made the point that the “home-grown economy of 
providers who reinvest money back into their communities” would be significantly 
eroded by the closures, possibly pushing family daycare providers to rely on public 
assistance  (FUREE 2004: 1). This was counterproductive to the Giuliani administration’s 
aims of promoting “economic independence” for the poor.   
 
Stop the Shutdowns made a number demands on the city and state: first, that providers be 
given access to easy to understand regulations concerning the safety of children in their 
care; second, that inspectors and providers be trained and educated about the new 
regulations; third, that the process of policy change to be made transparent and public; 
and lastly, FUREE insisted that a pool of money be made available as a one-time “facility 
improvement grant” to save family daycares from closing or going “off the books”. 
Combined, these interventions would “protect the vital supply of child care in low-
income communities, while continuing to work for the safety of children in home-based 
day care centres” (FUREE 2004: 2); an agenda that both family daycare providers and 
parents could rally around.  
 
In order to ramp up on pressure on City Hall, FUREE did intensive research to determine 
the actual number of child care slots at risk if the closures proceeded as planned. 
Organizers believed that illustrating the scale of the problem would be an effective 
strategy to complement a series of rallies and press releases. According to this research, 
in three of Brooklyn’s highest-needs neighbourhoods—African-American communities 
with high rates of poverty and a low supply of regulated child care—anywhere from 51 
percent to 91 percent of family daycare spaces could be lost. A detailed report was made 
public and provided to New York City council and the mayor’s office (Interview 12).  
 
FUREE then issued press releases to publicize the report and met individually with city 
councillors representing Brooklyn districts—all sympathetic to the cause. Of particular 
help was Yvette Clarke, an African-American councillor and former family daycare 
operator. Clarke coordinated city council opposition to the new regulations (Interview 
12). In addition, FUREE directed its lobbying at the chairs of the health and public 
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housing committees at city hall and New York State assembly members in Albany. The 
campaign made ample use research by organizations like CCI, emphasizing that finding 
regulated child care in the New York “was next to impossible” (FUREE nd.: 3). In doing 
so, FUREE hammered home that the interests of family daycare providers and low-
income families were united in the campaign.  
 
“Parents and providers are literally in tears”: Media Coverage of Stop the Shutdowns! 
 
Given the media’s interest in the city’s escalating child care crisis (see previous chapter), 
the Stop the Shutdowns campaign was picked up by a number of newspapers. In addition 
to coverage of FUREE’s rallies outside the state Office of Family and Children Services, 
community newspapers in Brooklyn and the city’s major dailies ran stories on providers 
who had been forced to close, leaving low-income families stranded without child care 
(see Grace 2005; Bleyer 2006). The New York Times ran an article featuring family 
daycare provider and FUREE board member, Sandra Robinson, in which Robinson 
pleaded with the city and state, saying “Everybody’s (parents and providers) are literally 
in tears. Women who’ve had a license for twenty-five years in the same place, on the 
same floor, are now being shut down. There’s no other choice but to change the policy” 
(qtd. in Bleyer 2006: 14). Robinson’s voice was featured in a number of articles, 
becoming FUREE’s media spokesperson (see Bleyer 2006; Robinson and Berger 2006).  
 
At the height of the media coverage, the New York Daily News ran a debate pitting the 
Associate Commissioner of the Health Department’s Bureau of Day Care against 
Robinson and FUREE director Ilana Berger. While the Commissioner argued that the 
new policies balanced “safety with the growing demand for quality child care in New 
York City” (Marcus 2006: 40), Robinson and Berger called the new rules “senseless”, 
saying they did “nothing to improve quality” and threatened “the survival of 600 city 
daycares, where about 5,000 kids are served” (2006: 40). Contra the Commissioner, 
Robinson and Berger argued that quality and safety were in fact being jeopardized by the 
closures as families were being forced to use license-exempt, unregulated child care or 
“underground” daycares.  
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At a FUREE press conference, a provider, whose family daycare had been closed by 
inspectors, broke down in tears saying that she had slipped into depression since losing 
her business (Malcolm 2006: 3). It was an emotional illustration of the toll the city’s 
policies were having on home child care providers struggling to make ends meet. At the 
same press conference, FUREE organizers extolled the virtues of family daycare, arguing 
that “the state’s narrow definition of safety does not even begin to take into account the 
many factors that contribute to a child’s safety in the community, and quality child care is 
one of the most important ways to keep children safe” (qtd. in Witt 2006). The media 
coverage was overwhelmingly positive. FUREE was able to clearly convey the message 
that daycare closures were negatively impacting providers and parents, that the 
alternative to family daycare was unregulated and unsafe, and that the city and state were 
deaf to the concerns of providers, parents, and low-income communities in general. In the 
court of public opinion, FUREE had gained the upper hand. 
 
The Shutdowns Stopped 
 
With positive press coverage and campaign momentum building, FUREE and its allies on 
city council successfully pressured the Giuliani administration into negotiations with state 
bureaucrats to resolve the building and fire code issues. In 2008, changes were made to 
state regulations, adapting key aspects of the code to reflect the realities of the city’s 
older housing stock (Gaton 2008; Interview 11). FUREE was also successful in 
convincing the city to fund necessary repairs to their providers places of residence and to 
help with relocation costs should they have to move to stay in business (Interview11). 
According to FUREE, these changes saved hundreds of daycares from being shut down 
and built further support amongst home child care providers (Interview 11). With the 
success of Stop the Shutdowns, FUREE decided to launch a campaign to raise the 
“market rate”—the reimbursement rate paid to providers by the state for the care of 
subsidized children.  
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However, two other organizations, the Association of Community Organizations for 
Reform Now (ACORN) and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), had embarked on 
their own campaign to organize home child care providers across New York City.110 
ACORN and UFT sought to build on the experiences of home health care providers’ 
unions in states like Illinois and California. Since the 1980s, unions like the Service 
Employees International Union had been developing a model of home care worker 
unionism, which took into account the non-traditional nature of home-based work, home 
health care providers’ ambiguous and problematic employment status, and their exclusion 
from traditional protections under employment and labour law (see Brooks 2005; Boris 
and Klein 2008, 2012).  
 
Through coalition-building with parents, senior citizens, and disability activists, home 
health care aides and their unions had pushed state governments to pass legislation and/or 
executive orders which defined the state as an employer for the purposes of collective 
bargaining, opening the way to unionization (see Boris and Klein 2008). The coalitions 
articulated the linkages between the interests of care providers and care consumers in that 
low-wages, poor working conditions, and high turnover in the home care workforce had a 
deleterious effect on the quality of services. As Boris and Klein (2008: 32) observe, these 
unions “asked for respect, dignity, higher wages, and improved conditions for the users of 
their services”. And this model of organizing had started to bear fruit: in 1999, 74,000 
Los Angeles home health care aides voted to join SEIU, the largest successful union 
drive since the Great Depression (Boris and Klein 2008).  
 
As subsidized informal and family daycare exploded in the wake of welfare reform, 
unions like SEIU believed their model of home care worker unionism could be applied to 
the growing home child care workforce (Brooks 2005). In 2003, Illinois’s Democratic 
governor, Rod Blagojevich, issued an executive order classifying home child care 
providers as employees of the state for the purposes of collective bargaining (Brooks 
                                                
110 ACORN had tried and failed to organize providers in 2002-2003 but returned to 
organizing after forming a partnership with UFT. This produced some tension between 
ACORN and FUREE as the latter had stuck with the campaign and won important gains 
(Interview 11).  
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2005). The order gave home child care workers the right to unionize, while maintaining 
their independent contractor status, and required the state to engage in collective 
negotiations with workers’ representative, the SEIU, over issues such as reimbursement 
rates, health insurance, working conditions, training and professional development (Blank 
et al. 2010).  
 
Rather than bringing providers into a community-based organization like FUREE, which 
relied almost exclusively on direct action and community mobilization to win gains, 
ACORN and UFT sought recognition from the state. It was through unionization and 
collective bargaining, they insisted, that New York City’s home child care workforce 
could best build their collective power, win improvements in wages and working 
conditions, a voice in the development of child care programs, and expand public 
investment in child care overall.   
 
FUREE had demonstrated that despite the absence of a common worksite and a 
traditional employee-employer relationship, home child care workers could be organized 
to defend their interests and those of the families they served. Furthermore, the common 
grievances, and shared social location, of welfare recipients and the “poor mother’s 
nanny” was fertile ground for this organizing and the emergence of a social movement 
that could challenge the city and state’s child care policies. Yet FUREE recognized its 
own limits as a relatively small, grassroots organization. While they could engage in 
advocacy and direct action, unlike a union, they could not represent providers in 
collective bargaining (Interview 12). Plus, ACORN and UFT were powerful actors in 
New York City politics, wielding far greater financial and political clout than the 
Brooklyn-based group. And UFT had political muscle in the state capital of Albany, 
allowing New York City home child care providers to more effectively scale-up their 
struggle to where many of the policies shaping the home child care sector were made. 
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A New Mayor in Town: From Giuliani to Bloomberg  
 
2002 marked the end of the Giuliani era and the election of Michael Bloomberg. ACORN 
and the UFT would have to confront a new mayor, but one who cut from the same 
political cloth as his predecessor. Bloomberg left Giuliani’s welfare-to-work program 
largely intact, making a few minor concessions to welfare rights campaigners (Interview 
7). And while the new mayor reopened policy channels for child care advocates, as 
advocates quickly discovered, access did not necessarily equal influence (Interview 25).  
In its first two years in office, the Bloomberg administration did not chart a radically 
different direction in child care. As a 2004 report by New York’s leading welfare rights 
organization, the Welfare Law Centre (WLC), observed “despite a child care budget that 
exceeds half a billion dollars—children continue to be placed at risk by poor and patched-
together care” (Scharf and Carlson 2004: 3). 
 
WLC’s Lost in the Maze (Scharf and Carlson 2004) documented how little progress had 
been made since the passage of federal welfare reform in 1996. The city’s subsidy 
waiting list had grown to 38,000 families and the lack of access to affordable care was 
impeding “the ability of low income families to attain economic security” (ibid.: 4). The 
“confusing array of bureaucracies” that delivered child care services meant many eligible 
families did not receive the support to which they were entitled. Overall, New York 
City’s child care system was “bureaucratically complex and makes access for low income 
families often difficult and all-too-often impossible” (ibid.: 6).  
 
Despite sustained activism and advocacy, many of the front-line practices of the city’s 
welfare bureaucracy lingered on: TANF mothers still had less than a week to find full-
time child care arrangements before the start of their work assignment, and case 
managers “routinely pressed cash assistance recipients to seek child care from a friend, 
family member, or neighbour” (ibid.: 9). Furthermore, there had been little expansion of 
regulated child care in twelve of the city’s high-needs neighbourhoods, where the child 
care crisis was most acute. The positives were that fewer public assistance families were 
relying on unregulated, license-exempt care and the use of sanctions to were less 
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frequently used to punish welfare recipients for failure to find adequate child care had 
diminished (ibid. 2004).  
 
In the final years of the Dinkins’ administration, the Temporary Commission on Early 
Childhood Services scrutinized the city’s public child care services and urged civic 
leaders to overhaul the system, make it more accessible, and expand the city’s high-
quality, centre-based child care infrastructure to keep up with rising demand. Despite an 
unprecedented expansion of the child care budget between 1996 and 2003, none of the 
Commission’s recommendations had been implemented (ibid.). Mayor Rudy Giuliani had 
overseen eight years of privatization, retrenchment, and deregulation and Mayor 
Bloomberg looked set on pursuing similar policies. Welfare rights groups, child care 
advocates, and labour movement activists had valiantly fought this agenda with notable, 
but nonetheless few victories.  
 
5. Unionizing Home Child Care Providers: The ACORN-UFT Campaign (2005-
2007) 
 
As previously mentioned, the seeds of home child care worker organizing had been 
planted by community groups in the early 2000s. Organizations like FUREE, the Welfare 
Law Center, and South Brooklyn Legal Services shifted resources from welfare rights 
advocacy to projects aimed at giving voice to the grievances of the “poor mother’s 
nanny”. These seeds would grow into a citywide effort to unionize home-based providers 
as the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) and its ally, ACORN, built upon the 
important work of FUREE. Together, UFT and ACORN would build support amongst 
the city’s home child care providers, win back pay from city agencies, and eventually 
secure the right to unionize and collectively bargain with the state over reimbursement 
rates, benefits, training opportunities, and regulations governing the provision of home-
based care. They would do so by mobilizing around home child care workers’ quasi-
public status, as public employees and children’s “first teachers”, who provided an 
essential social service caring for children during their critical early development years.    
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Now defunct, ACORN was a national social justice organization with community-based 
chapters across the US. The organization emerged out of the welfare rights movement in 
the 1970s but had gone on to organize around a range of social and economic justice 
issues facing low-income urban communities (see Tait 2005). Like FUREE, ACORN had 
a presence in New York City’s low-income racialized neighbourhoods. And also like the 
Brooklyn group, some of ACORN’s members were themselves home child care providers 
fed up with delayed payments from the city, harassment by health inspectors, and the 
general precariousness of their work.  
 
As one of ACORN’s lead organizers explained: 
 
In 2002, a few child care providers, all members of ACORN, came in and told our staff organizer 
that they loved being child care providers, but that the working conditions were so awful, they 
were actually considering quitting. They talked about never knowing when they would get paid by 
the city, about being harassed by inspectors, and feeling like they had no one to turn to for support 
(Interview 14) 
 
Sensing these grievances were the raw material for an organizing campaign, ACORN 
used their neighbourhood chapters to canvass providers across the city, gauging their 
receptiveness to collective action (Interview 14). A community meeting soon followed in 
which child care providers from all five boroughs discussed their grievances and voiced 
their determination to build collective strength. According to one organizer, “providers 
decided they wanted to get organized to fight for the right to form an entity that could 
negotiate with the city and state for better working conditions” (Interview 14). Yet in the 
months that followed, a small group of around 200 providers found it hard to build 
momentum and experienced limited success in their lobbying efforts: “we were unable to 
get anywhere with our fight,” said one organizer, “it had become very clear that our 
campaign did not get very far because we did not have the kind of political pull we 
needed in order to really create change from the city to state level” (Interview 14). 
 
By 2005, ACORN staff had determined that an established union would better serve the 
home child care workforce (Interview 14). The community group reached out to the 
United Federation of Teachers, the city’s largest teachers’ union. ACORN chose the UFT 
for a number of reasons: First, ACORN had a healthy working relationship with the UFT, 
 
 
204 
having partnered together on a number of campaigns, including successfully fighting the 
growth of non-union charter schools in the city’s education system (Interview 14). 
Second, the organizations agreed that a campaign to organize child care providers should 
be framed in the language of professionalism; a campaign which sought to earn respect 
for children’s “first teachers”. Publicly, the UFT said it wanted to represent child care 
providers because of their important yet undervalued role in the education system 
(Interview 14). Teacher unionism had been built on the idea that through collective 
bargaining and political action, teachers could secure quality working conditions and a 
quality education system. And as FUREE had demonstrated, framing home child care 
struggles as one to improve the quality of child care had resonated with parents, 
policymakers, and the broader public. As a teachers union, the UFT was uniquely poised 
to represent home child care providers on these terms. Finally, ACORN was convinced 
that the 150,000 member strong union had the political clout and financial resources to 
make the campaign a success (Interview 14).  
 
After an initial planning meeting, in the spring of 2005 home child care worker 
organizing recommenced after a three-year hiatus. ACORN acquired a list of the city’s 
subsidized home child care providers from the Administration of Children’s Services and 
put together a team of twenty full-time organizers to survey providers and gauge support 
for unionization (Interview 15) . Given that providers lacked a common worksite, like 
FUREE, ACORN had to organize through social networks, often through kith and kin, 
and through its local neighbourhood chapters. ACORN members who had children in 
home child care alerted their providers to the campaign. Providers themselves spread the 
word to other members of their community. In addition, ACORN and UFT engaged in a 
citywide door-knocking campaign, focused in those neighbourhoods with a high number 
of home child care providers. As one provider put it “We knew that with 28,000 
providers we had to do a serious grassroots effort so that meant knocking on doors rain or 
shine” (Interview 18). The response was overwhelmingly positive: In just three months, 
organizers had collected 6,000 union card signatures and held a founding meeting with 
over 250 women (Interview 14).  
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Numerous obstacles faced the campaign. Providers’ feared that organizing would upset 
the agency-run child care networks to which some of them belonged, and could result in a 
network’s refusal to place children with pro-union providers. Then there was the prospect 
of a protracted struggle to win recognition from the State. Like in Illinois, providers had 
to secure legislation or an executive order that defined them as employees of the state for 
the purposes of unionization and collective bargaining, to say nothing of securing a first 
contract. There were cultural barriers as well: ACORN and UFT were bringing together 
Hispanic and African-American providers and more than 40 percent of the nascent group 
spoke Spanish exclusively (Interview 15) 
 
But perhaps the most difficult challenge, according to organizers, “was getting providers 
to believe that change was possible. That is if providers came together and organized, 
they could really change the way their work was viewed and compensated” (Interview 
15). To this end, the union and ACORN held meetings in the city’s five boroughs in 
which hundreds of providers participated. Organizers conducted leadership development, 
discussing issues of power and respect (Interview 14). A group of around fifty rank-and-
file leaders began to lead the meetings and worked to convince their fellow providers that 
like the teachers represented by UFT, they were educators who deserved to be treated 
with respect and dignity by the city and by demanding public investment in training and 
professional development, they would collectively enhance the quality of the care they 
provided, benefiting themselves and the families and communities they served  
(Interview 15). 
 
Providers discovered they were experiencing the same problems regardless of where they 
lived in the city, how long they had been in the profession, or how many children they 
had in their care. The three primary issues were: disrespect from the city agencies they 
dealt with; inspectors who were arbitrary and intimidating; and market rates which 
relegated many providers to a life of poverty (Interview 18). As FUREE’s child care 
providers had argued, in their interactions with the city, home child care providers felt 
they were treated “like women on welfare” (Interview 18). These conversations were 
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essential to breaking the isolation home child care providers experienced and building 
their capacities for collective action. As one rank-and-file leader explained: 
 
When reaching out to other providers, we would say, “I am a provider like you. Here are the 
problems I’m having. Are you having these problems too?” So our strategy was simple: tell our 
story and hear their story. In listening to others stories we immediately validated them as 
professionals. Part of the problem with being a provider is you are isolated and when you are 
disrespected it impacts your life and how you view yourself. When we reached out to other 
providers to hear about their lives, about their profession, it totally validated them. They wanted to 
commit to the union and make change for themselves. (Interview 18) 
 
This last point was crucial. Home child care was favoured by the Giuliani administration 
because it was cheap, non-union, and “responsive” to demand. Unlike the city’s daycare 
workers, the home child care workforce was relatively invisible, isolated, and politically 
weak. Yet in receipt of state funds to care for the children of low-income families, these 
providers had emerged as a quasi-public sector workforce. This status opened the legal 
and discursive space for home-based child care providers to collectively organize and 
make claims on the state as public employees providing an essential social service—as 
children’s’ “first teachers” and as educators—not “nannies” or “babysitters”. By 
mitigating the precarious nature of home child care work, a collective agreement could 
stabilize the home child care workforce and improve the quality of care for low-income 
children who were overrepresented in the sector. The campaign would have to convince 
the state that investment in home child care—in wages and benefits, training and 
professional development—was an investment in improving child care quality and 
enhancing the “school readiness” of low-income children (UFT 2005).  
 
Despite these obstacles, after months of grassroots organizing, in October of 2005 the 
UFT held a rally in which 1,300 providers participated (Interview 15). It was a clear 
show of strength, putting the City and State on notice that providers were capable of mass 
mobilization and serious in their commitment to organize. From here, providers exercised 
their new found strength to win some significant victories, including back pay totalling 
over $130,000—owed to providers by HRA and ACS—and a program to reimburse out-
of-pocket expenses for supplies and learning materials (Interview 15). They also asserted 
their voice in policymaking: through demonstrations and lobbying, providers demanded 
and won set meetings with ACS and the Department of Health in which they discussed 
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ongoing problems with communication, payment delays and paystub issues, as well as 
concerns with the health and safety inspection process.  
 
According to organizers, these victories gave providers greater belief in the power of 
collective action and the union (Interview 14; Interview 15). As one of the campaign’s 
strategists put it, “even before we won the right to represent providers as a union, we 
were trying to function as a union” (Interview 14). As one rank and file provider 
explained, if they failed to make progress in negotiations with the city, for example, “we 
would rev up our strategy … do a rally or press conference, or attend a city council 
hearing. Anything to stay visible and in their faces to let them know we were not going 
anywhere until they made the changes and corrected the problem” (Interview 18). Rather 
than dealing with city agencies one-on-one, providers confronted the state in solidarity 
with one another.  
 
Yet the biggest obstacle to formal unionization remained state labour laws. To win 
recognition, the UFT, ACORN, and AFSCME (which had established an agreement with 
the UFT for organizing jurisdiction outside of New York City) sought to leverage their 
formidable political power in Albany. To do so, the organizations broadened their 
coalition to include New York State’s social democratic Working Families Party, 
influential church ministers, and members of the Black and Latino Legislative Caucus.  
And fortunately, the political winds at the state level had begun to shift. A gubernatorial 
election was on the horizon and the Democratic candidate, Elliot Spitzer, was polling 
well ahead of his Republican challenger. There were also a broader shift in the discourse 
around child care that could be seen as favouring the providers’ cause. As some observers 
have argued by the mid-2000s, the popularization of research into the benefits of early 
childhood education and care was beginning to convince policymakers, even a few 
conservatives, that public investment in child care was positive for children, families, and 
the economy (Polakow 2007).  
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For Justice and Respect 
 
After months of lobbying and flexing of political muscle, the coalition assembled by 
ACORN and UFT convinced a Republican-controlled State Senate to unanimously pass a 
bill establishing the State of New York as subsidized home child care providers’ sole 
employer of record for the purposes of collective bargaining, giving providers the right to 
unionize (Gregory 2008). The Democrat-controlled Assembly soon followed. According 
to the bill’s sponsor, the unionization would give home child care providers a collective 
voice and representation in the State’s child care assistance program, help ensure quality 
care, facilitate higher standards for the children and families served, and improve the 
delivery of services (see Gregory 2008: 287).  
 
However the victory was short-lived as the outgoing Republican Governor, George 
Pataki, exercised his veto, squashing the bill. In doing so, he relied on old arguments 
about the nature of state-supported home care work, arguing that it was “a blatant legal 
fiction to characterize these providers as public employees” and that unionization would 
jeopardize federal child care funding (Gregory 2008: 277). Furthermore, Pataki claimed 
that providers would be taking precious child care dollars out of the hands of families and 
putting them into union coffers, would jeopardize federal child care funding, and make 
child care too costly for the State’s low-income families (Greenhouse 2007). 
 
Mayor Bloomberg joined Pataki in opposition to the union. The mayor argued that 
unionizing home daycare providers would cost the city up to $100 million a year in 
increased wages and benefits (Greenhouse 2007). Others close to the mayor made similar 
arguments. The neoliberal Manhattan Institute exclaimed unionization would “increase 
day care costs for everybody,” but perhaps more disturbingly from the perspective of 
conservatives, it would “increase the power of the states’ most powerful unions” (as qtd. 
in Greenhouse 2007). Similar concerns were expressed by one of New York State’s 
largest business lobbies, the Business Council of New York, arguing the State already 
had more public employees per capita than most other states and that the bill perpetuates 
a political culture that “serves the interests of those who get paid to provide public 
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services, more often than it does the people who are the ostensible beneficiaries of such 
services” (as qtd. in Gregory 2008: 290). Giuliani may have been gone, but the anti-union 
sentiments of New York’s elite remained strong.  
 
The UFT’s president, Randi Weingarten, countered by saying one of the primary goals of 
unionization was to not to shift dollars from parents to unions, but to improve training for 
home child care providers, raising standards for both providers and children. As 
Weingarten remarked, “I have a vision of educational unionism from birth through 
university. Here you have child care providers who are not just custodians of kids, but 
they can plan a pivotal role in teaching kids” (as qtd. in Greenhouse 2007). The New 
York State United Teachers union, the UFT local for upstate teachers, made a similar 
argument, stating that research “demonstrated that quality early childhood education 
results in greater achievement throughout ones educational experiences … investment in 
the quality and stability of early childcare workers correlates with better social and 
academic outcomes for children” (as qtd. in Gregory 2008). 
 
While the Senate voted to override Pataki’s veto, the UFT waited to work with soon to be 
elected Democratic Governor, Elliot Spitzer. Spitzer had made sympathetic overtures to 
providers during his election campaign, drawing his support from much the same base 
that made up ACORN/UFT coalition (Gregory 2008). Soon after taking office in 2007, 
the new governor issued an executive order classifying home child care providers as state 
employees for the purpose of collective bargaining and giving them the right to unionize. 
The order authorized state agencies to meet and confer with providers’ representatives in 
order to reach a contract that “may address the stability, funding and operation of child 
care programs; expansion of quality child care; and improvement of working conditions, 
including subsidies, benefits or payment, for child care providers” (NYS 2007).111 In the 
                                                
111 In keeping with New York State’s Taylor Law, which prohibits public employees 
right to strike, the executive order states that nothing in the order permits “the child care 
providers collectively to engage in any strike or work action to secure any right or 
privilege from the State.” The executive order does not render home child care providers 
state officers or employees and does not imply that there exists “any employer-employee 
relationship between the child care operator and the State … for any purpose, including 
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introduction to the order, Spitzer stated that home child care providers, “perform an 
essential service for working parents and guardians in this state, by creating a safe, 
enjoyable and educational home-like environment for their children” and that providers 
should be empowered to make decisions on issues that impact their services since they 
receive compensation and benefits “that are not commensurate with the value of the work 
they perform.” The executive order, according to Spitzer, would establish a “framework 
for child-care providers to secure representation [that] can help improve the environment 
in which they work, their benefits, and the funding they receive” (NY State 2007).  
 
While awaiting Spitzer’s executive order, UFT and ACORN had kept busy, organizing 
rallies and demonstrations and going door-to-door to solicit card signatures from home 
child care workers (UFT 2008). With Spitzer’s order in place, the UFT duly submitted 
12,000 union authorization cards to the State Employment Relations Board, which 
certified the union had enough cards for an election. In the ensuing election, 8382 
providers voted to join the UFT with only 96 voting no.112 The vote gave formal 
authorization for the UFT to act as a bargaining representative for New York City’s 
28,000 home child care providers.  Remarkably, it was the largest successful unionization 
campaign the city had seen in close to fifty years, when 45,000 teachers joined the UFT 
(Greenhouse 2007).  
 
After two years of negotiations, the UFT providers reached an agreement in principle 
with the state of New York on a first contract. Providers voted to ratify that contract in 
January 2010, with 3,658 ballots cast in favour and 54 against (Landau 2010). In the time 
between organizing and ratification, the union made some important steps forward. The 
                                                                                                                                            
but not limited to any public retirement system, membership in any public health 
insurance program, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, disability 
coverage, New York Civil Service Law, or indemnification under New York Public 
Officers Law.” In addition, the order provides that it no way interferes “with the existing 
relationship between consumers and the child care providers, including the existing rights 
of parents or guardians to choose their own provider, or to terminate that provider’s 
services at any time” (see N.Y. Exec Order. 2007; also Gregory 2008: 293-294). 
112 Under New York State labour law, if a majority of those workers who voted are in 
favour of unionization, the vote is binding upon all members of the bargaining unit.  
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UFT negotiated with ACS to improve the complaint and licensing renewal process and 
secured a two-week maximum turn-around time for issuing subsidy payments to 
providers (Interview 18). Furthermore, while the State adjusted market rates to account 
for the increased costs of providing child care, New York City, which is responsible for 
paying the rates, refused to respect the adjustment in violation of state law. Elected state 
officials applied pressure on the Bloomberg administration and providers held 
demonstrations, which included teachers and other members of UFT, demanding “justice 
and respect” (Landau 2010). Finally, in May 2009, some eighteen months after home 
child care providers had unionized, the city agreed to pay the market rate and make 
retroactive payments back to 2007.  
 
The Unionization Effect: Mitigating Precariousness and Raising Standards 
 
The unionization of home child care providers in New York City has mitigated the 
precariousness of their work, improved standards in the sector, and increased public 
investment in child care overall. In their first contract with the State, the UFT 
successfully negotiated an increase in the market rate, giving providers more money for 
each child in their care, and raising their incomes. With regard to benefits, the first 
contract guarantees health insurance for all providers to be phased in over a period of 
four years. The state has also agreed to assist with liability and disability insurance.  
 
In terms of child care quality, the contract provides funding for professional development 
and grants to upgrade providers’ skills. The union and the state will collaborate to 
determine how funds will be allocated. Training will be conducted by the union in UFT-
sponsored teacher centres, in addition to opportunities through the child care resource and 
referral agencies such as Child Care Inc. The contract also includes a grant to help 
licensed family daycare providers purchase supplies and upgrade their facilities; prior to 
unionization, this was an economic burden shouldered solely by providers. Furthermore, 
funds have been made available to facilitate the transition of informal providers into 
licensed providers, allowing these workers to qualify for a higher market rate while 
improving the quality of previously unlicensed, unregulated care (UFT 2010).  
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In terms of employee voice, the first contract includes the development of a new 
grievance procedure in consultation with the State. Providers will be able to use the 
procedure to resolve payment and contract disputes as well as licensure and inspection 
issues that impact their work environment. This measure will help to ensure that local 
administrations, in this case, New York City, comply with payment procedures and 
regulations that the union has negotiated with the State. In addition, the union will have 
regular meetings with the various government agencies that regulate home child care 
work, including ACS, the city’s Department of Health, and the state Office of Child and 
Family Services. Through these meetings, the union will have voice in shaping rules and 
regulations. Speaking about the first contract, Tammie Miller, chair of the UFT Providers 
chapter, said, “There was a time when providers were disrespected by the city and state 
of New York. Those days are over” (UFT 2010).   
 
In summary, UFT’s efforts to unionize New York City’s home child care providers has 
resulted in improved wages and working conditions for providers, and elevated standards 
in the home child care sector. Along with ACORN, the UFT made visible the work of 
home child care and broke the isolation providers’ experienced. Collectively, providers 
challenged the policies that contributed to the devaluation of their work, winning 
recognition, respect, and the right to unionize and collectively bargain. They did so 
through grassroots mobilization and political lobbying, building a strong coalition 
capable of scaling-up providers struggles from the city to the state. In receipt of public 
funds for the care of low-income children, the campaign leveraged home child care 
workers’ quasi-public status to make claims on the state as public employees providing 
an essential social service. Perhaps most importantly, home child care providers now 
have an organized political presence in the city and state, which allows them to mobilize 
for increased public funding for child care overall, improving their livelihoods while 
expanding access to regulated, high-quality child care for New York City’s low-income 
families.  
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The Missing Players 
 
There were some important absences in the politics of resistance at the intersection of 
welfare and child care in New York, including the unions representing the city’s daycare 
workers and their supervisors, AFSCME District Council 1707, Local 205, and the 
Council of School Supervisors and Administrators, Local 1, respectively. At first glance, 
these unions appeared to have much to lose from federal and state welfare dollars flowing 
to non-union providers in informal and family daycare. Yet, according to representatives 
of DC 1707, as welfare reform saw demand for child care at a high and the city’s daycare 
centres fully enrolled—providing relative job security for their workforce—DC 1707 and 
the CSA did not consider this trend an immediate threat (Interview 20). As a senior 
policy analyst with DC 1707 put it: 
 
The fact that HRA workers were pressuring public assistance parents to find a relative or 
neighbour to take of their child as quickly as possible in no way reduced the enrolment in our 
unionized centres … What we all did see that it was clearly harming the public assistance children 
and their families by denying them access to the safe, reliable nurturing child care and early 
childhood education that our centres could provide, without which these at-risk children would be 
bound to fall behind their peers when they started school and they would never be able to catch up 
(Interview 20). 
 
Rather than challenge the expansion of informal care directly, DC 1707 put resources into 
a state-wide union coalition lobbying Albany for increased funding for quality child care. 
This coalition had some success in winning more subsidies for moderate-income working 
families and expanded access to child care for union families in particular (Firestine and 
Dones 2007).113 Furthermore, DC 1707 claimed that it was policies implemented long 
                                                
113 A year after Giuliani’s election to office, a new coalition formed committed to a 
comprehensive child care, work, and family agenda (see Firestone and Dones 2007). The 
New York Union Child Care Coalition (NYUCCC) was founded by ten of the city’s 
unions including the powerful SEIU 1199, a progressive union with a history of 
organizing women of colour in the city’s health care sector. The coalition grew to include 
twenty-five unions and won official recognition from NYC’s Central Labour Council and 
the New York state AFL-CIO. The coalition’s goal was to link union efforts in New York 
City to a statewide child care agenda, pushing politicians in Albany to expand funding 
and services for quality child care. The Federation of Protestant Welfare Agencies, a key 
advocate for the city’s welfare recipients would eventually join the coalition, but no poor 
people’s organizations or welfare rights groups were founding members. While based in 
the city, the NYUCCC primary scale of contestation would be the state. The coalition 
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after welfare reform—including complex changes to eligibility and enrolment regulations 
implemented by the Bloomberg administration—that would become the focus of their 
unions. It was these changes, DC 1707 has argued, that led to under-enrolment in 
unionized daycare centres and their chronic under-funding under Bloomberg (Interview 
20).114  
 
However, there are unanswered questions as to why DC 1707 did not try to fight the 
privatization of child care under Giuliani by “following the work” and organizing the 
home child care workforce. Apparently the union did show some interest in organizing 
informal and family daycare providers. For one, DC 1707’s parent union, AFSCME, 
eventually organized home child care providers in upstate New York. And second, 
according to Schaller, Warner and Wagner (forthcoming), DC 1707 brought a claim 
against UFT at the AFL-CIO’s New York Labour Council (the labour federation in the 
state), which claimed home care workers were the natural constituency of the union. 
However, AFL-CIO determined that organizing home child care providers was within 
UFT’s jurisdictional right. Unfortunately, the complexities of this case fall beyond the 
scope of the research.  
 
Another absence in the politics of resistance was civil society actors defending the right 
of poor mothers to stay at home and care for their children. According to Reese (2011: 
20), in California and Wisconsin, local chapters of the Wages for Housework campaign 
and the welfare rights group Welfare Warriors took this position. Yet these organizations 
found few allies among welfare rights groups and few policymakers to actively support 
their demands. In both jurisdictions, as in New York City, demands to expand and 
improve subsidized child care, “which challenged the devaluation of paid child care and 
sought to defend and expand low-income working parents’ access to affordable child 
care” took priority (Reese 2011: 20). Even prior to neoliberal welfare reform, in the dying 
                                                                                                                                            
would not become directly involved in the municipal child care battles that proceeded 
federal welfare reform (Firestone and Dones 2007).  
 
114 The gradual rollout of full-day, or “universal”, pre-kindergarten under Bloomberg also 
contributed to under-enrolment in unionized daycares (Interview 20).   
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days of AFDC, the end of poor women’s right to care for their own children, always 
tenuous and seldom fully realized in US social policy, was considered a lost battle for 
many in the welfare rights movement.  As Reese (2011: 128) observes, the new gendered 
consensus—poor, able-bodied mothers were unworthy of aid and expected to work—in 
effect “discouraged all but a few welfare rights organizations from defending every 
mother’s right to care for her own children.” 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Chapter Three detailed how the Giuliani administration restructured the relationship 
between poor mothers, the state, and the market along neoliberal lines. In response to the 
city’s growing child care crisis, New York’s welfare bureaucracy channelled welfare 
mothers into relying on an expanding pool of precarious home child care providers to 
care for their children, systematically violating welfare recipients’ child care rights in the 
process, while shifting public resources away from New York’s centre-based child care 
infrastructure and its unionized workforce. For the Giuliani administration, home child 
care was the fastest and cheapest route for moving mothers from welfare into paid work. 
 
Providing child care at low-wages with no benefits, and excluded from employment 
protections and labour rights, home child care workers performed the care work of a 
neoliberalizing welfare state “on the cheap”. Other poor mothers were diverted from 
public assistance altogether and thereby denied access to much needed child care 
subsidies. As I have argued, these policies are best understood within the broader context 
of the neoliberalization of New York’s urban welfare state, as the Giuliani administration 
shifted costs of and responsibilities for social reproduction onto families/households and 
low-income communities. This project targeted the institutional legacies of the city’s 
urban social democracy, as political and economic elites sought to rollback the legacies 
of popular struggle and shrinks the size and scope of local government.  
 
As this chapter has illustrated, progressive actors in New York’s civil society challenged 
this agenda. In each case presented here, the state’s privatized efforts aimed at mediating 
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the child care crisis unleashed contradictions and opened space for resistance by social 
movements, including welfare rights groups, progressive lawyers, child care advocates, 
and the labour movement. Collectively, these movements sought to reshape the social 
organization of child care work on terms more favourable to poor mothers and the 
women who cared for their children.  
 
Child care advocates and welfare rights groups mobilized around the neoliberal rhetoric 
of “parental choice”, pushing the city to respect welfare recipients’ child care rights and 
allow welfare mothers true choice in child care. Through advocacy, research, and public 
outreach, they demonstrated that the city’s welfare bureaucracy denied welfare mothers a 
choice of child care arrangements, dispelling the myth that families on public assistance 
overwhelmingly preferred informal care. The evidence suggests that these groups had 
some success: fewer welfare mothers turned to informal arrangements for the care of 
their children and welfare caseworkers were instructed to provide welfare recipients with 
a range of child care options, including regulated care settings. In addition, the political 
pressure brought to bear on the city and State government resulted in greater regulation of 
the informal child care sector.  
 
In the case of Satellite Child Care, labour movement activists and child care advocates 
developed a new model of child care which provided quality care for the children of low-
income families and quality care work for welfare recipients transitioning into careers as 
family daycare providers. Satellite Child Care leveraged government grants typically 
used to fund local workfare experiments that sought to churn welfare recipients into the 
lower reaches of the labour market as quickly and as cheaply as possible, and often into 
low-paid care work. In contrast, Satellite provided an alternative welfare-to-work model, 
training welfare mothers as family daycare providers with secure, unionized employment 
at a living wage. Overall, Satellite mitigated the precariousness of home child care work. 
While eventually starved of funds, Satellite contested the city’s vision of “child care on 
the cheap,” demonstrating that another world of child care was in fact possible.  
 
Finally, by channelling public funds to non-union informal and family daycare providers, 
 
 
217 
the Giuliani administration facilitated the growth of the publicly subsidized home child 
care sector. In campaigns like those undertaken by FUREE, the shared grievances—and 
shared social location—of welfare recipients and home child care providers proved fertile 
ground for organizing. While these campaigns moved in fits and starts, they built the 
collective power of the home child care workforce and welfare recipients desperate for 
quality, affordable child care. FUREE’s Stop the Closures campaign demonstrated that 
home child care workers, despite lacking a common worksite or history of collection 
action, could come together to make demands on the state and win progressive policy 
reforms.  
 
Eventually these campaigns blossomed into a union drive, drawing on the experiences of 
home care worker unionism. Receiving public dollars, home child providers came to 
contest their exclusion from labour and employment protections and make claims on the 
state as public employees. The UFT’s brand of “educational unionism” shaped the 
campaign as home child care providers asserted their place in the city’s public education 
system as the “first teachers” many low-income children come into contact with.  
 
Partly thanks to shifting political winds, but also to a massive organizing drive and 
sustained political pressure, home-based providers convinced policymakers that 
investment in child care was necessary to improve the quality of child care jobs and the 
quality of care poor children received, linking child care quality with improved working 
conditions in the sector.  Through unionization, home child care providers were able to 
secure higher wages, health insurance, funds for educational materials, and money for 
training and professional development.  
 
From a relatively isolated and invisible workforce, New York City’s home child care 
providers emerged as a political force capable of winning demands. While they may not 
have built the social democratic model of child care envisioned by the daycare movement 
of decades past, home child care providers stemmed the tide of privatization, 
deregulation, and retrenchment that characterized Giuliani-era child care policies, and 
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made successful claims on the state for increased collective responsibility for social 
reproduction.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
CHILD CARE AGAINST THE NEOLIBERAL CITY 
 
 
In the 1990s, New York City’s workfare regime was one of the most punitive in the 
United States. Against the backdrop of federal welfare reform, thousands of the city’s 
poor single mothers were pushed off the welfare rolls and into workfare jobs and the 
lower reaches of the labour market. As this study has illustrated, the question of who 
would care for these women’s children—that is, how would the socially necessary work 
of child care be organized in the wake of welfare reform—was fundamentally a political 
one. The answer would become the subject of a fifteen year struggle between the local 
state, on one side, and child care advocates, welfare rights organizations, legal aid 
lawyers, low-income community groups, unions, activist mothers, and home child care 
workers, on the other.  
 
How the city answered this question was of great consequence in the local and national 
politics of welfare reform. In the years leading up to President Clinton’s 1996 welfare 
reform act, designed to “end welfare as we know it”, welfare’s critics and defenders had 
turned their eyes to New York. The Giuliani administration had begun rolling out 
welfare-to-work for poor single mothers a year prior to the passage of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, pioneering the placement of 
welfare recipients in public sector workfare jobs. Furthermore, the city’s welfare caseload 
was bigger than that of every state in the nation but California. And in the racial 
composition of the city’s welfare rolls, New York City amplified racist anxieties about 
race, gender, families, poverty, and dependency. Finally, the city had been the symbolic 
home of the national welfare rights movement and remained a hub of anti-poverty 
activism, with social service agencies, community organizations, and welfare rights 
lawyers working to advance poor peoples’ rights. For these reasons, in the politics of 
welfare reform, there was no battleground more important than New York City.   
 
In New York City, the question of who would care for the children was not a new one. 
The location of care work, the conditions of those who provide it, and the value accorded 
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this work—i.e. the social organization of care—was the subject of a long history of 
political and social struggle in the city. The federal welfare reform act of 1996 abrogated 
the right of poor mothers to care for their own children, a right that was fought for and 
won by poor women of colour in the 1960s. As the epicentre of the welfare rights 
movement, thousands of poor African-American and Hispanic New Yorkers, primarily 
women, had mobilized to demand state support for the work of raising and caring for 
their children. The militancy of this movement meant that for a short time, from the late 
1960s to the mid-1970s, many of the city’s poor single mothers could stay home to care 
for their children and live at levels not worse than low-wage workers. 
 
The question had also been answered in the 1930s, when workers and the poor took to the 
city’s streets en masse during the Great Depression. As part of the New Deal, New York 
City had established public day nurseries with federal government aid, creating jobs for 
unemployed teachers and providing care for children whose parents were out looking for 
work. When women entered the war industries in the late 1940s, the question was 
answered with the expansion of these New Deal daycares. When the State government 
attempted to shut down this nascent system of public child care at war’s end, working 
class women, socialists, and communists resisted and the day nurseries stayed open. The 
City of New York became the first local government in the nation to fund municipal child 
care services.  
 
When child care services expanded in the 1960s, as the federal government responded to 
urban unrest by expanding the welfare state, the workers on whose labour the city’s 
public child care system rests formed a union and struck for three weeks. As part of a 
wave of public sector unionism, New York’s daycare workers would set the bar for 
wages and working conditions in the child care sector for years to come. And the 
feminists and child care advocates who entered the city’s bureaucracy in this turbulent 
decade worked in tandem with the day care workers’ union to push for innovations in 
child care, such as twenty-four hour-a-day care to accommodate the schedules of parents 
working non-standard hours.  
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In the early 1970s, the feminists, child care advocates, activist mothers, unions, and 
community organizations that made up New York City’s child care movement 
ambitiously pushed for a universal child care program; while public daycares proliferated 
at an extraordinary rate, their vision was ultimately never realized as the clouds of 
austerity gathered on the city’s political horizon. When New York’s fiscal crisis hit in 
1975, day care workers, child care advocates, and activist parents defended child care 
services against funding cuts. While austerity measures led to the erosion of standards in 
the city’s public daycares, what one politician called “the best legacy we have of the 
1960s” remained open, continuing to serve thousands of the city’s children. And in the 
1980s, when the Reagan administration cut aid to cities and orchestrated the privatization 
of urban services, New York held fast to its role in the delivery and regulation of child 
care, while most other cities marketized child care services through voucher schemes. 
 
So by the early 1990s, welfare rights campaigners, child care advocates, the day care 
workers’ union, and progressive policymakers had a readymade answer to the question of 
who would care for the children of poor single mothers pushed into workfare jobs and the 
low-wage labour market. That answer was the nation’s most comprehensive public 
center-based childcare system. A system that despite successive rounds of retrenchment 
and restructuring, remained a source of quality, affordable, regulated child care for the 
children of low-income families. A system staffed by a unionized workers—women who 
had helped build New York City’s child care “exceptionalism”, making the city an urban 
outlier in a national welfare state in which childcare services are underfunded, limited, 
and means-tested, and childcare workers underpaid and exploited.   
 
But that system was not the answer the Giuliani administration chose to give. Since the 
fiscal crisis of 1975, New York City had experimented with new ways to get public 
service work done cheaply: contracting out services to the private sector; encouraging 
volunteering; pushing welfare recipients into public sector jobs previously occupied by 
unionized municipal workers; and shifting services, through cuts to social programs, to 
unpaid work in families/households and communities. These initiatives had gendered and 
racialized impacts. For women of colour, the public sector had been one of the few 
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sources of decent work in a labour market rife with racial discrimination and sexism. And 
when social services were cut, it was the women in poor and working class communities 
who took up the social reproductive slack. Yet for the city’s neoliberal think tanks, 
corporate elites, and conservative politicians, the continued existence of a public centre-
based child care system staffed by a unionized workforce was evidence that these efforts 
had not gone far enough. Some conservative cheerleaders put the case for public sector 
restructuring in the most dramatic of terms, as if New York City’s very existence 
depended on the fulfilment of the neoliberal counterrevolution begun in 1975. As Newt 
Gingrich said of New York in 1992, its “bankrupt welfare statism” and “rapacious 
unionism” was “contributing to the slow-motion suicide of the once world’s greatest city” 
(Gingrich 1992).  
 
So in response to the escalation of the city’s already existing child care crisis, the Giuliani 
administration channelled welfare mothers into relying on an expanding pool of home-
based child care providers for the care of their children. Non-union, unorganized, isolated 
and doing public care work in private homes at a fraction of the cost of centre-based care, 
home-based child care workers could provide a much-needed social service “on the 
cheap”. In a country in which various forms of state coercion has traditionally tracked 
poor, racialized, and immigrant women into the work of care, and in which home care 
workers—domestic workers, home health care aides, and home child care workers—were 
excluded from basic labour protections, including the right to organize and collectively 
bargain, the gendered and racialized home child care workforce was the Giuliani 
administration’s solution to the child care crisis.  
 
That welfare mothers did not necessarily prefer home child care was no obstacle to the 
administration’s privatized remedies aimed at mediating the crisis. As detailed in Chapter 
Three, despite a welfare recipient’s right to choose amongst a variety of child care 
options, including centre-based care, New York’s City’s welfare bureaucracy 
systematically violated this right and pushed welfare mothers—sometimes illegally, 
through the threat of sanction—to rely on informal child care providers and to a lesser 
extent, non-union family daycare.  
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The outline of this strategy was made clear in the years leading up to welfare reform. 
Upon taking office, Giuliani pursued an aggressive agenda of privatization, deregulation, 
and retrenchment. Few public services escaped the administration’s restructuring plans—
in social welfare alone, the city contracted out services to private providers in home 
health care, homeless shelters, and employment training. Voucher programs were 
introduced or expanded in a wide range of services, including public housing, education, 
employment, and homeless services. In childcare, Giuliani expanded a previously small 
voucher scheme, marketizing and deregulating child care services, while shutting down a 
number of unionized city-run daycare centres.  
 
As discussed in the opening of Chapter Three, this was just one initiative in a broader 
project of urban neoliberalization that targeted the institutional legacies of earlier rounds 
of social protest and social reform—the city’s social democratic welfare state—and 
sought to curtail the power of New York’s municipal unions. In addition to the direct 
restructuring of the public sector workforce, the Giuliani administration raised tuition in 
the municipal university system by one-third, slashed the homeless services budget, 
gutted anti-poverty programs and related community services, and even made a failed 
attempt to privatize the city’s public hospitals. 
 
While resistance to this privatization agenda was uneven, at the intersection of welfare 
reform and child care there was no doubt that progressive civil society actors rejected the 
neoliberal logic of “child care on the cheap”. The city’s policies at the intersection of 
welfare and child care were fiercely contested. Through a variety of resistance strategies, 
child care advocates, welfare rights groups, community organizations, activist mothers, 
and labour unions pushed the state to socialize more of the costs of and responsibilities 
for child care. They aimed for a mediation of the child care crisis on terms more 
favourable to welfare mothers and the home child care workers who cared for their 
children. And in many ways, it was the contradictions unleashed by the Giuliani 
administration’s strategies, policies, and practices, which provided the political space for 
progressive forces to mobilize and win victories.  
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While early attempts to demand changes to the city’s welfare and child care policies were 
well intentioned—such as WEP Workers Together’s “guerrilla daycare centre”—it was 
not until child care advocates and welfare rights activists began to fight the city on its 
own terms that campaigners saw results. Child care advocates in particular employed the 
discourse of “choice” to demand that the city’s welfare bureaucracy adhere to state and 
federal laws designed to protect welfare recipients’ child care rights. As Kershaw (2004: 
928) has argued, ‘choice’ discourse “facilitates the articulation of neoliberal principles 
within a rhetorical framework that conveys a sense of political neutrality and 
individualizes responsibility for social inequalities.” In their organizing around “choice”, 
child care advocates revealed that this discourse was not in fact politically neutral, but 
grounded in a neoliberal strategy to individualize responsibility for child care and offload 
its costs to low-income communities.   
 
As welfare rights activists and child care advocates got word of the systemic violations of 
welfare recipients’ child care rights, they mobilized to ensure poor mothers had real 
choice in child care. Child care advocates successfully pressured the city into giving them 
access to welfare offices to provide poor mothers with child care information and 
advice—something the city’s welfare caseworkers had failed to do. The evidence 
suggests that their presence in these Job Centres curtailed caseworkers’ use and abuse of 
child care related sanctions. Furthermore, child care advocates conducted studies which 
showed that given a range of child care options, many welfare mothers preferred 
regulated, centre-based care for their children, proving that poor mothers neither had the 
opportunity or the privilege of freely choosing child care arrangements. Welfare rights 
activists and child care advocates publicly insisted that welfare recipients deserved access 
to developmentally appropriate, high quality child care for their children. As a result of 
their efforts, fewer and fewer of the city’s welfare mothers relied on informal child care 
arrangements.  
 
Welfare reform was also accompanied by federal welfare-to-work grants designed to 
fund workfare schemes that churned poor women into the lower reaches of the labour 
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market, often with minimal education, training, or skills development. Traditionally, such 
initiatives pushed welfare mothers into low-wage care work, such as domestic service 
and home health care work. Yet, subversively, child care advocates and labour movement 
activists used these grants to develop a new form of child care, which provided quality 
care and quality care work for poor women of colour. Through the Satellite Child Care 
program, they trained women on welfare as child care workers, subsidized their 
education, and set them up as family daycare providers. Furthermore, these providers 
were unionized and covered by a collective agreement, mitigating the precariousness that 
characterized home-based care work. While this model ran up against the neoliberal logic 
of “child care on the cheap” and was starved of funding, it challenged the devaluation of 
women’s care work and offered an alternative, progressive model of welfare-to-work 
which addressed the needs of both home child care providers and families in need of 
child care.   
 
Finally, by channelling public dollars to the least-regulated, least-trained, and worst-paid 
sector of the child care industry—i.e. home child care—the Giuliani administration 
expanded the publicly subsidized home child care workforce. Many previously “private-
pay” providers now received state funds for the care of children of low-income families. 
These providers emerged as a quasi-public sector workforce performing the care work of 
a neoliberalizing welfare state. Their quasi-public status opened the legal and discursive 
space for home child care workers to collectively organize and make claims on the state 
as public employees who provided an essential social service and were deserving of better 
wages and working conditions. New York City’s home child care workers successfully 
challenged their employment status as independent contractors, collectively organized, 
and made claims on the state as public employees.  
 
This mobilization had its seeds in the work of community-based organizations like 
FUREE and ACORN in which poor women of colour—some home child care providers, 
others welfare moms—strategized around their common grievances with the city’s 
welfare and child care bureaucracies. They came to recognize their common cause in 
stable, affordable, quality child care, provided by women paid a living wage and with 
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decent benefits such as health insurance. From an isolated, invisible, and politically 
unorganized workforce, home child care providers emerged as a political force in the 
wake of welfare reform, demanding greater socialization of the costs of and 
responsibilities for child care, and more socially just solutions to New York City’s child 
care crisis.   
 
Together, these progressive civil society actors—child care advocates, activist mothers, 
welfare rights organizations, community groups, legal aid lawyers, and the home child 
care workers’ union—provided a different answer to the question of “who will care for 
the children?” In the tradition of the city’s welfare rights movement, child care 
movement, and day care workers’ union, home child care workers struggled to revalue 
their social reproductive labour, to demand recognition and respect, to be treated as child 
care professionals—children’s “first teachers” as the UFT put it—and to say to neoliberal 
administrations at New York’s City Hall, we refuse to be “a cheap” solution to a child 
care crisis of your own creation.  
 
The Contested Urban Welfare Regime: Towards a Feminist Political Economy 
 
By taking the “urban” as my scale of analysis, and particularly New York City’s urban 
welfare regime, I have attempted to fill a lacuna in FPE and feminist welfare state 
scholarship. As discussed in Chapter One, both literatures have relatively neglected cities 
and the urban as a scale of analysis. Just as importantly, this study acts as a corrective to 
critical approaches to urban neoliberalization, which often fail to address questions of 
social reproduction and the interrelationships among gender, race, and class as they are 
shaped by households, communities, markets, and states, and women’s activism. 
 
In endeavouring to fill some analytical gaps in two different fields of scholarship, this 
study has attempted to contribute to advancing a feminist political economy of the urban 
welfare regime. As I hope to have demonstrated, by employing the lens of social 
reproduction to explore processes of urban neoliberalization, and an urban lens to 
feminist political economy analyses of welfare state restructuring and resistance, we are 
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able to uncover social processes that are hidden when the national scale is assumed to be 
the privileged level of social policy action, contestation, and analysis.  
 
As this study suggests, under neoliberalism urban welfare regimes are central sites of 
contested state-driven efforts at mediating crisis tendencies in social reproduction. The 
rescaling and restructuring of welfare states has seen key aspects of social reproduction 
downloaded to subnational governments—including to cities—and offloaded via 
processes of privatization to families/households, to markets, and to the third sector. 
Urban governments have been under pressure to restructure from above, as new 
responsibilities for social and physical infrastructure are downloaded without the 
matching fiscal capacities to fund them.  
 
But as we see in the case of New York, cities can be willing and active participants in the 
neoliberalization of local government and urban space more broadly. Coalitions of urban 
elites, neoliberal think tanks, and right-wing politicians welcome the fiscal pressures 
imposed from above as it provides a rationale to impose austerity and curtail the size and 
scope of local government. In the name of creating a “good business climate” these 
coalitions seek the destruction of the urban institutions of Fordist-Keynesianism and the 
idea of the “liberal city” in which all inhabitants are entitled to basic civil liberties, social 
services, and political rights (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 372).  
 
With precarious urban labour markets, cuts to urban services and limited state inputs into 
social reproduction, and punitive neoliberal policies such as workfare, the neoliberal city 
creates crisis tendencies in social reproduction for poor and working-class 
families/households. And while crisis tendencies can be seen in a host of social 
processes, as illustrated by this study they take sharp expression in a crisis of care. 
However, while the state’s role is crucial in limiting crisis tendencies in social 
reproduction, state-driven efforts aimed at mediation are not produced in a political 
vacuum; they are shaped by politics, ideology, and the orientation of particular 
governments. Depending on the balance of social forces in a given social formation, 
social movements may mobilize around alternative political projects designed to mediate 
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crisis tendencies and secure a viable process of social reproduction on very different 
grounds than the state. As contestation over the child care crisis in New York City 
illustrates, state-driven efforts to mediate crisis tendencies are fundamentally political in 
nature, and may be partial, inadequate, and even paradoxical, giving rise to contradictions 
and opening space for resistance. 
 
As I have argued, understanding how these processes play out in specific urban welfare 
regimes—i.e. how they are contextually embedded—requires attention to “actually 
existing” urban neoliberalism. As neoliberalism develops in constant tension with 
inherited institutional legacies and existing social-political constellations of power in 
particular locales, “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore 2002) is 
necessarily path-dependent, uneven and variegated across different locales (Brenner, 
Peck, and Theodore 2010). This is why I have emphasized the historical and place-
specific context of neoliberal restructuring in New York. The city’s unique political-
economic landscape reflects the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy 
regimes, regulatory practices, and political and social struggles. Likewise, the resistance 
the Giuliani administration’s project of privatization engendered reflected certain place-
specific legacies of resistance.  
 
Looking Beyond New York: Struggles Over Social Reproduction in the US Welfare State 
 
What might the New York case tell us about the possibility of a more equitable 
distribution of the costs and responsibilities of social reproduction across the state-
market-family/household nexus? The UFT Providers union is only one political actor 
demanding greater state investment in social reproduction and better wages and working 
conditions for care workers. It is yet to been seen whether the union will work with other 
care worker movements—such as New York City’s Domestic Workers United and home 
health care unions such as SEIU—to demand a more caring city, in which good quality 
care is available for those who need it and decent wages and working conditions are 
guaranteed for those who provide it.  
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Beyond New York, the rise of home child care worker unionism in the United States is a 
promising development. In 1999, 74,000 Los Angeles home health care aides voted to 
unionize; this was the largest successful union drive since the sit-down strikes of the 
Great Depression (Boris and Klein 2008). Successful home health care organizing drives 
have followed in a number of states (see Boris and Klein 2012). As discussed in Chapter 
Four, in 2005, nearly 13,000 Illinois home child care providers voted to join the SEIU. 
This drive paved the way for the UFT’s success in New York and since 2007, home child 
care workers’ unions in a number of states have negotiated increases in reimbursement 
rates, additional opportunities and incentives for training, access to health insurance, 
improved payment procedures, and a voice for providers in shaping the policies that 
shape their working lives (Blank et al. 2014). 
 
Boris and Klein (2008 and 2012) have argued that home care worker organizing 
constitutes a new wave of union organizing driven primarily by poor women of colour 
and has the potential for reigniting the US labour movement. As they argue, “women’s 
labours—once outside the market or at the periphery of economic life—have now 
become the strategic sites for worker struggle and the direction and character of the 
American labor movement” (Boris and Klein 2012: 7). Home care workers are raising 
recognition of the value of care work and pushing for the expansion of the welfare state 
(Boris and Klein 2008: 41). 
 
There are other promising developments. Across the US, nannies, housekeepers, and 
elder care providers have come together under the banner of Domestic Workers United 
(DWU) to fight for dignity and justice (Boris 2012). These women number 200,000 in 
New York alone, and like home child care providers, they are predominantly immigrant 
women and US-born women of colour. Whereas their labours have been essential to 
easing the care crisis for middle- and upper-class New Yorkers, making it possible for 
“other women to go out to their jobs by cleaning houses, cooking dinner, bathing 
children, and aiding the aged” (Boris 2012: 100), domestic workers suffer from low 
wages and are excluded from labour rights and employment protections. However, after 
six years of organizing, in June 2010 New York State passed a Domestic Workers Bill of 
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Rights, becoming the first state to establish a framework for dignity and justice for paid 
household labor. New York’s domestic workers now have coverage under existing laws 
against sexual harassment and for temporary disability benefits, are eligible for 
unemployment insurance and overtime, and have established a set workweek with a day 
off for live-ins (Boris 2012). 
 
Beyond the particulars of care workers struggles, Abramovitz (2010: 46) has argued that 
in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis there appears to be a growing consensus among 
some sections of the ruling class around the need for the state “to restore its support for 
social reproduction in order to foster family well-being, profitable economic growth, and 
political stability. That is the state must mediate rather than continue to exacerbate the 
inherent conflict between economic production and social reproduction.” However, as 
Abramowitz (2010: 46) continues: 
 
If social movements remain weak, state intervention is more likely to promote profits over people. 
In contrast, the revitalization of mass movements has the potential to force business to 
compromise with these movements in ways that will redistribute income, power and other 
resources downward and otherwise mediate the tension between profitable production and 
sustained social reproduction. 
 
A close reading of US political history suggests that social unrest and political protest 
“from below” can push the state to underwrite more of the costs and responsibilities for 
social reproduction and improve the lives of working class people (see Piven and 
Cloward 1977). One lesson the social movements of today may have learned from the 
struggles of the 1930s and 1960s is that urban-based struggles waged by the poor and 
working class can necessitate the intervention of national states in social reproduction, 
pushing them to socialize more of the costs of and responsibilities for the daily and 
intergenerational maintenance of working people. As this study has shown, even in 
neoliberal times—in which processes of privatization, deregulation, and welfare state 
retrenchment appear hegemonic—marginal workers, low-income communities, and their 
allies have the capacity to shape urban welfare regimes from below. Given the growing 
crisis of care, the transformation of urban labour markets under neoliberalism, and rapid 
growth of low-wage service sector work, including care services, struggles to revalue 
social reproductive labour will be at the heart of any effort to build a more socially justice 
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city.  Whether these struggles will result in a new mediation of the tensions between 
social reproduction and capital accumulation—with a new national care bargain at its 
centre—is yet to be seen. 
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Interviews  
 
Interview 1. In-person Interview. New York City, June 17, 2009. 
 
Interview 2. In-person Interview. New York City, June 18, 2009. 
 
Interview 3. In-person Interview. New York City, June 18, 2009. 
 
Interview 4. In-person Interview. New York City, June 19, 2009. 
 
Interview 5. In-person Interview. New York City, July 13, 2009. 
 
Interview 6. In-person Interview. New York City, July 13, 2009. 
 
Interview 7. In-person Interview. New York City, July 17, 2009. 
 
Interview 8. In-person Interview. New York City, July 24, 2009. 
 
Interview 9. In-person Interview. New York City, July 24, 2009. 
 
Interview 10. In-person Interview. New York City, July 29, 2009. 
 
Interview 11. In-person Interview. New York City, August 3, 2009. 
 
Interview 12. In-person Interview. New York City, August 3, 2009. 
 
Interview 13. Phone Interview. September 17, 2009. 
 
Interview 14. In-person Interview. New York City, November 6, 2009. 
 
Interview 15. Phone Interview. November 9, 2009. 
 
Interview 16. Phone Interview. January 12, 2010. 
 
Interview 17. Phone Interview. January 19, 2010. 
 
Interview 18. Phone Interview. January 23, 2010. 
 
Interview 19. Phone Interview. March 24, 2010. 
 
Interview 20. Phone Interview. May 24, 2010. 
 
Interview 21. Phone Interview. March 9, 2011. 
 
Interview 22. In-person Interview. New York City, June 12, 2009. 
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Interview 23. In-person Interview. New York City, July 20, 2009. 
 
Interview 24. Phone Interview. August 25, 2009. 
 
Interview 25. Phone Interview. January 21, 2010. 
 
Interview 26. Phone Interview. December 5, 2010.  
 
Interview 27. Email interview. June 25, 2009.  
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APPENDIX A:  CHILD CARE IN NEW YORK CITY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 
 
Since 1996, New York City has had a three-eligibility-category, two-agency child care 
system. The Human Resource Administration and Administration for Children’s Services 
are separate agencies with distinct missions and operating systems.115 However, both 
agencies provide publicly subsidized child care benefits and services to New York’s low-
income families (CCI 2003: 2). State and federal child care resources are apportioned 
between the agencies at the local level.   
 
HRA and ACS Child Care 
 
HRA’s mission is to “provide temporary help to individuals and families with social 
service and economic needs to assist them in reaching self-sufficiency” (HRA 2012). 
HRA administers TANF for the City of New York, providing cash assistance and 
federally mandated child care to families participating in approved employment related 
activities. HRA also administers Transitional Child Care (TCC) for families moving from 
public assistance into employment. In accordance with federal and state law, TCC is 
guaranteed to all TANF recipients who participate in approved welfare to work activities 
and who have children up to the age of 13. However, TCC is guaranteed only if 
requested. Families who leave the welfare rolls due to income from employment become 
eligible for TCC for up to one year. After one year, their case is transferred to ACS as 
long as the family remains income eligible.  
 
TANF child care and TCC are structured as voucher reimbursement payments paid 
directly to child care providers (payments were previously made to families but this 
changed in 1997 to cut down on “fraud”). As per federal and state regulations, child care 
vouchers entitle a parent to enrol their child in any regulated or legally exempt (i.e. 
unregulated, informal) child care setting of their choosing. HRA Job Centers and welfare 
caseworkers are mandated to serve as families’ primary source of information about child 
                                                
115 Prior to 1996, ACS was known as the Agency for Child Development (ACD) and 
subsumed under HRA. 
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care options and availability. Federal and state regulations also call for comprehensive 
consumer education regarding child care options. Welfare caseworkers are to review the 
different types of child care available and must provide parents with the names of at least 
two regulated providers (CCI 2003).  
 
ACS manages New York City’s child care services for non-TANF families i.e. working 
families meeting income eligibility requirements and who are not TCC eligible.  Duration 
of an ACS subsidy is until a child ages out (at 13 yrs. of age) or until a family earns more 
than the allowable annual income. Access to ACS subsidies is not guaranteed in law and 
only a small portion of eligible families receive subsidy (CCI 2003). Maximum eligibility 
levels (determined by annual income as a percentage of the federal poverty line) and 
parent co-payments are subject to change. Unlike for TANF families, there is no federal 
mandate that low-income working families be served.  
 
Number of Children Served and Settings 
 
At the time of welfare reform, there were approximately 425 municipally-contracted day 
care centres in New York City i.e. non-profit providers with a contract for service 
arrangement with the city. Outside of the city’s subsidized centre-based system, there are 
thousands of home-based child care providers who provide care to state-subsidized and 
private pay children. Out of the providers who care for state-subsidized children, 
approximately 20,000 are informal—often referred to as ‘kith-and-kin’ or ‘family, friend 
and neighbour care’—and 8,000 regulated family day cares providers, many of whom are 
connected to home daycare networks or agencies that have a vendor services contract 
with the city.    
 
In 1995, the number of children ages 0-13 in publicly supported early childhood care and 
education in New York City was 169,435 (CCI 1996). 42,806 children were enrolled in 
ACD/ACS city-contracted daycares. 3,127 children accessed regulated daycare via 
ACD/ACS vouchers while another 204 children received informal care paid for by 
ACD/ACS. 3,428 children of AFDC families were in regulated care settings while 17,206 
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children were in informal care paid for by HRA. 16,636 children were enrolled in the 
city’s federally funded Head Start programs (2-3 hours per day) and approximately 
100,000 children were enrolled in Board of Education programs including kindergarten, 
pre-kindergarten, and special education programs. Around 1,400 children were cared for 
in the City University of New York’s day care system (CCI 1996).  
 
In New York City, it is typical for a low-income family to patch together various forms 
of care to meet their needs. For example, depending on their age, children from low-
income families may be enrolled in Head Start or pre-kindergarten programs for half the 
day and find secondary care in a centre, family daycare or an informal setting for the 
remainder (see Chaudry 2004).  
 
New York City’s Child Care Workforce 
 
There are approximately 6,000 child care workers employed at city-contracted daycare 
centres (95 percent of whom are women) and 28,000 home child care providers (99 
percent of whom are women). Centre-based workers have varying levels of education and 
qualifications, from directors who must hold Master ’s degrees in Early Childhood 
Education to teacher’s aides who must at a minimum have a high school diploma. Local 
205 of District Council 1707 AFSCME represents centre-based workers. The Council of 
Supervisor and Administrators (CSA) Local 1 represents the centres’ 200 supervisors and 
assistant supervisors. 
 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the annual mean wage for a “child care 
worker” in New York City (excluding the category of “self-employed”) is $25,890. The 
annual salary for a teacher in an ACS contract centre is around $40,000 whereas a 
teacher’s aide earns $23,156. The average annual salary for a unionized centre-based 
daycare worker is around $30,000.  
 
Home-based child care providers have significantly lower earnings. In 2002, the average 
annual earnings of “self-employed” child care providers (which includes family child 
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care providers) nationally, including for part-time work, ranged from a low of $6,209 in 
New Mexico to a high of $16,367 in Washington (NWLC 2007: 5). According to the 
American Federation of Teachers, in 2008 the average annual earnings for family daycare 
provider in New York City was around $19,600.  
 
Race, Gender and Remuneration: Understanding the Market Rate System 
 
The ‘market rate’ is the maximum level of payment that New York State will reimburse a 
provider for the care of a publicly subsidized child. The income of a home-based provider 
is greatly dependent on the level at which the market-rate is set and where the provider 
lives. The market rate system perpetuates class and raced-based inequalities in the child 
care market and gendered ideologies that devalue women’s care work (Smith 2007).   
 
Under the CCDBG, New York State is federally mandated to set the market rate based on 
a survey of providers across the state every two years. New York State divides its survey 
into five geographic regions with New York City constituting one region. Federal 
guidelines recommend that states set the market rate at the seventy-fifth percentile of 
market rates i.e. the rate at or below at least seventy-five percent of providers in a 
category charge their clients. A family with subsidy should be able to purchase child care 
services from seventy-five percent of programs in their region. Thus, in New York City, 
the market rate represents the seventy-fifth percentile of rates charged to parents by 
private programs across the city’s five boroughs. This system is designed to fulfill the 
guarantees of ‘parental choice’ and ‘equal access’ (OCFS 2013). While the New York 
State sets the rate, New York City is responsible for administering payments. 
 
Rates vary by age group and type of care. The state pays lower rates to home-based 
providers than they pay to centres that provide similar care. Infants in centre-based care 
constitute the highest rate, and school-age children (6-12) in informal care the lowest. 
The market rates for centre, group family, family and license-exempt care decline in that 
order (CCI 2008). Between 1998 and 2008, the New York City market rate for an infant 
in family daycare was close to one-third of the rate for an infant in a centre. The market 
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rate for a toddler in family daycare was around close to one half the rate for a toddler in a 
centre. In this system, care in a home setting is systemically deemed to be of less value 
than care outside of the home. This reinforces a gendered ideology that on the public-
private continuum deems women’s care work most removed from the public sphere to 
have the least economic value and receive the least economic reward (Tuominen 2003: 
177). 
 
Rates also vary by region. Home-based providers located in higher income regions—
where the market can bear higher rates—are subsequently compensated at a higher rate 
for a publicly subsidized child of the same age in the same care setting than a provider in 
a lower income region (Smith 2007). For instance, in New York State the weekly market 
rate for a child in registered family daycare or informal care in the richest geographic 
cluster of counties (Nassau, Putnam, Rockland, Suffolk, and Westchester) can be as much 
as double the rate for a child in the poorest cluster of counties (New York City).116 For 
example, a registered family child care provider caring for a state-subsidized infant in 
New York City is paid $160 per week compared to $275 paid to the same category of 
provider caring for a child of the same age in the wealthy county of Westchester.  
 
In many low-income communities, the government is the primary or only purchaser of 
child care. As Smith (2007: 337) observes, with limited market competition in such areas, 
market rates can be artificially low and significantly lower than rates charged by 
providers who do not care for subsidized children. And while a provider in a low-income 
community can charge more than the market rate, it is highly unlikely that the families 
they serve will be able to pay more than their subsidy allows. 
 
As Smith (2007: 336) argues, the market rate “reflects harmful gender-based assumptions 
about the value of work performed primarily by women”. While the state sees labour 
market dynamics as a fair basis for establishing wages, historical occupational sex 
                                                
116 Author’s calculations. See pages 15 to 23 of the New York State Office of Children 
and Family Services Local Commissioners Memorandum regarding Child Care Market 
Rates 2011-2013. Accessed at http//:www.ocfs.state.ny.us/.../11-OCFS-LCM-
12%20Child%20Care%20Market%20Rates%202011-2013.pdf 
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segregation and gender discrimination taint the market’s wage-setting process. Child 
care, which is associated with women’s unpaid work in the home, “suffers from a 
perception that caring for children, while socially important, is unskilled emotional work 
of only marginal economic value” (Smith 2007: 337).  
 
This gendered dynamic overlaps with the geography of rate setting and the racialization 
of the home-based child care workforce. Most urban regions in the US are socio-spatially 
polarized, with low-income groups, disproportionately people of colour, concentrated in 
particular areas of a city. Racialized providers are more likely to care for subsidized 
children than white providers, and thus a greater percentage of their earnings come from 
the state (Smith 2007: 339). Providers in higher-income communities are less likely to 
accept subsidized children with non-subsidized children aplenty; whereas providers in 
low-income communities are not likely to turn away subsidized children given their own 
economic need and the fact that most children needing care in their community are 
subsidized. Poor women of colour caring for poor children of colour are thus 
systematically disadvantaged by the market rate system. 
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APPENDIX B: LOW-INCOME FAMILIES, CHILD CARE CHOICE, AND SUBSIDY 
USE IN THE US: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
There is a growing body of research that aims to unpack parental preferences and 
decision factors in child care (see Chaudry and Henly 2011; Chaudry, Sandstrom, and 
Giesen 2012). This brief review of the literature on low-income families, child care 
choice, and subsidy use attempts to address two questions: Why do low-income families 
make the child care choices they do? And second, what accounts for low child care 
subsidy take-up rates?  
 
The child care market in the US is extremely complex because of its interaction with non-
markets such as household provision on the one hand and government provided pre-
school on the other (Folbre 2006). As Warner and Gradus (2011: 570) note, low barriers 
to market entry and substitutability among types of care create a diverse array of choices 
with centre, family and informal child care providers.  
 
It is widely acknowledged that welfare reform has driven huge growth in publicly 
subsidized home-based child care in the U.S., particularly license-exempt care, 
alternatively known as informal care, family, friend and neighbour care, or kith and kin 
care (see Adams and Rohacek 2002; Smith 2007; Reese 2011). Many states have 
increasingly come to rely on license-exempt providers that are paid through state and 
federal subsidy dollars to care for the children of low-income families (Whitebook 2000). 
And whereas children in higher-income families are more likely to be placed in centre-
based arrangements, low-income children are more likely than children from higher-
income families to be in the care of kith and kin (Adams and Capizzano 2004) and in 
family daycare (Tuominen 2003). Chaudry (2004) and Hildebrandt and Stevens (2009) 
also found that women who are poor are also more likely to use home-based child care, 
which is not well regulated and can be of lower quality.   
 
The rise in publicly funded child care vouchers is understood as part of a government 
response to promote parental labour force participation (Warner and Gradus 2011). By 
 
 
259 
using market competition to provide publicly subsidized child care, vouchers are said to 
enhance parental voice and choice (see Warner and Gradus 2011: 570). As vouchers give 
parents the freedom to choose the provider, the expansion of publicly subsidized home-
based child care in the U.S. is thought to reflect parental preference (see MDRC 2003). 
However, individualizing preference fails to take into account how the child care 
decisions of low-income families are shaped by individual circumstances, community 
contexts, and broader socio-structural factors; what Chaudry and Henley (2011) call 
“contextual factors”. These factors facilitate or constrain parents’ child care choices 
(Chaudry and Henley 2011).  
 
In the wake of welfare reform, home child care was actively promoted by policymakers 
as a cost-effective way to rapidly expand the supply of child care services in low-income 
communities, while creating employment opportunities for poor women (Gillman et al. 
2001). According to Whitebook (2003), the growth in subsidized informal care in 
particular results from policy shifts reflecting a complex interplay of beliefs about 
parental choice, cost, family needs, and preferences (e.g., culturally and linguistically 
compatible care, and flexible non-traditional hours) and the limitations of the formal 
child care delivery system. Child care “choice” therefore takes place within structures 
that limit families’ child care options, especially those of low-income families. For 
example, parents’ incomes, work schedules, and the availability of various types of care, 
all impact child care “choices” (Chaudry 2004). Similarly, Chaudry and Henley (2011) 
cite convenience of location/transportation, cost of care, availability of relatives, positive 
relationship with caregivers, and hours of availability as key decision factors for low-
income families.  Contexts and constraints include availability and affordability, 
awareness of options (or information), and employment contexts/constraints including 
income, hours of work/scheduling, and transportation between home, child care and place 
of employment (Chaudry and Henley 2011; Chaudry et al. 2012). Furthermore, Chaudry 
(2004), Shlay et al. (2010), and Houser et al. (2014), have documented how low-income 
parents must also confront a complicated subsidy system, bureaucratic structures and 
administrative practices, which constrain and shape their child care choices.  
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In a review of the literature on the child care preferences of low-income families, Smith 
(2007) found that parents may prefer home child care for a host of reasons including: it 
resembles a family setting; relative to centre based care, parents view home child care as 
warm and nurturing; the family atmosphere may be thought to enhance opportunities for 
spontaneity; parents prefer to have their child in the care of one consistent caregiver 
versus multiple caregivers typical of a centre; and there is thought to be greater one-one-
on attention in home child care as the adult-child ratio is generally lower than in centres. 
Adding to these factors, Adams and Capizzano (2004) have found that a child’s age may 
impact child care preference with parents choosing preferring the intimate setting of 
home child care for infants.  A number of scholars, including Chaudry (2004) and Adams 
and Capizzano (2004) have also found that cultural considerations (such as language, 
food, and faith) may also influence a parent’s preference for home child care, as many 
home child care networks consist of providers of particular ethnic identity. Adams et al. 
(2008) found that preference for informal—i.e. family, friend and neighbour care—in 
particular may reflect the trust parents have in providers and their ability to meet cultural 
needs.  
 
However, these preferences must be understood within the context of multiple 
constraints. For women on welfare or transitioning into paid employment, home child 
care provides flexibility, convenience, and affordability compared to centre-based care, 
and is more readily adaptable to non-standard work hours (see Adams et al. 2008; 
Chaudry 2004). Furthermore, low-income mothers may lack access to transportation, 
which in turn limits their access to various child care settings; home child care is 
generally located in their own neighbourhoods, whereas there is a dearth of centre based 
care in poor communities. In addition, for parents whose subsidy does not cover the full 
cost of care and must co-pay, home child care is less expensive than centre based care 
(see Smith 2007 and Chaudry 2004).  
 
An ethnographic study of single parents with histories of welfare receipt in Cleveland, 
Milwaukee, and Philadelphia, found that informal care dominates blended child care 
arrangements or is often used exclusively by low-income parents (MDRC 2003). The 
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study found that while informal care typically plays a central role in these families’ 
patchworks of care, it met some families’ needs very well but represented “inadequate or 
unsafe arrangements of last resort for many others” (MDRC 2003: 1). The study 
concluded that real choice in child care choice could only be realized in a context of 
significant investment high-quality, flexible, and reliable child care and by 
operationalizing the goal of making child well-being a central mission of the welfare 
system, through changes in service delivery (see MDRC 2003). 
 
Research on the child care choices of low-income families in other liberal welfare 
regimes echoes many of these conclusions. Baker and Tippin’s (1999) four-country 
(Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) study of low-income mothers 
and employability policies found that family, friends and neighbours disproportionately 
care for the children of low-income mothers because such arrangements respond to needs 
for flexibility and affordability. The lack of supply of centre based care operating outside 
of non-standard work hours, or accepting children on only a part-time basis, shaped low-
income mothers’ choices (Baker and Tippin 1999). 
 
Explaining low child care subsidy take-up rates 
 
In the US, many low-income families do not have access to subsidies despite being 
eligible (Adams and Rohacek). Studies have found two dynamics at play which explain 
why low subsidy take up rates: First, in the wake of welfare reform, overall levels of 
federal funding have never been enough to meet the need and demand for subsidized 
child care (see Adams and Rohacek 2002). This has led to policies in which states and 
localities formally or informally “ration” child care subsidies and prioritize families 
currently in receipt of welfare or transitioning from welfare into paid employment. The 
latter are thus more likely to gain access to subsidies than families with no recent history 
of welfare receipt. These policies prioritize poor mothers on—or who have been on—
welfare over equally poor mothers who have not (Adams and Rohacek 2002: 1). Formal 
efforts to ration subsidies take the form of policies in which states set eligibility 
requirements below federal levels (ibid.: 5). “Informal” policies take the form of states 
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and localities limiting outreach to eligible families. As a result, many eligible families are 
not aware that subsidies are available (ibid.).  
 
Research also shows that bureaucratic impediments and administrative practices faced by 
low-income families effectively limits their access to subsidies and may therefore be a 
cause of their over reliance of unregulated informal child care (Shlay et al. 2010). Shlay 
et al. (2010) found that factors getting in the way of acquiring and maintaining a subsidy 
include: rude or insensitive caseworker interactions; inaccessibility of the caseworker’s 
office; the necessity of interactions with multiple agencies; required in-person and 
multiple in-person agency visits; excessive paperwork; requirements to recertify 
eligibility after a period of time or a change in employment; and different application 
procedures for TANF and non-TANF child care subsidies. Overall, Shlay et al. (2010: 
1712) found that for low-income families “the subsidy experiential process can be seen as 
an amalgam of hassles.” Furthermore, studies have found that welfare caseworkers do not 
necessarily inform clients that they are eligible for subsidized child care and lack of 
information thus operates as an important barrier to subsidy access (see Meyers et al. 
1999; Schumacher and Greenberg 1999; Adams et al. 2002; Shlay et al., 2004).  
 
Houser et al. (2014) found that welfare caseworkers’ interpretations of the goals and 
priorities of TANF have substantial influence over the availability and use of child care 
subsidies. Evidence suggests that caseworkers “use TANF benefits in a variety of ways, 
including to secure clients’ attention and compliance by the threat of cash and other 
benefit withdrawals and to cushion the effects of transitioning from welfare receipt to 
paid employment” (Houser et al. 2014: 3). Furthermore, these factors can vary across 
states and within states, across counties. Adams et al. (2006) find substantial differences 
across states and locales in key areas including: who determines eligibility for child care 
assistance; the amount of paperwork and number of interviews needed to secure benefits; 
the degree to which assistance is available in locating suitable care providers; the 
duration of initial eligibility periods; processes for recertification of eligibility; and 
communication of eligibility for transitional benefits.  
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Houser et al. (2014) conclude that pressures to produce client outcomes, increase work 
participation rates, and decrease caseload size, turn child care subsidies from one work 
support among many into a disciplinary tool. Child care subsidies are used to “motivate 
behaviors that may hold no intrinsic value for clients but are essential to documenting 
work participation” and are employed “in overtly disciplinary ways, at times withdrawing 
them in a first instance of non-compliance, even if the non-compliant behavior has no 
direct bearing on actual work performance.”  
 
As this brief literature review illustrates, “choice” and “preference” in child care are 
indeed shaped by contexts, constraints, and structures that are often beyond low-income 
parents’ control. Constraints are related to available supply of early care and education 
programs and providers, information and parental awareness of child care options, the 
accessibility and affordability of care, and access to child care subsidies. For these 
reasons, a reading of the over reliance by low-income single mothers on home child care, 
and on informal care in particular, as reflecting their “choices” and “preferences” is 
extremely problematic. As Chaudry and Henley (2011) note, it is hard to change the child 
care choices of low-income families without changing child care constraints and 
expanding early childhood resources to increase the availability of quality affordable 
child care options in low-income communities.  
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APPENDIX C: FEDERAL WELFARE AND CHILD CARE POLICY: A TIMELINE 
 
 
1908-35 Widows’/Mothers’ Pensions introduced (State programs, variously 
implemented) 
 
1935 Social Security Act passed creating Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) 
(Title IV of the 1935 Social Security Act; federal/state partnership) 
 
1939  Amendment to the SSA creates survivors’ (i.e. widows) insurance  
 
1962  ADC becomes Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)  
 
1964 Johnson Administration’s Great Society announced. Economic 
Opportunity Act passed. 
 
1965  Social Security Act of 1965. Medicare and Medicaid introduced. 
 
1967  Work Incentive Program (WIN) created. For the first time states are 
required to establish employment and training programs for welfare 
recipients 
 
1969   Family Assistance Plan defeated 
 
1973  Real value of AFDC payments begins decades long decline 
 
1974   Supplemental Social Security created  
 
1975  Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) introduced. EITC is a refundable tax 
credit for working individuals and families designed to incentivize 
employment by offsetting federal, state, city and payroll taxes and by 
providing income support specifically to working people. 
 
1981   Regan Administration’s Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
 
1988 Family Support Act (FSA) passed. FSA moves toward mandatory work 
program with various supports for working mothers. FSA creates Job 
Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) Training Programs and were to 
provide education and training service and at least two of four additional 
activities—job search, on-the-job training, work supplementation, and 
community work experience. If services (including child care) could be 
made available to them, all AFDC recipients who were not specifically 
exempted were obliged to participate in welfare-to-work activities or face 
financial sanctions.  
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1993  EITC expanded. The biggest expansion of the program since its 
introduction in 1975. 
 
1994   New York State enacts a state-level EITC 
 
1996  Person Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
